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Abstract
This thesis contains three chapters that fall under the broad banner of development economics,
with a particular focus on the study of mechanisms and strategies that improve public goods
delivery.
The first chapter studies the role of financial incentives as signals of job attributes when
these are unknown to potential applicants. I create experimental variation in expected earn-
ings and use it to estimate the effect of financial incentives on candidates’ perception of a
newly created health worker position in Uganda and, through this, on the size and compo-
sition of the applicant pool. I find that more lucrative positions are perceived as entailing a
lower positive externality for the community, and discourage agents with strong prosocial pref-
erences from applying. While higher financial incentives attract more applicants and increase
the probability of filling a vacancy, they hamper retention and performance. This is because
the signal they convey reduces the ability to recruit the most socially motivated agents, who
are found to stay longer on the job and to perform better.
The second chapter analyzes the role of social connections on the targeting choices of
delivery agents. During the expansion of an agriculture extension program in Uganda, we
randomly selected one delivery agent out of two eligible candidates per community. We
find that social connections matter: relative to farmers connected only to the non-selected
candidate, those connected only to the selected delivery agent benefit more from the program.
They are indeed more likely to receive advice, training and more likely to adopt improved
seeds, a new beneficial technology. We show that these results are consistent with delivery
agents (a) putting positive weight on the utility of farmers connected to them (altruism) and
(b) putting a negative weight on the utility of farmers connected to the rival candidate (spite).
This sheds light on the importance of both positive and negative social preferences in shaping
program delivery.
The third chapter studies the effect of movement restrictions on education. The evidence
is based on the construction of the West Bank Separation Barrier in 2003. The exposure of
an individual to the Barrier is determined both by her locality of residence and by whether
she was in school or about to start school when the Barrier was built. Using a difference-in-
differences approach, I find that movement restrictions increase the probability of dropping
out from elementary and preparatory school by 3.7 and 6 percentage points respectively,
i.e. a 50% increase relative to localities with no movement restrictions, while the proportion
of children who have never attended school increased by 3.6 percentage points. Among all
households, the poorest ones are the most affected, indicating that movement restrictions not
only deteriorate the average education level but also increase income inequality.
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Financial Incentives as Signals:
Experimental Evidence from the
Recruitment of Health Promoters
1 Introduction
Understanding how individuals respond to incentives is a central question in economics. In
standard economic theory, financial incentives affect agents’ behavior by increasing the mon-
etary payoff from accomplishing a task. Recent theory points out that, in the presence of
incomplete information about a job, financial incentives can also affect agents’ effort by con-
veying a signal about the characteristics of the job (Benabou and Tirole 2003; Sliwka 2007).
More lucrative positions may, for instance, be perceived as more difficult and less enjoyable, or
may signal distrust or exploitative intentions on the part of the principal. This is analogous to
the well-known concept that increasing the price of a new product can change the way people
perceive this new product—e.g., its quality—and this signal can affect consumers’ decisions
(Milgrom and Roberts 1986).
In this paper, I test whether offering stronger financial incentives for a prosocial job
changes agents’ perceptions of the job and thereby their behavior in the labor market. To
this end, I create exogenous variation in expected total earnings for a brand-new position that
involves a social task, which entails positive social externalities, and a business task, which
entails purely private benefits. I find that higher expected total earnings—or, equivalently,
stronger financial incentives—signal the business-oriented nature of the job and decrease the
expected social output.1 This crucially affects the size and composition of the applicant pool.
On the one hand, financial incentives increase the aggregate number of applicants. On the
other hand, they discourage applications from agents with strong prosocial preferences, who
are found to stay longer on the job and to perform better.2
These results can be rationalized by the presence of incomplete information on the side
of the agents in my setting. For well-known positions and recruiters, financial incentives do
1Financial incentives are defined here as any type of monetary reward that induces agents to work harder,
i.e., higher wages, higher total earnings (see efficiency wage theory), higher performance reward.
2A large theoretical and empirical literature, both in economics and in psychology, suggests that prosocial
motivation aligns interests of workers with those of mission-driven organizations.
8
not convey a signal, i.e., they increase the monetary payoffs without distorting expectations
about the prosocial nature of the job. In this scenario, incentives attract workers who value
remuneration without displacing workers with strong prosocial preferences, leading to an
increase in the number of applicants. In contrast, if the position is unfamiliar, raising financial
incentives discourages prosocially motivated agents if these agents perceive more lucrative
positions as less “social.”3 In this scenario, the effect on the number of applicants becomes
ambiguous.
The field experiment was implemented during the expansion of BRAC’s health program
in rural villages of Uganda. The program consists in recruiting Community Health Promoters
(henceforth, CHPs) to provide their own community with basic health services. An important
aspect of the job is that BRAC, as many other NGOs, does not pay a stipend; rather, it allows
CHPs to sell household products (e.g., oil, salt, soap) at a margin. Unlike government health
workers, this implies that BRAC’s agents have two tasks: one that has a prosocial component,
i.e., the home-based health services, and one that has purely private benefits, i.e., the sale
of goods. This nonprofit entrepreneurial model of community delivery, which is increasingly
popular and has been evaluated by Bjorkman-Nykvist et al. (2014), is financially sustainable
and easy to implement.4
Because both BRAC and the CHP position are nonexistent in the villages prior to the
experiment, the job’s potential candidates are unable to know precisely ex ante the relative
importance of the social versus the business task, the social output of the job, the difficulty
of the two tasks, the intentions of the recruiter, etc. The setting is thus ideal for illustrating
whether financial incentives affect the perception of these job characteristics.
To test this, I create exogenous variation in whether the position is advertised as being
high, medium or low paying, while the actual incentives do not change. This design, which
follows a similar methodology as the one used in Ashraf et al. (2014b), is made feasible by the
significant variation in earnings among workers (they earn a profit margin for each product
they sell but receive no base payment). While information on earnings needs to be conveyed
to potential candidates before recruitment, BRAC does not know ex ante how much each
candidate would earn if hired and has flexibility on how to advertise the position.
Variation in expected total earnings from the CHP position is created by randomly reveal-
ing a different point of the true income distribution of existing health promoters: either the
3This can happen in a number of different scenarios. For instance, financial incentives may signal that
agents need to devote more time to profit-oriented activities. Moreover, a large literature shows that workers
tend to supply labor to the social sector at lower-than-market wages in return for the opportunity to provide
goods with positive social externalities (e.g., Weisbrod 1983; Preston 1989). As a consequence, weak financial
incentives may be perceived as associated to social-sector positions. All this is more formally described in a
simple theoretical framework that I develop in Appendix A to guide the empirical analysis.
4The products are bought by BRAC at the wholesale price, sold to the CHPs at a price that is higher than
the wholesale price but lower than the market price, and subsequently sold to the community at the market
price. Each sale yields a profit for the CHP and generates funds for BRAC that are used to cover the costs of
training and monitoring the CHPs.
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maximum, the average, or the minimum. Although the effect of the treatments on expected
earnings is theoretically ambiguous, I find that the higher the point of the revealed earnings
distribution, the higher the expected earnings. These treatments thus allow me to create
exogenous variation in perceived incentives.
The research design is composed of two separate experiments—the information and the
recruitment experiments—that both use the same exogenous variation as the one described
in the previous paragraph. The information experiment aims to test the signal channel of
financial incentives: 6,844 respondents, located in 231 rural communities in which BRAC
was expanding, were randomly assigned to the high-, medium- or low-pay recruitment strat-
egy, and then interviewed on their perception of monetary and non-monetary aspects of the
position.
Because asking questions about perceptions makes salient specific job aspects and in and
of itself influences expectations and behavior, the effect of financial incentives on the applicant
pool is analyzed in a separate experiment—the recruitment experiment—in which candidate’s
decision on whether to apply for the job is recorded without any questions on perceptions
having been asked prior to that decision. In 315 similar rural communities in which BRAC
was expanding, the position was randomly advertised either as high, medium, or low paying
(randomization at the community level) with the aim of recruiting a health promoter in
each community. The impact of financial incentives on the pool of applicants is assessed by
administering a survey to all potential candidates on their prosocial preferences and other
characteristics.5 The data are used to compare, across treatments, the types of potential
candidates who apply and, among the applicants, those who are appointed by BRAC. To
understand which worker trait predicts retention and performance, data on retention and on
the number of services provided by each recruited worker (i.e., the number of home visits,
the number of pre- and postnatal checks, the number of health products sold) are collected
monthly over a period of two years. A household survey is additionally administered to
measure the quality of these health services, i.e., the type of household targeted, the amount
of information provided during the home visits.
The results indicate that increasing (expected) financial incentives signals the business-
oriented nature of the job and decreases the expected social output. Agents in the high-pay
treatment are 17 percent more likely than those in the low-pay one to perceive the job as a
private-goal job, which health promoters do to earn money, rather than as a social-goal job,
which they do to improve health in the community. They also perceive the job as one in
which a larger proportion of time is spent on the business task rather than providing health
services. Other expectations—e.g., the number of hours of work, the difficulty of the tasks,
the candidates’ own abilities—are unaffected.
5BRAC recruits health promoters within BRAC microfinance groups. Within each community, the pool of
potential candidates thus consists of all microfinance members.
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The negative signal conveyed on social output affects the applicant pool. Stronger financial
incentives are indeed found to attract agents who are interested in the business component
(either because they like selling products or care about earning money) while discouraging
those who care mainly about the social component, i.e. agents who have volunteered in the
health sector in the past or who declare that helping the community is the most important job
characteristic. Importantly, this latter effect is explained both by a crowding-in of low social
motivation and a crowding-out of high social motivation. The probability that a candidate
who has never volunteered in the health sector applies is three times as high in the high-pay
treatment as in the low-pay one, while the likelihood that a candidate who has volunteered
in the health sector applies is 36 percent lower.6 Finally, the total number of applicants per
vacancy increases with financial incentives, indicating that the distribution of preferences in
the candidate pool gives more weight to agents crowded in than those crowded out. On the
extensive margin, the probability that at least one individual applies and that a position is
filled is found to increase with financial incentives.
Among the applicants of each village, BRAC selects one health promoter following guide-
lines that prioritize candidates who are educated and who value the job’s impact on the
community. While the results confirm that prosocial motivation is a key determinant of ap-
pointment, the selected 301 health promoters differ significantly in their prosocial attitudes
across treatments. When asked to donate a voluntary and private amount of money to a
public health NGO, the agents recruited in the high-pay treatment donate 55 percent less
than in the low-pay treatment. They are significantly more likely to donate no money at all
(crowding-in of low motivation) while less likely to donate large amounts (crowding-out of
high motivation). The workers are moreover 32 percent less likely to have volunteered in the
health sector. In summary, the signal conveyed by incentives affects not only the composition
of the applicant pool, but also the composition of the pool of recruited health promoters. This
is because the crowding-out of prosocially motivated agents reduces the likelihood of them
applying and, consequently, the chances of them being selected.7
In the course of two years, 27 percent of the health promoters dropped out. The proba-
bility that a worker quits is 14 and 8 percentage points higher in the high- and medium-pay
treatments respectively, than in the low-pay one. Although the magnitude of these results is
large, the direction is not surprising: for a given level of earnings, an agent is more likely to
drop out if recruited with higher expected earnings. This may happen mechanically, i.e., the
ex-ante participation constraint holds while the ex-post does not, or through a more complex
6Education level and income are balanced across treatments. One possible explanation is the presence of
low heterogeneity in both of these dimensions in the population studied. With more heterogeneity in ability,
increasing compensation may lead to a higher-ability pool of workers with better outside options (Guiteras
and Jack 2012; Dal Bo´ et al. 2013; Ashraf et al. 2014b).
7Different types of workers are appointed in the three treatments because the applicant pool changes, and
not because BRAC uses different recruitment criteria (more details on this in Section 5.2).
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negative reciprocity or reference-dependence story. Importantly, the observed difference in
retention is largely explained by changes in the composition of workers across treatments.
Controlling for agents’ prosociality, the treatment effects on retention shrink by 40 percent
and lose significance. Prosocially motivated agents are indeed less likely to be affected by
the negative surprise of earning less than expected: a one standard deviation increase in the
amount donated is associated with a 6.3 percentage points decrease in dropping out, while
having volunteered in the health sector reduces the dropout rate by 13 percentage points.
These results thus suggest that prosocial agents are more likely to be retained than non-
prosocial ones and, although this is true within each treatment, prosocial agents are more
frequently recruited when incentives are low.
If workers who stay in their post longer are also those who perform worse while on the
job, then the organization faces a clear trade-off on whom to recruit. I do not find such a
trade-off in my setting: prosociality not only predicts retention, it also predicts aggregate
performance in the first year of work as measured with the number of household visited,
the number of pre- and postnatal checks provided, sales profits, and BRAC performance
evaluations. Agents recruited in the low-pay treatment also more frequently target the most
vulnerable households—i.e., households with a pregnant woman or with young children, who
are more time-consuming to visit (these individuals need to be identified and the women need
to receive ante- and postnatal checks)—and do not convey worse information about health.
Taken together, these results indicate that the performance on the job of the prosocial workers
is not low enough to create a trade-off. If anything, the data suggest that their performance
on the job is higher both in terms of output “quantity” and “quality”: when I exclude from
the analysis workers who have dropped out at the time of the data collection, prosociality
continues positively predicting most of the performance measures.8
This paper contributes to three strands of the literature. First, it contributes to the
existing research on the role of financial incentives as signals, which has so far been mainly
theoretical (Benabou and Tirole 2003; Sliwka 2007; Godes and Mayzlin 2012). There also
exists a small laboratory literature that documents the role of incentives as a signal of the
egoistic and exploitative intentions of the principal (Carpenter and Dolifka 2013), of distrust
(Fehr and List 2004), of social norms (Danilov and Sliwka 2013) and of difficulty (Bremzen
et al. 2011).
Second, this paper is closely related to the literature on price signaling. In the absence
of complete information about a product, consumers may infer the product’s quality from its
price (Milgrom and Roberts 1986; Heffetz and Shayo 2009) and this may affect the number
and the types of consumers. Consistent with a low price signaling a low quality, Ashraf et al.
8The analysis eliminates 34 workers out of 301. Although this raises the empirical concern that I eliminate
from the analysis a selected sample of those initially appointed, the results provide suggestive evidence on
performance on the job by separating the effect from retention.
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(2013) show that reducing the price of a new (unknown) water-purification product in Zambia
reduces the demand for the product.
Finally, my results contribute to the emerging empirical literature on selection in the
social sector. Ashraf et al. (2014b) test whether promotion prospects and career advancement
change the applicant pool for a government health job in Zambia and how this affects workers’
performance. Dal Bo´ et al. (2013) study the selection effects of a higher fixed wage for a
position in the Mexican federal government.9 In line with my results, these two papers find
that stronger incentives (in the form of career advancement or higher wages respectively)
increase the number of applicants. In contrast with my results, they find, however, that
incentives do not discourage prosocial agents from applying and select agents who perform
better in Ashraf et al. (2014b). Financial incentives indeed should not play the role of a signal
for the positions analyzed in these two studies, i.e., salaried government positions that consist
of one type of task only and with a well-known recruiter. This is one possible explanation for
the presence of crowding-out in my context, and the absence in theirs.
By collecting rich data on all eligible candidates for a job, perceptions at the recruitment
stage, application decisions, and behaviors on the job, I complement this existing literature
by providing the first real-world evidence of the signaling effect of incentives on agents’ be-
havior. While the type and the intensity of the signal undoubtedly vary from one context
to another (depending on the characteristics of a job, the recruitment strategy and the goal
of the recruiter), this study indicates that we need to pay careful attention to the potential
signals conveyed by financial incentives, as these may strongly affect the behavior of workers.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 describes the context and research
design; Section 3 provides validation checks, Sections 4 and 5 discuss the role of incentives
as signals and their effect on selection. Sections 6 and 7 explore the effect of incentives on
retention and performance. Section 8 concludes.
2 Context and Research Design
2.1 The Community Health Promoter Position
In Uganda, as in many developing countries, rural populations are often isolated and lack
access to basic services and facilities, e.g., health facilities, schools, agriculture-extension ser-
vices. In this context, an increasingly popular approach to reach these populations is the
community-based approach: workers are recruited within their villages and are trained to
9In the private sector, Guiteras and Jack (2012) separately identify the effect of financial incentives on
worker selection and worker effort in the context of casual labor markets in Malawi. In a laboratory setting,
Banuri and Keefer (2013) and Dohmen and Falk (2011) document sorting and effort effects. Barfort et al. (2015)
show that higher public-sector counterfactual wages lead to a more dishonest and less public-sector-motivated
pool of candidates for public-service jobs in Denmark.
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serve their own community. Examples of these community-based positions abound: com-
munity health workers, community agriculture-extension workers, community microfinance
group leaders, etc.
An increasing number of these community-based programs follow an entrepreneurial model:
in addition to delivering a development program, agents sell products at a margin to the com-
munity and earn money from these sales. This model is financially sustainable and easy to
implement: the organization buys the products in large quantities at the wholesale price, and
distributes them to the delivery agents who subsequently sell them to the community at the
market price. While nonprofit organizations tend to choose products that are beneficial—e.g.,
community extension workers selling improved seeds or fertilizers, community health work-
ers selling health products—the margin on these products is not always enough to generate
a decent pay for the workers. Consequently, organizations often allow workers to sell more
popular household products—such as commodities and phone airtime, etc.—to increase their
pay. The job becomes one with two types of tasks: prosocial tasks, i.e., health services, and
tasks with purely private benefits.
In this paper, I focus on the Community Health Promoter (CHP) program implemented by
one of the largest existing NGOs, BRAC.10 BRAC operates in a total of 12 different countries
and in Bangladesh alone has more than 70 thousand health promoters. In Uganda, BRAC
is composed of 128 branches spread throughout the country and of more than 2500 health
promoters. The CHP program is built on top of BRAC’s microfinance program: CHPs are
recruited from microfinance groups following BRAC guidelines, which prioritize candidates
who are educated and who value the job’s impact on the community. Given that all BRAC
microfinance clients are women, CHPs are all women as well. Once appointed, CHPs receive
an initial two weeks of training and a monthly one-day refresher course covering healthcare-
related issues.
CHPs have multiple tasks. First, they visit households in their own village, educate
household members on health issues and provide ante- and postnatal checks. Second, they
sell health products (e.g., pain relievers, soap, oral rehydration salts) and other more popular
but less health-oriented products (salt, fortified oil).11 All these products are bought by
BRAC at the wholesale price, sold to the CHPs at a price that is higher than the wholesale
price but significantly lower than the market price, and subsequently sold to the community
more or less at the market price. Each sale yields a profit for the agent and generates funds
10As mentioned in BRAC’s Uganda Annual Report 2012: “The main objectives of the health program are
to lower morbidity and mortality among pregnant women and children under five from preventable diseases
(...). Parallel to this, an economic goal was integrated into the program to make CHPs economically viable.”
11In this experiment, CHPs do not sell antimalarials and bednets and are not allowed to give any injections.
Their role is thus less complete than that of a formal nurse. The list of products they sell includes iodized salt,
fortified cooking oil, soap, pain relievers, cold capsules, cough syrup, oral rehydration salts (ORS), deworming
Albendazole, eye drops, creams, disposable gloves, cotton.
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for BRAC that are used to cover the costs of training and monitoring the CHP.12
Monthly profits vary significantly from one CHP to another: the demand for each product
and the range of products BRAC sells to CHPs differ indeed from one area to another. A
survey carried out by BRAC throughout Uganda in 2012 (the “BRAC CHP survey”) indicates
that CHP monthly income ranges from as little as 7 to as much as 200 thousand UGX per
month, with an average of 30 thousand. As the average monthly income from the main
earning activity of the respondents in my sample equals 175 thousand UGX per month, the
CHP monthly remuneration varies from being below the average pay for some CHPs to being
above the average pay for others.
To limit shirking, CHPs are closely monitored by their supervisors, who visit them weekly.
Moreover, BRAC sets minimum monthly targets in terms of volume of products to sell and
numbers of households to visit.13 When a CHP does not reach the targets, her supervisor visits
and supervises her more frequently. If the performance does not improve and the CHP is not
showing interest, BRAC considers the CHP to be “inactive” and to have “dropped out” and
does not invite her to the refresher training anymore. As a result of the existing monitoring
system, active CHPs are less likely to shirk on the “quantity” of work provided than in areas
that are harder to monitor and have no targets, i.e., output “quality” (information content of
the home visits, type of household visited, etc.). The 2012 “ BRAC CHP survey” indicates
that the average active CHP dedicates fifteen hours of work per week to the position.
In a recent cluster-randomized controlled trial taking place in 10 districts of Uganda,
Bjorkman-Nykvist et al. (2014) evaluate the model of community health delivery implemented
by the NGOs BRAC and Living Goods and find that the program reduces the under-five
mortality rate by 27 percent. The authors observe a 54 percent increase in follow-up visits
for under-five children falling sick with malaria, ARI, or diarrhea and a 72 percent increase in
home visits in the first seven postnatal days. The main challenge of the program remains low
retention, i.e., health promoters quickly drop out after they receive training, and this leads
to a loss of critical time and skills (Bhattacharyya et al. 2001; Nkonki et al. 2011).
2.2 Experimental Variation
The empirical design is composed of two experiments. The first experiment, which I will refer
to as the information experiment, tests the signal channel of financial incentives by collecting
data on agents’ perception after the job is advertised as being more or less lucrative. Because
12The average profit margin across all products equals 20 percent for the health promoters (ranges from 0
to 47 percent depending on the product) and 16 percent for BRAC (ranges from 1 to 82 percent). This is
calculated using three prices: (a) the wholesale price, (b) the price at which CHPs buy the products from
BRAC, and (c) the price at which BRAC recommends CHPs sell the products to the community.
13The number of households CHPs are required to visit and health products they need to sell varies from
one branch to another, depending on the number and density of households in the villages. Details on these
targets and on the BRAC CHP program can be found in the “BRAC Health System Operations Manual 2012”
(available upon request).
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asking questions about perceptions makes salient specific job aspects and in and of itself
influences expectations and behavior, the effect of financial incentives on the applicant pool
is analyzed in a separate experiment—the recruitment experiment—in which a candidate’s
decision on whether to apply for the job is recorded without any questions on perceptions
having been asked prior to that decision. While these two experiments are implemented in a
different pool of similar villages (more details on the design are listed below), the exogenous
variation is identical.
This paper experimentally changes the way the job is advertised. While all respondents
were shown a leaflet describing the position and containing the same exact information on
the different tasks, on how CHPs acquire their knowledge, and on how they earn money,
they were given different information on CHP monthly earnings. The leaflets, displayed in
Figure I, revealed different points of the true earnings distribution of existing CHPs. The
“high-pay treatment” revealed the maximum of the earnings distribution (“CHPs earn up to
200 thousand UGX per month”), the “medium-pay treatment” revealed the mean (“CHPs
earn an average of 30 thousand UGX per month”) and the “low-pay treatment” revealed the
minimum (“CHPs earn at least 7 thousand UGX per month”).14
As I show in Section 3, the higher the point revealed in the earnings distribution, the higher
the expected compensation with no change in the expected income variability. While different
mechanisms may explain the results—e.g., individuals may update their beliefs differently or
the amount on the recruitment message may be a focal point (salience theory)—I am not able
to precisely disentangle these mechanisms and use the treatments as a tool to vary earnings
expectations and solve the potential endogeneity in expectations. Appendix B contains a
more detailed discussion of the potential mechanisms.
The experimental design relies on two key features. First, the CHP position is charac-
terized by a complex remuneration scheme that pays CHPs a profit margin for each product
they sell, and the profit margin varies from one product to the next. Neither BRAC nor the
potential candidates know how much each candidate would earn if recruited. Indeed, this
depends on a number of different things, including the demand for the health products in the
catchment area in which the individual works, which are hard to predict ex ante. Second,
at the recruitment stage, BRAC needs to convey some information on earnings to potential
candidates but, due to their limited attention, their limited education, and the complexity
of the incentive structure, avoids informing them about the multiple features of the job that
determine earnings, i.e., the full list of products CHPs sell, the respective profit margins, and
14The data come from the 2012 “BRAC CHP Survey,” in which a random sample of BRAC CHPs were
interviewed across Uganda and were asked how much profit they make from their CHP position in a typical
month. The enumerators in both the information and recruitment experiments were instructed to explain
each difficult word of the recruitment leaflets (i.e., the words “at least,” “average,” or “up to”). Although
respondents could have asked questions about points of the earnings distribution that were not revealed to
them, enumerators reported this did not happened.
16
the target BRAC imposes on these sales (which influences the time CHPs spend selling the
products). Instead, BRAC gives the candidates an idea of how much they could earn. In this
paper, I manipulate this by advertising the position as high paying, medium paying or low
paying (by revealing different points of the distribution).15
While the CHPs’ tasks are described in details to potential candidates at the recruitment
stage, along with information on training and expected earnings, a number of other aspects
of the job are either too hard or simply impossible to explain, and this leads to incomplete
information on the agent side. How difficult each task is, the amount of time an agent
needs to spend on each task to reach the target, the social impact the agent will have on
the community are all aspects of the job that can vary from one worker to another and are
not easy to convey. Moreover, while the recruitment message emphasizes the positive social
impact of the program, candidates may not know whether this is the true goal of the CHP
program as BRAC is new in the villages and the position inexistent. In other words, they
may not know whether BRAC has selfish or altruistic intentions. The existence of incomplete
information in this setting is ideal to study whether the perception of the job is affected by
expected earnings.
2.3 Information Experiment
The information experiment was carried out in 231 rural villages across four areas of Western
Uganda (Kabale, Muhanga, Rukungiri, and Buyanja) where BRAC’s health program was
nonexistent at the time of the experiment, but where BRAC was opening new branches. It
aims at identifying (a) the effect of the treatments on earnings expectations, and (b) the “signal
effect,” i.e., how changing expected earnings impacts perceptions of other job characteristics,
such as the relative importance of the sales versus the public health components.
Stratifying by village, 6,844 women, drawn to be representative at the village level, were
randomly assigned to view either the high-, medium- or the low-pay recruitment leaflet and
were then asked to answer one of two different sets of questions (randomization at the individ-
ual level). Expected earnings distributions for the CHP position were elicited for a random
half of the respondents (Sample 1). The other half of the respondents (Sample 2) were given
a survey about their perceptions of other monetary and non-monetary aspects of the CHP
position, i.e., how CHPs allocate time across tasks, how many hours they work, and how
difficult they perceive the position to be.
The causal effect of the treatments is measured by regressing agents’ perceptions on treat-
ment dummies under the assumption that treatment assignment is orthogonal to the error
15This is not the standard way BRAC advertises the job’s earnings. Outside the experiment, BRAC does not
give specific guidelines to its staff on whether the job should be advertised as high, medium or low paying, and
anecdotical evidence suggests that this greatly varies from one staff member to the next. In this experiment,
the new staff recruited by BRAC to conduct the recruitment of CHPs was trained to advertise the position as
indicated on the recruitment leaflet without deviating from it.
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term.16 In support of this assumption, Table I presents balance checks on respondent charac-
teristics. For each variable, I report basic summary statistics among all interviewed respon-
dents (in Samples 1 and 2) and then perform two exercises to check balance across treatments.
The first exercise tests the joint significance of the full set of treatment dummies in explaining
each variable in Samples 1 and 2 separately. Using a multinomial logit model, the second ex-
ercise estimates a test of joint significance of all covariates in predicting treatment assignment.
The summary statistics indicate that the average respondent is 44 years old, has completed
primary school (6 years of education), and works 35 hours per week. Seven percent of the
respondents have volunteered in the health sector (as an unpaid volunteer for the Government
or an NGO, or as a counselor), and 30 percent declare that “having a positive impact on the
community” is more important as a job feature than earning money or gaining respect. Only
6 percent have borrowed money from a microfinance institution in the year before the survey.
This is because BRAC was not present in the villages and access to microfinance loans was
extremely limited.
Reassuringly, these characteristics do not differ significantly across treatments in both
Samples 1 and 2, indicating that the randomization yields samples that are balanced. In
a multinomial logit model, treatment assignment is regressed on all covariates. The null
hypothesis that the covariates do not jointly predict treatment assignment is not rejected in
either sample (p-values are 0.25 for Sample 1 and 0.41 for Sample 2).
2.4 Recruitment Experiment
The aim of the recruitment experiment is to estimate the treatment effects on the selection of
workers and on their retention and performance once recruited. The experiment took place in
2012 when BRAC opened 15 new branches throughout Uganda in areas where it had previously
not had a presence and which are different from those of the information experiment.17 The
recruitment process took place in 315 microfinance groups, located in 315 villages across the
15 branches, that were formed as soon as BRAC expanded and which resulted in 301 CHPs
being successfully recruited.
Stratifying by branch, the recruitment message used to advertise the CHP position in
the microfinance groups was randomly assigned to the high-, the medium- or the low-pay
treatment, with randomization at the microfinance-group level. The high-pay treatment was
used in 106 microfinance groups, the medium-pay in 104, and the low-pay in 105.More details
16To limit spillovers, the enumerators were instructed to minimize the time between interviews of households
living in proximity to one another.
17Four of the new branches are in West Uganda (Kiganda, Kibito, Bundibugyo, Bwera), four in North
Uganda (Adjumani, Moyo, Yumbe and Maracha), four in East Uganda (Musita, Buyala, Mayuge, Idudi), and
three in Central Uganda (Nkonkonjeru, Kasawo, Busunju).
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on the experimental design are presented in Section 5.18
Table II presents balance checks on characteristics of the villages in which the microfinance
groups are located and characteristics of the potential applicants, i.e., the microfinance clients.
The summary statistics indicate that the microfinance groups are located in villages that are
situated 50 minutes away, on average, from the closest hospital (by foot), and 23 minutes
away from the closest drugstore. Microfinance groups are composed of an average of 15
literate members present on recruitment day. These characteristics do not differ significantly
across treatments, indicating that the randomization yields a sample that is balanced.
Comparing Tables I and II suggests that respondents interviewed in the recruitment ex-
periments are comparable in terms of their education, age, marital status, number of rooms
in the house (a proxy for house size), prosocial motivation (i.e., “volunteered in the health
sector” and “community driven”) to respondents in the information experiment.19 However,
while respondents in the recruitment experiment are necessarily microfinance clients, those
sampled in the information experiment are not (BRAC microfinance groups had not been
formed when the survey was conducted). Consequently, respondents in the recruitment ex-
periment are more likely to be self-employed in a non-agriculture business rather than in the
agriculture sector.
To ensure that responses from the respondents in the information experiment are infor-
mative of the expectations of potential candidates in the recruitment experiment, I estimate
below the treatment effects in the information experiment using two samples: (a) the full
sample of respondents, and (b) a sub sample of these respondents who are matched, based on
a number of relevant observed characteristics, to the most similar women in the recruitment
experiment. I also make sure that there is nothing specific about the way microfinance clients
update their beliefs in the information experiment compared with other respondents.
3 Validation of the Experiment
This section provides evidence that the experimental variation used in this paper overcomes
the problem of endogeneity in individuals’ expectations. In particular, I show that revealing
only a specific point of the earnings distribution can be used as a tool to exogenously vary
the expected first moment of the distribution, without changing the expected second moment.
This ensures that my treatments affect the types of agents who self-select into the job without
changing their perception of the risk involved, and thus without changing the risk attitudes
among applicants across treatments (this is tested in Section 5.1).
18To limit spillovers, the time elapsed between two recruitment events within a branch was minimized.
The distance between villages makes it very unlikely that agents in one microfinance group heard about the
recruitment message used in another group before the recruitment in their own group.
19The variables “owning a shop”, “having ever sold health-related products”, “weekly earnings” cannot be
compared across tables as these variables were not collected in the information experiment.
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After the position was advertised with one of the three treatments, each respondent was
asked: “How much do you think CHPs earn in a typical month?” and “How many hours
do you think CHPs work in a typical month?”. These two questions allow me to estimate
expected monthly earnings and expected earnings per hour for each respondent. Table III
(Columns 1 and 2) show that both of these variables turn out to be higher in the the high- and
medium-pay treatments than in the low-pay one. The expected earnings per hour of work,
represented by Yˆ in the theoretical framework, increase significantly by 30 and 8 percent in
the high-pay and medium-pay treatments, respectively, relative to the low-pay one.
Because it is unclear whether “earnings in a typical month” refer to the mean or the median
of the expected distribution, I collected additional data on the expected earnings distribution.
Each respondent was asked to assign a probability to the possibility that CHPs earn roughly
Yn (expressed in thousands of UGX) where Yn = {0, 30, 60, 90, 120, 150, 180, 210}. This was
done by asking respondents to distribute 24 beans across eight cards representing the different
levels of earnings Yn.
20 Assuming a uniform distribution within each bin, the expected average
and standard deviation in earnings for respondent i is calculated by weighting each Yn with




pi(Yn)× Yn; SDi(Y ) =
√∑
n
pi(Yn)× (Yn − Ei(Y ))2.
Table III displays the treatment effects on expected earnings, estimated with
Ei(Y ) = α+ β1 MediumPay i + β2 HighPay i +Xiη + ui, (1)
where Ei(Y ) is the earnings expectation of respondent i, MediumPayi and HighPayi are
dummies indicating which recruitment message the respondent was randomly assigned to
observe before answering the questions (randomization is at the individual level), Xi are a set
of individual-level controls believed to affect the outcome variables and villages fixed effects,
and errors are clustered at the village level. In this section, as well as in the rest of the paper,
the omitted treatment is the low-pay one and the list of individual controls includes age,
marital status, education level, number of hours of work per week, occupation (agriculture
vs. non-agriculture), and size of the house (as a measure of wealth). Note that the results are
almost identical both in magnitude and in precision if I drop the controls or if I use robust
standard errors rather than clustered ones.
Table III shows that respondents in the high- and medium-pay treatments expect CHPs
to earn significantly more money than in the low-pay treatment: both the average and median
expected earnings are higher (Columns 3 and 4). There is, however, no difference between
20The approach of using visual aids to represent probability units is common practice in the literature
(Sequeira et al. 2013; Attanasio 2009; Delavande et al. 2011).
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these two higher-pay groups and the low-pay one in terms of perceived income variability
SDi(Y ) (Column 5). Finally, the ratio between expected average earnings and expected
standard deviation in earnings is higher than one in all the treatments (indicating that the
treatments convey more signal than noise), but it is statistically larger in the high- and
medium-pay treatments (Column 6).
Figure II estimates the treatment effects on the aggregate distribution of perceived earn-
ings: the probability that respondent i allocates to income Yn, pi(Yn), is regressed on the
treatment groups with the same specification as in (1). The right panel suggests that, com-
pared with those who viewed the low-pay leaflet, respondents who were shown the high-pay
leaflet shift upward the distribution of expected earnings. In particular, they assign higher
probabilities to CHPs ending up at the higher-income levels and lower probabilities to the
lower levels. Results for the medium-pay treatment (left panel) follow a similar pattern,
although the effects are smaller in magnitude. Overall, this figure indicates that the experi-
mental variation used in my paper shifts upward the expected earnings distribution, without
significantly varying the expected variance in earnings.
While respondents seem to understand the meaning of the words “at least” and “up to” in
the recruitment message (only 2.3 percent expect less than the minimum in the low-pay group
or more than the maximum in the high-pay one), the average expected pay in the medium-
pay treatment is higher than what is advertised in the recruitment leaflet. To make sure this
is not driven by less-educated respondents not understanding the word “average,” I interact
treatment effects with the education level of the respondent and find that the interaction term
is not significant (see Table A.I, Column 1). This is reassuring, as the contrary would have
indicated that literate women understand the recruitment message better and are more likely
to update their beliefs.
To ensure the effect of the treatments on expected earnings is not entirely driven by a
specific pool of agents, more heterogeneous treatment effects are reported in Table A.I. The
results indicate that revealing different points of the distribution affects expected earnings
similarly for agents who have borrowed from a microfinance institution versus those who have
not. This is reassuring, as the main difference between the recruitment and the information
experiment lies in the fact that respondents in the former are all microfinance clients, while
those in the latter are often not.
In Table A.II, I use a matching approach to have a more similar group of respondents
in the information experiment to those in the recruitment experiment. Based on a list of
observable variables (age, marital status, education level, occupation, number of hours of
work, size of the house), I use a matching approach with replacement in which each individual
interviewed in the recruitment experiment is paired with her five nearest neighbors in the
information experiment. Results remain similar to the unmatched sample and are not sensitive
to increasing the number of neighbors in the matching procedure.
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4 Treatment Effects on Job Perceptions
In this section, I test whether increasing perceived incentives affects job perceptions. It is
important to remind here that both BRAC and the CHP position were nonexistent in the
villages prior to the experiment. Consequently, agents’ perceptions about the job are strongly
influenced by what is revealed to them at the recruitment stage. As illustrated in Figure I,
all the agents are told what tasks they would do as a CHP, how long and how frequent the
training is, how they could have a positive impact on the community and how they would
earn money. Given the limited amount of time available to advertise the position, a number
of other features of the job are not discussed because too complex, too subjective or simply
impossible to convey—e.g., difficulty of each task, amount of time each agent would have to
work to reach the targets imposed by BRAC, the proportion of time they would spend on
each task, the whole list of products they would sell and their respective profit margins.
As agents do not have a precise idea of a number of aspects of the job, the effect of
increasing incentives on perceptions is theoretically ambiguous. A higher pay could signal
that CHPs spend more time selling products, thereby changing the perceived nature of the
job, or can signal selfish intentions on the part of BRAC. A higher pay may also signal that
CHPs work more hours overall, that they sell products with higher profit margin, that the
demand for these products is higher, etc. To understand which type of signal was conveyed in
my setting, I collected information on agents’ perceptions after the job was advertised using
one of the three treatments. Data include measures of perceptions about the nature of the job,
time allocation across tasks, hours worked, and job difficulty. The perceived allocation of time
across tasks is measured by instructing the respondents to distribute 12 beans across different
cards representing the different tasks of a CHP (i.e., selling goods, educating the community
on health issues, and providing pre- and postnatal exams). The questions on job difficulty ask
the respondents to rank on a scale of 1 to 4 the expected difficulty of convincing households to
buy goods (which is correlated with the profit margin) and the expected difficulty of improving
their health-related behavior.
Following Benabou and Tirole 2003, I test whether financial incentives also affect the
agents’ perception of their own abilities rather than only their perception about the job. The
unknown variable at the recruitment stage could indeed be a characteristic of the applicant
herself rather than uncertainty about the task per se. As agents accept the job only if they
have sufficient confidence in their own abilities, financial incentives may affect the participation
constraint of potential candidates by influencing the perception of their own ability. Perceived
ability is calculated by asking agents to rank themselves on a scale of 1 to 10, where 1 means,
“If 10 women were recruited, I would be ranked last in terms of performance,” and 10 means,
“I would be ranked first.”
Table IV reports the exhaustive list of survey questions on perceived attributes and sheds
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light on what aspect of the CHP position is perceived differently when expected financial
incentives increase. I find that incentives convey a signal about the nature of the job. Relative
to the low-pay treatment, respondents in the high-pay treatment are 17 percent more likely to
perceive the position as a “private goal” position that CHPs accept to earn money rather than
as a “social goal” position that CHPs accept to improve the health conditions in their villages.
Moreover, the perceived proportion of time CHPs spend selling goods versus delivering health
services increases by 10 percent in the high-pay framing. Both these results suggest that
stronger financial incentives signal the business-oriented nature of the job and decrease the
expected social output.
One thing to note is that these results hold when we compare the low- and medium-pay
treatments with the high-pay one, but not when the low-pay treatment is compared with
the medium-pay one. This indicates that the difference in expected earnings in the low- and
medium-pay treatments, which is 6 times smaller than the difference between the high- and
low-pay groups, is too small to convey a signal on social output.
While incentives can theoretically also potentially change agent perceptions of a number
of other aspects of the job, I do not observe such signals. Incentives are indeed found to have
no impact on the agents’ expected number of work hours, expected difficulty in convincing
households to buy commodities, and expected difficulty in improving their health behavior.
Moreover, financial incentives neither boost nor attenuate self-confidence about succeeding in
the job: a measure of own perceived ability does not vary across treatments.
Finally, Table A.I shows that the CHP job is perceived equally across different types of
workers, and hence that incentives play the same signaling role irrespectively of the worker’s
type. Importantly, this is true for prosocial versus non-prosocial agents, where prosociality is
measured with (1) whether a respondent has ever volunteered in the health sector, and (2) a
survey question in which respondents are asked for the most important feature of a job: to
have a positive impact on the community, to earn money, or to earn respect.21 In regressions
that have perceptions as outcome variables, the interactions of the treatment dummies with
“having volunteered in the health sector” or “being community driven” are indeed small and
not significant (Columns 6 and 7). This ensures that the treatment effects on the applicant
pool’s composition identified in the next section, are explained by different types of workers
being less or more likely to apply for the job, rather than different types of workers perceiving
the job differently.
21Both of these measures of prosociality have their own limitations, i.e., “ever volunteered in the health
sector” could be a proxy of prosociality as well as a proxy of experience, “community driven” is a measure of
relative weight rather than absolute weight given to “helping the community.” For robustness, I will show that
all the results of this paper are robust to using both measures. Starting in Section 5.2, I will also complement
these survey measures with an incentivized measure of prosociality (i.e., donations to a public-health NGO).
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5 Treatment Effects on Selection
This section estimates whether the negative signal on social output affects the type and the
number of agents who apply for the CHP position and those who end up being appointed.
The theory predicts that, under the observed signal channel, stronger incentives should (a)
attract agents who are interested in the “remunerated” component of the job, while displacing
agents with strong prosocial preferences, and (b) increase the number of applicants only if
the number of agents displaced is smaller than the number of those attracted. I test these
predictions next.
The recruitment process took place from August to October 2012 in 315 BRAC microfi-
nance groups, located in 315 villages across 15 new BRAC branches. As soon as a microfinance
group was formed, BRAC organized an unexpected visit in the group’s weekly meeting with
the aim of recruiting a microfinance member as CHP.22
In each group, the whole recruitment process lasted half-day and involved four subsequent
steps. First, all microfinance members were asked to complete a brief questionnaire, very
similar to the one used in the information experiment, about their prosocial preferences,
education, main occupation, etc. To avoid biased answers, the survey was administered before
the CHP position was advertised so that none of the microfinance clients knew that BRAC
would then seek to fill the position.23 Second, all microfinance clients were asked to view one
of the three recruitment leaflets (randomization at the microfinance-group level). Third, each
microfinance client was asked, privately and confidentially, whether she wanted to apply for
the position. Because this step took place immediately after the position was advertised, there
is no monetary cost of applying for the job in my context.24 Fourth, in each microfinance
group, a BRAC officer was in charge of selecting a CHP among the applicants, after a quick
individual interview with each of them.25 While there are no other requirements to become
eligible as a CHP other than being literate and being a microfinance client, BRAC’s guidelines
prioritize candidates who are educated and who value the job’s impact on the community.
22In 15 of the 315 groups, BRAC officers were instructed to recruit two CHPs, because the formation of the
microfinance groups was proceeding too slowly in the branches. The two recruited CHPs were then assigned
to work in the village in which the microfinance group is located and in another village nearby. The number
of CHPs BRAC aimed to recruit in each microfinance group is balanced across treatments (available upon
request).
23The survey was kept very short to make sure that all of the microfinance members were still present at
the meeting by the time the CHP position was advertised.
24To make sure all applicants were seriously interested in the CHP position, all microfinance clients were
informed that, conditional on applying and being selected, they would be designed as the CHP in front of
the others, without being previously informed privately. They were also told that their decision of whether to
apply or not would have no impact on their eligibility to receive future BRAC loans.
25Although BRAC officers could have potentially accessed the survey data, anecdotal evidence suggests that
most of them did not because “this would have taken too much time,” but they certainly could have asked
similar questions verbally to each candidate. As the groups had just been formed when the recruitment took
place, BRAC officers did not have much more information about the candidates than what I collected from
the survey, e.g., they did not know them personally and had no information on their credit history.
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5.1 Selection in the Applicant Pool
Composition of the Applicant Pool
Rich data on the characteristics of all potential CHP candidates (microfinance members)
allow me to more precisely estimate selection effects using within-group differences between
applicants and non-applicants and comparing these differences across treatments:
Applyig = α+ β0 Yi + β1 Yi ∗MediumPayg + β2 Yi ∗HighPayg +Xiη + σg + uig, (2)
where Applyig equals one if the microfinance client i in microfinance group g applies for the
CHP position, and Yi is a characteristic of microfinance client i, e.g., prosocial motivation or
interest in sales. Errors are clustered at the level of the randomization unit, microfinance-
group g. The regression includes microfinance group fixed effects σg and a list of individual-
level controls Xi (age, marital status, education level, number of hours of work per week,
occupation, and a measure of wealth).26 The coefficients of interest, β1 and β2, estimate
whether the predictive power of characteristic Yi in determining whether an agent applies
differs across treatments.
The first two columns of Table V test whether stronger financial incentives affect the
likelihood that prosocial candidates apply. The treatment dummies are interacted with two
measures of prosociality: (1) whether a candidate has ever volunteered in the health sector,
and (2) whether “having a positive impact on the community” is reported as being the most
important feature of a job. Importantly, both these variables were collected before the CHP
position was advertised. So, although the respondents might over-report their level of proso-
ciality, this over-reporting is, by construction, uncorrelated with the recruitment strategy.
Finally, all regressions control for the respondent’s socioeconomic and occupation status to
take into account the fact that, for a given level of prosociality, women who are wealthier and
more educated, or who work fewer hours, may be more/less likely to say “that they care less
about earning money” or may have more/less time available to be a health volunteer.27
Column 1 of Table V shows that, in the low-pay treatment, agents who have volunteered
in the health sector are 28 percent more likely to apply than those who have not, while in the
high-pay treatment this probability drops to 12 percent. Moreover, in comparison with other
agents, respondents who are “community driven” (who report that helping the community is
26When fixed effects are combined with clustered standard errors, the standard errors obtained from an OLS
regression may be biased and may require a degrees-of-freedom correction (see Cameron and Miller 2015).
Because the number of clusters is large with respect to the number of observations within each cluster, the
cluster-robust standard error estimator converges here to the true standard error.
27In the main specification, I do not control for agents’ reservation earnings, i.e., profits per hour from their
current job, due to missing values in this variable. Results remain consistent to adding this variable, although
the number of observations drops. Moreover, note that profits per hour are strongly correlated with being
involved in a non-agriculture activity, a measure that I control for in all specifications.
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the most important job characteristic) are significantly more likely to apply in the low-pay
treatment, while they are not more likely to apply in the other two treatments.
Results go in the opposite direction for respondents who are “money driven” (who de-
clare that earning money is the most important job characteristic), while agents who care
about “earning respect” more than anything else are equally likely to apply across treatments
(Columns 1 and 2 of Table A.III). The latter result provides evidence that, in my context,
higher financial incentives do not crowd out agents for reputational concerns (Be´nabou and
Tirole 2006). Instead, the findings are consistent with financial incentives crowding-out the
most motivated agents because they signal the business-oriented nature of the job (Benabou
and Tirole 2003).
Columns 5 and 6 of Table V show that women who enjoy selling products, i.e., who own
a shop or who have sold health-related products in the past, are significantly more likely to
apply when earnings expectations are higher. This is consistent with the earlier evidence that
stronger financial incentives signal the sales-oriented nature of the job (i.e., less time is spent
on the sales task).
Applicants and non-applicants do not differ across treatments along other dimensions,
such as education level, occupation, reservation earnings (proxied with hourly income at their
current non-CHP jobs), wealth (proxied with the house size), number of hours of work or
number of small kids to take care of (see Table A.III). One key feature of my setting that may
explain the small selection on education and reservation earnings is that CHPs are recruited
from the pool of literate microfinance members, which is probably more homogeneous in terms
of these variables than the whole population. In other contexts with more heterogeneity in
these areas, increasing compensation may lead to a more-productive/higher-skilled pool of
workers with better outside options (Guiteras and Jack 2012; Dal Bo´ et al. 2013; Ashraf et
al. 2014b). Finally, the absence of selection on the degree of risk-aversion (Column 9 of Table
A.III) supports the findings of the information experiment: revealing different points of the
earnings distribution impacts the expected average earnings without changing the expected
variance of those earnings. If the contrary were true, we would expect risk-averse agents to
be significantly more likely to apply in the treatment with the lower perceived variance.28
Table VI compares the likelihood that prosocially and non prosocially motivated agents
apply for the position across treatments, holding other agents’ traits fixed:
Applyig = α+ β0Prosociali + β1Prosociali ∗MediumPayg + β2NotProsociali ∗MediumPayg
+β3Prosociali ∗HighPayg + β4NotProsociali ∗HighPayg +Xiη + uig. (3)
28Table A.IV regresses the probability that a potential candidate applies for the job on a set of different char-
acteristics. Although these traits are correlated with each other, the table shows that the main determinants
of the likelihood of applying are prosociality, interest in sales, education, and wealth.
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In line with the predictions of the simple theoretical framework I develop in Appendix A),
increasing monetary compensation for a job not only crowds in low prosocial motivation,
but also crowds out high prosocial motivation whenever a negative signal on social output is
conveyed. In the high-pay treatment, in which the job is perceived as more lucrative but less
“social” (see Tables III and IV), non-prosocial agents are crowded in (βˆ4 > 0), while prosocial
agents are crowded out (βˆ3 < 0). Candidates who have never volunteered in the health sector
are indeed 3 times more likely to apply in the high-pay group than in the low-pay one, while
those who have volunteered in the health sector are 36 percent less likely to apply. In the
medium-pay treatment, in which the job is perceived as more lucrative but the signal on social
output is milder, the results show there is a crowding-in of low prosociality (βˆ2 > 0) but no
significant crowding-out of high prosociality (βˆ1 ∼ 0). Finally, the same results are presented
for “interest in sales” on the right-hand side of Table VI. In the low-pay treatment, agents
who “have ever sold health-related products” are 8 percentage points more likely to apply,
while they are 22 percentage points more likely to apply in the high-pay treatment.
Assessing how costly the displacement of prosocial preferences is for an organization re-
quires knowing the correlation between prosocial preferences and other characteristics in the
pool of potential candidates. Data on all potential candidates are usually hard to obtain.
Most of the empirical literature that exists on the selection effects of incentives has informa-
tion on the applicants for a job but does not observe potential candidates who do not apply
(e.g., Dal Bo´ et al. 2013; Ashraf et al. 2014b). In this paper, I take advantage of a key feature
of the CHP recruitment procedure—it is conducted within microfinance groups—to collect
data on all potential candidates for the job.
In Table A.V (Part A), I explore how individual traits correlate with each other in the
pool of potential candidates. As expected, both measures of prosociality (having prior volun-
teering experience in the health sector and being community driven) are positively correlated
with each other. Importantly, prosocial preferences measured with having prior volunteering
experience in the health sector and with being “community driven” are positively correlated
with the ownership of a shop. Prosocial preferences are also positively correlated with educa-
tion and wealth, measured with the size of the house. This suggests that, for a given level of
prosociality, wealthier and more educated women are more likely to say “that they care less
about earning money” or are more likely to have time to be a health volunteer. This pos-
itive correlation stresses the importance of controlling for socioeconomic variables whenever
prosocial preferences are considered.
Size of the Applicant Pool
Advertising the position as better paying increases the size of the applicant pool only if the
number of agents who are crowded in is larger than the number of agents with prosocial
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preferences who are crowded out. The treatment effects on the size of the applicant pool are
estimated with
#Applicantsg = α+β1MediumPayg+β2HighPayg+γ#Potential Candidatesg+ug, (4)
where the outcome variable is the number of candidates applying for the position in microfi-
nance group g, and MediumPayg and HighPayg are treatment dummies indicating which
recruitment message was used in microfinance group g. In all the specifications, the regres-
sion additionally controls for the number of potential candidates (microfinance clients) and
for branch fixed effects.
Table VII indicates that the average number of applicants per vacancy in the low-pay
treatment is 2.2 (15.2 percent of the microfinance clients). This number significantly increases
to 3 and 2.6 in the high- and medium-pay groups respectively. While there is no monetary
cost in applying for the position in my context, there could be a psychological cost, i.e., agents
may prefer not to apply or may feel less obligated to do so if there is a better candidate in
the group. Controlling for the number of potentially “outstanding” candidates in the group,
i.e., the number of prosocial candidates and those interested in sales, only marginally reduces
the coefficients. Finally, the results are robust to adding village-level controls, such as the
distance to the closest hospital.
While Table VII indicates a significant mean effect, Figure III shows that financial incen-
tives also impact the upper and lower tails of the distribution. The density of the proportion of
microfinance members interested in becoming CHPs in the high- and medium-pay treatments
shifts to the right of the density in the low-pay treatment. Taken together, these results pro-
vide evidence that the number of agents who become interested in the position when financial
incentives increase is larger than the number of agents who become disinterested.
On the extensive margin, Table VII shows that the likelihood of finding at least one person
interested in the CHP position is 5 percentage points higher in the high-pay than in the low-
pay framing (significant at 10 percent level). Although BRAC officers visited a similar number
of microfinance groups across the three treatments, they recruited a total 301 CHPs: 95 CHPs
in the low-pay treatment, 102 CHPs in the medium-pay treatment and 105 in the high-pay
treatment.29 Financial incentives thus help the recruiter fill vacancies. In poor rural areas
that have an urgent need for a CHP, the recruiter faces a social cost of advertising the job as
a low-paying position if the vacancy is unfilled.30
As my treatments are allocated randomly across microfinance groups, the experimental
29Of the 303 microfinance groups with at least one applicant, BRAC recruited a CHP in 285. It did not
recruit any of the applicants in the remaining 18 groups and did not offer the job to anyone in the village.
30Table A.VI shows that the high-pay treatment decreases (increases) the number of applicants who are
prosocial (non-prosocial) and the probability that at least one prosocial (non-prosocial) person applies. The
probability that at least one “community driven” person applies in the high-pay treatment is for instance 14
percent lower than in the low-pay one.
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design allows me to estimate the elasticity of labor supply, holding quality constant. To do so,
I divide the change in the size of the applicant pool (Table VII, Column 1) by the change in the
hourly expected earnings obtained from the information experiment (Table III, Column 2).
This yields three different labor-supply arc-elasticities that depend on the pair of treatments
considered, i.e., an elasticity of 2.41 from low- to medium-pay, 0.93 from medium- to high-
pay and 1.16 from low- to high-pay treatment. Although these results are derived from two
separate experiments, they indicate that the relatively small jump in earnings from the low-
to the medium-pay treatment raises, for many candidates, the expected utility from taking
the job above their outside option. For a larger jump in earnings from low- to high-pay, the
signal channel of incentives kicks in and reduces the expected utility from taking the job for
prosocial agents and, consequently, reduces labor-supply elasticity.31 Note that, because the
CHP position is not a full-time position and working hours are flexible, the outside option of
each candidate is hard to estimate in my context. It is indeed unclear whether the time spent
working as a CHP is substituted away from working in another job or from spending time
taking care of the children, volunteering, etc.
5.2 Selection in the Pool of Appointed Workers
Differences across Appointed Workers
Two months after being selected, the 301 appointed CHPs attended a two-week training ses-
sion that took place at the BRAC branch office. At the beginning of the training session, and
before starting work, each CHP was asked how much she was expecting to earn as a CHP in a
typical month. Figure IV plots the kernel density of the expected-earnings distributions of the
301 CHPs. Consistent with the results of the information experiment, earnings expectations
of the CHPs recruited in the high-pay and medium-pay treatments are significantly higher
than in the low-pay treatment: both these treatments shift the density to the right of the
low-pay density. A Komogorov-Smirnov test rejects the equality of each pairwise distributions
at the one-percent level (the highest pairwise p-value is 0.003). The regression counterparts of
Figure IV, presented in Table A.VII, indicate that expected earnings, expressed in thousands
of UGX, are 28 and 73 percentage points higher in the medium- and high-pay treatments,
respectively, than in the low-pay one.32
During the training session, CHPs received a payment of 3.5 thousand UGX for attending
and were asked to play a contextualized dictator game to measure their prosocial attitudes
toward health-related issues. More specifically, each CHP was privately asked for voluntary
31The calculated elasticity of 1.16 is smaller than the elasticity of 2.15 estimated in Dal Bo´ et al. (2013) and
is consistent with the absence of crowding-out of prosocial motivation in their setting.
32The treatment effects are stronger in changing expected earnings in the recruitment experiment than in
the information one. Prosocial agents are not more likely than non prosocial ones to increase their expectations
in the higher-pay treatments (Columns 2 to 4 in Table A.VII).
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donations to an existing public-health NGO (TAMTAM) that distributes bednets for free in
poor communities.33 The amount donated is taken as a proxy for the agents’ motivation for
the cause.
Table A.V displays the correlations between the amount donated by a CHP and other
traits. Given that donations and volunteering in the health sector both represent one’s moti-
vation on health-related issues, these variables are significantly correlated. Being community
driven, a measure of relative importance assigns for helping the community, is positively
correlated with donation, although less significantly. Finally, donations are positively and
significantly correlated with wealth (proxied with the size of the house), while they are not
correlated with weekly earnings from non-CHP positions.
Characteristics of the 301 selected CHPs are compared across treatments in Table VIII:
yg = α+ β1 MediumPayg + β2 HighPayg + ug, (5)
where yg is a trait of the CHP recruited in microfinance group g and branch fixed effects
are included in all regressions. Because adding individual-level controls (age, marital status,
education, etc.) in the regressions reduces the number of observations below 301 due to
missing values in these controls, Table VIII shows the main results without any controls. The
first three columns of Table A.VIII report the same specification adding the controls.
The results suggest that CHPs recruited in the medium- and high-pay treatments are
significantly more likely not to donate any money at all (crowding-in of low motivation) and
significantly less likely to be among to the top 15 percent of donors (crowding-out of high
motivation). As a consequence, the overall donation amount is more than 50 percent lower
in the high- than in the low-pay treatment.34 The graphic representation of these results is
presented in the left panel of Figure V, which plots donations of recruited agents by treatment
group. Table VIII moreover indicates that the CHPs appointed in the high-pay treatment
are significantly less likely to have volunteered in the health sector and are less likely to be
community driven, though they do not differ significantly in their interest for sales. Finally,
Table A.VIII indicates that CHPs do not differ across treatments in the level of education,
income, wealth, reference dependence, and occupation.
33CHPs were informed that their donation decision would have no consequences on their job or on their
participation in BRAC microfinance group. This modified dictator game has been shown to predict performance
on prosocial tasks (Lagarde and Blaauw 2013; Ashraf et al. 2014a).
34One possible criticism of donations as a measure of intrinsic motivation is that agents in the high pay
treatment may have felt “richer” at the training session and may have donated more money. This would lead
to an underestimate of the true effect on selection.
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BRAC’s Appointment Decision
If individual traits such as prosociality and interest in sales are at least partially observable
to the recruiter, then the way the recruiter selects CHPs among potential candidates may
attenuate or exacerbate the effect of expected earnings on selection in the applicant pool. In
particular, candidate selection attenuates the effect of earnings expectations in the applicant
pool if (a) each applicant pool includes at least one “outstanding” candidate, with both
interest in sales and prosocial motivation, and (b) the definition of the most “outstanding”
candidate does not change across treatments, i.e., BRAC officers, who were responsible for
the selection of the CHPs and were exposed to the experimental variation of this study, gave
the same weights to different individual traits across treatments. Candidate selection instead
exacerbates differences in the applicant pool if some individual traits, such as prosociality,
are perceived by BRAC to be more appropriate for low earnings expectations than for high
earnings expectations. If so, my design would identify the effect of earnings expectations on
retention through candidate self-selection and BRAC candidate selection.
Table A.IX compares within-group differences between appointed and non-appointed can-
didates, across treatments. Two points are of note. First, prosociality and interest in sales
are determinants of appointment (see also Column 2 of Table A.IV) and are thus at least
partially observable by the recruiter. Second, the way CHPs are selected attenuates differ-
ences in sales interest. More importantly, BRAC’s candidate selection slightly exacerbates
differences in prosociality from an already heterogeneous pool of applicants. This happens to
be true mainly in the medium-pay treatment, resulting in recruited CHPs being significantly
less prosocial in the medium-pay than in the low-pay, while differences were not significant in
the pool of applicants. Overall, because the interaction terms in Table VIII are not significant,
I conclude that differences in the “types” of selected CHPs are mainly driven by divergences
in the applicant pool rather than differences in candidate selection across treatments.
In summary, the signal conveyed by incentives affects not only the composition of the
applicant pool, but also the composition of the pool of recruited health promoters. This
is because the crowding-out of prosocially motivated agents reduces the likelihood of them
applying and, through this, the chances of them being selected.
6 Treatment Effects on Retention
This section studies whether the selection effect of financial incentives—i.e., discouraging so-
cially motivated agents—affects worker retention. In the health sector, which suffers from a
shortage of health workers, attrition leads to a loss of critical workforce (Bhattacharyya et al.
2001; Leaver and Albano 2004; Nkonki et al. 2011). This is particularly true for community-
based programs that recruit low-skilled workers to provide health services to their own com-
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munity: these workers receive intensive and expensive training paid for by the organization,
and their learning curve on the job is very steep. Moreover, because their career opportunities
in the health sector are often limited, the welfare cost of attrition is high.
Figure VI plots the number of active CHPs over time for the three treatments separately.
While the total quantity of recruited workers is larger in the high- and medium-pay treatments
than in the low-pay one, two years after CHP recruitment, the number of retained workers is
smaller both in the high- and medium-pay treatments. The regression counterpart of this is
presented in Figure VII:
DropOutgt = αt + β1tMediumPayg + β2t HighPayg + ugt, (6)
where DropOutgt equals one if the CHP recruited in microfinance group g has dropped out (is
not active) in month t = {0, 1, ..., 24}. The left and the right panels, which plot, respectively,
βˆ1t and βˆ2t, show that the probability of a CHP dropping out is higher in the medium-pay
and high-pay treatments than in the low-pay one throughout the two years.
Although the observed differences are large, the direction of the results is not surprising: all
else being equal, an agent is more likely to drop out if recruited with higher expected earnings.
This may happen mechanically (i.e., the ex-ante participation constraint holds while the ex-
post does not) or through a more complex negative reciprocity or reference-dependence story.
Agents may indeed be less satisfied not just with low pay, but also with pay below a reference
(expected) compensation (Koszegi and Rabin 2006; Mas 2006; Esteves-Sorenson et al. 2015).35
Rather than illustrating this “direct effect” of increasing expected earnings on retention, this
section aims to show that the observed treatment effects on retention are largely driven by
differences in the composition of workers, i.e., the types of workers who self-selected into the
high-pay treatment are more affected by the negative “surprise” of earning less than initially
expected compared with workers who self-selected into the low-pay treatment.
To corroborate this, Figure V plots the distribution of donations for the CHPs initially
recruited in month 0 (left graph) and for those retained in month 24 (right graph). While
the high-pay treatment attracted more agents who did not donate any money, more than
40 percent of them dropped out within the first two years. At the same time, the high-pay
treatment discouraged agents who donated larger amounts and who would have stayed on the
job with a probability close to one if they had been recruited. As discussed in the theory (see
Appendix A), it is the crowding-out of these “good” workers (generated by the signal conveyed
by incentives) that leads to a reduction in the number of workers retained. In the absence
of such signal and such crowding-out, the number of workers retained would unambiguously
35In my context, the CHP position is considered a very “social” job relative to other jobs while earnings
may be significantly lower. The main reason for dissatisfaction (and dropping out) is the “negative surprise”




The same argument is presented more formally in Table IX. Column 1 indicates that CHPs
recruited in the high-pay and medium-pay treatments are, respectively, 74 and 43 percent more
likely to drop out in the first two years of work than those in the low-pay treatment. Once
I control for CHP prosociality, the point estimates of the treatment effects shrink and lose
their significance, suggesting that selection matters for understanding retention.36 Absolute
measures of prosociality are found to be strong predictors of retention: an increase of 1,000
UGX in the amount donated (two standard deviations) decreases the dropout rate by 74
percent. Similarly, CHPs who have volunteered in the health sector in the past are 68 percent
less likely to drop out (Table IX, Column 3). In contrast, a relative measure of prosociality,
i.e., the relative importance given to “helping the community” as a job characteristic relative
to “earning money” or “earning respect,” does not predict retention. Finally, having sold
health products in the past positively correlates with retention as well. All these results are
robust to adding individual-level controls and are robust to using a proportional hazard model
that corrects for right-censoring (Table A.X).
The differential impact of the treatments with respect to prosociality, as measured with
the amount donated, is investigated in Figure VIII with:
DropOutgt = αt + β1tMediumPayg + β2t HighPayg + β3t Donationg
+β4tMediumPayg ∗Donationg + β5t HighPayg ∗Donationg + ugt
The interaction terms between the treatments and the amount donated, i.e., β4t and β5t,
suggest that agents who put a larger weight on the social output of the job are less sensitive
to discrepancies between expected and realized earnings. These effects are stronger in the first
months on the job and attenuate over time as the surprise effect disappears. The regression
counterpart of this figure, obtained two years after recruitment, is presented in Table A.XI
for the different available measures of prosociality.
Two sets of findings suggest that reference dependence plays a small role in my context.
First, as indicated in Table IX, the treatment effects on retention shrink and lose significance
once I control for selection. This suggests that reference dependence and negative reciprocity,
as residual mechanisms, do not have a relevant role in driving the results. Moreover, the
interaction of the treatment groups with a measure of each CHP’s reference dependence is
negative and not significant (Table A.XI, Column 6).37 If reference dependence were driving
36Given that selection is affected by the treatments, prosociality is not a predetermined control and the esti-
mated treatment effects are not causal. There is, however, no reason to believe that controlling for prosociality
leads to overestimating the negative effect of increasing earnings on the dropout rate.
37This measure, which was collected during the initial CHP training session, counts the number of lotteries
that the CHP is not willing to play from a list of seven hypothetical lotteries of the form “50% chance of
winning 5 thousand UGX, 50% chance of losing X,” where X varies from 0 to 6 thousand. Commonly used
in the behavioral economics literature (Fehr and Goette 2007; Abeler et al. 2011; De Quidt 2013), the idea of
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the results on retention, then we would expect agents with a high degree of reference de-
pendence to be significantly more likely to be disappointed and to drop out in the high-pay
treatment than in the low-pay one.
Due to space constraints, two last steps of the analysis are reported in the annex but are
worth mentioning here. In the first step, I estimate the exact quit elasticity by instrumenting
CHPs’ expected earnings with the random treatment assignment (more details in Appendix D
on the first stage and the exclusion restriction). Table A.XVII shows that a one-standard-
deviation increase in expected earnings increases the dropout rate by 15 percentage points.
Finally, Appendix E discusses the recruitment campaign as a powerful and more cost-effective
tool to improve retention than changing the actual incentives.
7 Treatment Effects on Performance
If the non-prosocial workers who quit the job more quickly are also those who perform bet-
ter while on the job, then the organization faces a clear trade-off on whom to recruit. This
section explores whether this is the case using two sources of data. Output “quantity,”—i.e.,
the number of home visits, pre- and postnatal checks, and products sold—is measured using
data collected by BRAC from each CHP on a monthly basis (more details below). Because
BRAC imposes targets on these measures of performance that are easy to observe and easy to
monitor, substitution between “quantity” and “quality” is a concern. Data on output “qual-
ity”—i.e., information content of the visits and types of households targeted—are collected by
interviewing a random sample of CHPs’ clients. As the ultimate goal of the BRAC’s health
program is to improve maternal and child health, the aim of this survey is to collect data on
CHPs’ targeting: CHPs are asked to prioritize households with women who are pregnant or
who have recently given birth (“priority households”).
For each data source, the analysis proceeds as follows. First, I test the hypothesis that
the types of workers recruited in the high-pay treatment (i.e. non prosocial workers) are
“stars,” who counterbalance lower retention with higher performance on the job. To do so,
I compare the aggregate performance of different types of CHPs, a measure that correlates
with the length of time a CHP remains in her post as well as with the performance of the
CHP while she is active. Second, I restrict the analysis to the 89 percent of CHPs who are
active at the time of the data collection, therefore eliminating differences in retention. While
this approach is not without caveat—attrition is not random—it provides suggestive evidence
on their performance on the job.
this measure is that aversion to risk in small-stakes lotteries that involve a loss is better explained by reference
dependence than standard concave utility. Note that Table A.VIII shows that the treatments do not affect the
average reference dependence among the applicants.
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BRAC Monthly Records
Each month, CHPs are required to attend a one-day refresher course, in which they receive
further training and are given the opportunity of buying new products. During the refresher
courses that ran from May 2013 until April 2014, BRAC recorded information on the number
of home visits, the number of pre- and postnatal checks provided, and the sales profits of each
CHP.38
Data on monthly CHP sales profits indicate that the compensation levels of the CHPs in
my experiment are in line with those announced in the recruitment leaflets: CHPs who have
been active during the period from May 2013 to April 2014 report an average sales profit of 42
thousand UGX per month, with a maximum of 177 thousand and a minimum of 5 thousand
UGX (only one agent earned less than 7 thousand UGX).
The treatment effects on the full sample of 301 recruited CHPs are presented in Table
X. The strategy used in this table was to assign a performance of zero for the months of
inactivity of each CHP who dropped out before April 2014.39 The results show that CHPs
recruited in the high-pay and medium-pay treatments do worse on the social tasks than those
in the low-pay treatment: they visit fewer households and provide fewer pre- and postnatal
checks to pregnant women. Performance on the business task, measured by the monthly sales
profits, however, does not vary significantly across treatments.40
On a scale from 1 to 10, CHPs’ supervisors rated the first-year performance of the CHPs
9 and 12 percent lower in the high- and medium-pay treatments than in the low-pay one.
This means that, ultimately, BRAC is more satisfied with workers recruited in the low-pay
treatment. Importantly, all these measures of aggregate performance are positively and sig-
nificantly correlated with prosociality, indicating that prosociality not only predicts retention
but also aggregate performance.
To estimate treatment effects on performance on the job, Table A.XII (Part 1) displays
the same regressions as in Table X but restricts the analysis to the first month of available
data (May 2013) and to the 267 health promoters who were active by that time, therefore
eliminating differences in retention across treatments. As it eliminates a non-random sample
of 34 CHPs, this strategy is not without caveat. However, it provides suggestive evidence that
38This information is collected from logbooks in which CHPs record their daily activities. To ensure accuracy
in reporting, CHPs’ supervisors select a random sample of households each week from the home visits register
and follow up with the clients.
39The 41 CHPs who dropped out between May 2013 and April 2014 are assigned a performance of zero in
the months following the one in which they dropped out. The 34 CHPs who dropped out before May 2013
are assigned an average monthly performance of zero. While the lack of information on their performance is a
caveat, the results are unlikely to be strongly affected, as the proportion of CHPs who dropped out immediately
after they were hired is small.
40Because information on the number of hours each CHP spent selling goods would have to be self-reported
and CHPs have no incentives to tell the truth, I am unfortunately not able to compare “earnings per hour of
work,” which would be the best proxy of sales performance.
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performance on the job in the high-pay treatment is lower than in the low-pay one, although
most of the coefficients are not significant. Interestingly, prosociality as measured with the
amount donated strongly and significantly positively predicts the number of home visits but
does not predict sales profits.
While these results reject the hypothesis that the CHPs hired with higher expected earn-
ings are “stars,” previous analysis has shown that higher earnings have the advantage of
increasing the number of CHPs recruited. To analyze the trade-off between the number and
quality of CHPs recruited, Table A.XII (Part 2) replicates the analysis of Table X using
the full sample of 315 villages in which the recruitment took place and assigning a monthly
performance of zero to all villages in which no CHP was recruited. The table shows that
performance remains lower in the higher-pay treatment: while the coefficients are not signif-
icant anymore, they remain economically large. The higher number of workers hired in the
high-pay treatment hence does not outweigh the lower quality of these recruited workers.
Household Survey
One year after CHPs’ recruitment, a random sample of 10 households per village (10 percent
of the experiment’s population) was surveyed on the services received from the CHP. Details
on the timing and the sampling strategy are presented in Appendix C.
While there may be complementarities between the quantity of products sold and the
number of clients visited, these complementarities are less likely to exist between sales and
the proportion of priority households targeted. Visiting priority households indeed takes more
time than visiting other households: CHPs first need to identify them, and during the visits
they need to ensure pre- and postnatal checks. Although agents who care about earning money
(who are mainly recruited in the high-pay treatment) may have an incentive to visit a large
number of households, they should have less of an incentive to target “priority households.”
Table XI confirms this is the case. While priority households are 8 and 11 percentage points
(13 and 20 percent) more likely than non-priority households to know the CHP and to have
been visited by the CHP in the low-pay treatment, they are not more likely to be targeted
in the high-pay treatment.41 These results hold when the analysis is restricted to the 255
CHPs who were still active at the time of the household survey (Table A.XV), indicating that
on-the-job performance as measured by the targeting of priority households is significantly
worse in the high-pay treatment.
Finally, the data show that households in the high-pay treatment do not have better health
knowledge and are not less likely to suffer from health problems such as malaria, diarrhea, or
intestinal worms. If anything, the results indicate that households in the high-pay treatment
41Although the “number of times a household was visited by the CHP” does not differ significantly across
treatments, the coefficient on the high-pay treatment is negative and, taking into account the number of
households in a village, it is in line with the results on household visits of Section 7.
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are less likely to know how to treat diarrhea and more likely to have suffered from intestinal
worms. Because these data were collected only for the subsample of households who knew the
CHP when interviewed, the results suffer from sample selection and need to be taken with
caution. A more detailed analysis of the findings and of how I tackle the selection problem
are presented in Appendix C (Part 2).
8 Conclusion
We know that individuals respond to financial incentives. There is indeed evidence that
financial incentives affect agents’ effort on the job and selection into the job (Dal Bo´ et al.
2013; Ashraf et al. 2014b). While the existing literature has focused on the motivational effect
of incentives, this paper provides, to the best of my knowledge, the first real-world empirical
evidence of the signaling effect of incentives: when candidates have incomplete information
about a job, incentives can convey a signal about the job characteristics that affects agents’
behavior (Benabou and Tirole 2003; Sliwka 2007).
To cleanly identify the signal channel of incentives, I conduct a field experiment that
creates exogenous variation in expected earnings for a newly created health position in Uganda
that consists of both a business and a social component. I find that financial incentives signal
the business-oriented nature of the job and decrease the perceived social output. While higher
financial incentives attract agents who are interested in the remunerated component of the
job and increase the probability of filling a vacancy, the signal discourages agents with strong
prosocial preferences from applying and reduces the likelihood they are hired.
The crowding-out of prosocial motivation, generated by the signal, is costly for the organi-
zation. Prosocial motivation, measured both with survey questions and with a contextualized
dictator game, is found to be the key predictor of workers’ retention and performance. This
supports the existing theoretical literature that sheds light on the role of prosocial motivation
in aligning the interests of the workers with interests of the organizations (Besley and Ghatak
2005).
For wider applicability of the results, it is important to point out that the type and the
intensity of the signal conveyed by financial incentives may undoubtedly vary from the one
identified in this experiment and will ultimately depend on the context, i.e., how standardized
a job is, its characteristics, the way it is advertised, who the recruiter is, and who the potential
candidates are. In the private sector, for instance, more lucrative positions may be perceived
as more difficult or less enjoyable rather than less social. While the context certainly matters,
this paper provides evidence that “money can talk,” especially at the recruitment stage, and
organizations need to pay careful attention to what it says in order to design optimal contracts




This appendix develops a simple theoretical framework that is tailored to my context, in which
the principal (BRAC) needs to hire agents (health promoters) for a position that consists of a
“social” task, which entails positive externality for the community (health education, pre- and
postnatal checks), and a “private” (business) task, which entails a monetary benefit for the
agents and the principal (sales). The model makes it clear how changing expected earnings (or,
equivalently, financial incentives) at the recruitment stage affects the agents’ perceptions of
the relative importance of the two tasks, and, through this, the type and number of applicants.
Although this section focuses mainly on the agent’s problem, I discuss the principal’s problem
at the end of this appendix.
The position is one in which agents dedicate a proportion λ of their time to the social
task and 1 − λ to the private task. The two tasks vary both in the monetary and the non-
monetary dimensions. One hour of work on the social task generates social output s. One
hour of work on the private task yields a profit yi that varies across workers: yi = µ+εi, where
εi is an individual-specific error term that is drawn from a symmetric continuous distribution
g (cumulative distribution function G), has a mean of 0 and is larger or equal than −µ.
Monetary compensation, Yi = yi(1 − λ), thus varies across workers and decreases with λ,
while the social output, sλ, is constant across workers and increases with λ.42
Agents differ in their prosocial preferences, i.e., how much they care about the social task,
and in their interest in selling products, i.e., how much they care about the private task. At
the recruitment stage, they decide whether to apply for the position or not. To simplify the
model without changing the intuition of its predictions, I assume that workers have no degree
of freedom in the allocation of time across tasks: λ is imposed by the principal through a
monitoring technology and all workers are required to work a similar number of hours, which
I normalize to 1. The setting I am considering is thus one that abstracts from moral hazard.
Rather than deciding their level of effort, recruited workers decide whether to stay on the
job and exert the amount of effort they are “required” to provide or whether to drop out.
Predictions of the model when effort is a choice variable are discussed below.
At the recruitment stage, agents do not know their own realization of yi, while, without
42The model can be generalized to tasks that are both remunerated and that both create social output, as
long as one is relatively more lucrative and the other creates relatively more social output. In the health-
promoter position, the sales component (i.e., sales of oil, salt soap, etc.) may entail a positive externality,
but this is certainly smaller than the one generated by educating the community on how to treat and prevent
serious diseases such as malaria, diarrhea, etc.
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loss of generality, s is assumed to be common knowledge. As the position is new, both µ and
λ are unknown to potential candidates and are not revealed during recruitment.43 Agents’
expected earnings from the position, Yˆ , are assumed to be entirely determined by the vacancy
advertisement and are treated as exogenous in the agent’s problem:
Yˆ = E (Yi) = E (µ(1− λ)) .
Because the setting is one with multitasking and the agents are not separately informed about
λ and µ, agents make inferences on λ and µ after seeing Yˆ . They update their beliefs about
λˆ(Yˆ ), the expected proportion of time dedicated to the social task, and about µˆ(Yˆ ), the
expected average profit per hour spent on the private task.
Depending on the agents’ inference process, increasing Yˆ has three possible effects on λˆ:
(1) a decrease in λˆ, (2) no change in λˆ, (3) an increase in λˆ.44 Under scenario 1, which I call
the Inference scenario, increasing Yˆ decreases the expected proportion of time allocated to
the social task, i.e., λˆ′(Yˆ ) < 0. In this case, expected earnings signal the “business-oriented”
nature of a job and are substitutes with expected social output. Under scenario 2, which I
call the No Inference scenario, expected earnings Yˆ do not convey a signal on the expected
allocation of time across tasks, i.e., λˆ′(Yˆ ) = 0, and thus do not affect the expected social
output. This case arises if the inference on Yˆ is made entirely on µ and not on λ, e.g., λˆ is
unaffected by Yˆ or λ is known/revealed before recruitment.45 Finally, although scenario 3 is
theoretically possible, i.e., λˆ′(Yˆ ) > 0, it is less intuitive, it is not supported by my data, and,
for exposition reasons, I exclude it from the model. This case would indeed require agents to
perceive a more lucrative position as one in which more time is spent on the social task, and
hence as being more “social.”46
Definition 1: Financial Incentives as Signals. The effect of financial incentives
(or equivalently, expected earnings Yˆ ) on the agents’ perceived nature of the job depends on
whether incentives carry a signal about the social output. (i) In the “No Inference” scenario
43Although the principal does not know the ex-ante realization of yi for a given worker, she knows µ and λ
and has more information than the agents at the recruitment stage. In the specific context of this paper (rural
villages in Uganda), due to the limited education and limited attention of agents, the principal does not reveal
µ and λ at the recruitment stage (this would require agents to understand what proportions and probabilities
are and to have calculation skills in order to figure out their expected earnings). Instead, the principal decides
which expected earnings to give to the candidates.
44The inference process depends on the prior joint distribution of (µ, λ) and on whether or not agents
know the distribution G. If people do not know the underlying distribution G but know the bounds of the
distribution, Laplace’s principal of insufficient reasons (PIR) says that people perceive the probability as being
uniform and thus treat events as equally likely.
45We have: Yˆ = µˆ(1− λ), µˆ′(Yˆ ) = (1− λ)−1 > 0 and λˆ′(Yˆ ) = 0.
46This could happen if agents perceive λ and µ to be sufficiently positively correlated. As better paid
positions usually have lower social output (prosocial motivation works as a compensating differential), it is
more intuitive to assume that λ and µ are negatively correlated in agents’ priors, and that λˆ′(Yˆ ) ≤ 0 and
µˆ′(Yˆ ) ≥ 0.
39
(λˆ′(Yˆ ) = 0), higher financial incentives do no affect the job’s expected social output, i.e., a
more lucrative position is perceived as one in which the same amount of time is devoted to the
social task. (ii) In the “Inference” scenario (λˆ′(Yˆ ) < 0), higher financial incentives decrease
the job’s expected social output, i.e., a more lucrative position is perceived as one in which
less time is devoted to the social task.
Section 4 of the paper explores whether the data of my experiment support the Inference
or the No Inference scenario.
It is important to note that, although the “signal channel” is modeled here as the signal
that earnings provide on the allocation of time across tasks, other theoretical frameworks
would have similar predictions. For instance, under equilibrium conditions in which positions
with large social output are paid less (prosocial motivation works as a compensating differen-
tial), increasing the pay of a new job may adversely affect an agent’s perception of the social
output.47
Agents make two decisions: (a) whether to apply for the position, and (b) once on the
job, whether to stay. The rest of the model explores both agent decisions and makes clear
how these decisions depend on their preferences. The goal of the principal, which is discussed
in more detail below, consists here in recruiting and retaining as many workers as possible.
Indeed, the position is self-sustainable: the cost of recruiting, training, and compensating
workers to perform the social task is covered by requiring workers to spend a proportion of
time on the private task, which yields a profit both to the worker and to the principal. As a
consequence, the model assumes that any applicant is recruited and no worker is fired by the
principal.48
Agent’s Choice: Application
Agents apply for the position if the expected utility from working, which depends on how
much they like the social and the private tasks, is greater than the outside option:
Uˆi(Yˆ ) = σiYˆ + γisλˆ(Yˆ ) ≥ u¯, (7)
where σi is the “joy of selling” (or the taste for money), and γi is the “joy of giving” (or the
prosocial motivation).49 Each individual’s preferences (σi, γi) R2 are drawn independently
47A large theoretical and empirical literature shows that positions with large social output are often paid less
than others (prosocial motivation works as a compensating differential - e.g., Weisbrod 1983, Preston 1989).
48An alternative model is one in which the principal recruits a single worker among all the applicants. If the
probability of filling a position is strictly smaller than one and is affected by the way the position is advertised,
then the predictions remain similar. However, the fact that the principal selects one worker among different
applicants may attenuate or exacerbate differences in the applicant pool, depending on whether or not worker
preferences are observable to the principal.
49I assume here that people who like selling care about the expected value of products sold, E(µ(1 − λ)).
I get similar predictions if, alternatively, I assume that agents care about the expected time spent selling,
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from a continuous density f , where σi ≥ 0 and γi ≥ 0. Finally, I denote with N the number
of applicants.
The effect of stronger financial incentives, or equivalently higher expected earnings Yˆ , on
the applicant pool depends on whether increasing Yˆ affects λˆ. This is represented in Figure
A.I(a). In the No Inference scenario (λˆ′(Yˆ ) = 0), a higher Yˆ encourages an extra number of
agents to apply, while discouraging no one. Indeed, the expected utility function of potential
applicants with σi > 0 increases with Yˆ , i.e., Uˆ ′i(Yˆ ) > 0, while the expected utility of agents
who do not care about selling products (σi = 0) is unaffected by Yˆ and Uˆi
′
(Yˆ ) = 0. As a
consequence, raising Yˆ unambiguously increases the number of applicants: N ′(Yˆ ) > 0.
In the Inference scenario (λˆ′(Yˆ ) < 0), increasing Yˆ is “good news” for agents with little
prosocial motivation and a large interest in sales, but “bad news” for those with large prosocial
motivation and little interest in sales. As a consequence, increasing Yˆ both crowds in and
crowds out agents. Individuals who are crowded out have a higher γi and lower σi than those
who are crowded in. A higher Yˆ increases the number of applicants (N ′(Yˆ ) > 0) only if the
weight given to B is larger than the weight given to C by the distribution f - see bottom graph
of Figure A.I(a). For a given distribution f , the stronger is the inference on λˆ, i.e., the larger
is |λˆ′(Yˆ )|, the larger is the area C relative to B, and the less likely it is that N ′(Yˆ ) > 0.50
Result 1: Number of Applicants. The effect of financial incentives on the applicant
pool depends on whether incentives carry a signal about the social output. (i) In the “No
Inference” scenario (λˆ′(Yˆ ) = 0), higher financial incentives increase the number of applicants
(N ′(Yˆ ) > 0) without displacing applicants with high prosocial motivation. (ii) In the “Infer-
ence” scenario (λˆ′(Yˆ ) < 0), higher financial incentives displace applicants with high prosocial
motivation and have an ambiguous effect on the number of applicants N .
Result 1 is tested in Section 5 of the paper.
Agent’s Choice: Retention
Once on the job, workers learn λ and their own realization of yi and decide whether to stay
on the job or whether to drop out. An agent is retained only if her participation constraint
remains satisfied:
Ui = σiyi(1− λ) + γisλ ≥ u¯. (8)
Conditional on being recruited, any worker who is “prosocial” enough, i.e., γi ≥ u¯sλ , is always
retained. Because there is a positive probability that yi = 0, no matter the level of σi, agents
with γi ≤ u¯sλ drop out with a positive probability G( u¯−γisλσi(1−λ) − µ).
E(1− λ).
50Whether increasing Yˆ decreases or increases the average prosociality and interest in sales in the appli-
cant pool depends on f and in particular on the correlation between prosociality and interest in sales in the
population.
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Let Yˆ1 be the level of expected earnings, which, in expectation, equals the average realized
earnings: Yˆ1 = µ(1− λ). As represented in Figure A.I(b), any agent lying on the solid black
locus is indifferent between applying or not when the position is advertised with Yˆ1 and,
once recruited, drops out with probability 12 . Agents lying below this black solid locus drop
out with a probability larger than 12 , while all agents lying above the locus drop out with a
probability smaller than 12 .
All else being equal, the probability of dropping out decreases with stronger prosocial
motivation γi and higher interest in sales σi.
51 Which preference parameter is the strongest
predictor of retention (all else being equal) depends on the relative importance of the social
benefits sλ with respect to the average monetary benefits µ(1−λ). In positions that generate
relatively high social output but low average earnings (such as the health position analyzed
in this paper), all else being equal, the marginal increase in retention with respect to γi is
larger than the increase with respect to σi.
The information that Yˆ conveys on λˆ at the recruitment stage impacts the effect of in-
creasing Yˆ on the total number of workers retained R, i.e., the number of agents initially
recruited who decide to stay. If all recruited workers stay, then R = N . As presented in the
top graph of Figure A.I(b), in the No Inference scenario, raising Yˆ increases the number of
retained workers: R′(Yˆ ) > 0. Indeed, a higher Yˆ increases the number of workers recruited
N , and a proportion of these subsequently remain active.
In the Inference scenario (bottom graph), the effect of increasing Yˆ on R is instead am-
biguous. The sign of R′(Yˆ ) depends on (a) the sizes of the areas B, C1, and C2, i.e., the
intensity of the signal, (b) the weights given to B, C1, and C2 by the distribution f , and (c)
the distribution of earnings g.
Result 2: Number of Retained Workers. The effect of expected earnings Yˆ on the
number of workers retained depends on whether they carry a signal about the social output.
(i) In the “No Inference” scenario (λˆ′(Yˆ ) = 0), higher expected earnings increase the total
number of retained workers (R′(Yˆ ) > 0). (ii) In the “Inference” scenario (λˆ′(Yˆ ) < 0), higher
expected earnings have an ambiguous effect on the number of retained workers R.
Result 2 is tested in Section 6 of the paper. In the No Inference scenario, increasing Yˆ
above Yˆ1 reduces conditional retention, i.e., the proportion of the recruited agents who stay
(RN ). Conditional on being recruited, agents who are crowded in (area B) are indeed more
likely to drop out than other recruited workers (areas A1 and A2).
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51If σi is not held constant, then the effect of prosocial motivation on dropping out is negative only if the
correlation between γi and σi is not too negative.
52Note that the predictions change if Yˆ increases from level Yˆ2 to Yˆ1, where Yˆ2 < Yˆ1. Whenever agents are
recruited with expectations Yˆ2, they perceive the job as being more social than it actually is. As a consequence,
agents with strong prosocial preferences may end up dropping out from the position if the discrepancy between
λˆ−λ is negative enough. In this case, for levels of Yˆ below Yˆ1, increasing Yˆ reduces retention only if the signal
is weak enough (|λˆ′(Yˆ )| is small enough).
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In the Inference scenario, the effect of increasing Yˆ above Yˆ1 on conditional retention is
negative if retention among the agents who are crowded out (areas C1, C2) is large enough.
In this case, we can end up in a situation in which increasing Yˆ above Yˆ1 leads to more
agents being recruited but fewer being retained (N ′(Yˆ ) > 0, R′(Yˆ ) < 0). This situation is
more likely to arise for positions that generate relatively high social output and low average
earnings (such as the health position analyzed in this paper).
Result 3: In the “Inference” scenario (λˆ′(Yˆ ) < 0), higher expected earnings Yˆ may
increase the total number of recruited workers (N ′(Yˆ ) > 0) while reducing the number of
retained workers (R′(Yˆ ) < 0).
Although the results for retention are driven, in my specific framework, by the discrepancy
between expectations and realizations (Yˆ 6= Y ), the same predictions would hold in a model in
which the principal changes the real incentives Y rather than the earnings expectations Yˆ , and
in which recruited workers have a probability of receiving an offer for another, better-paying
position and then decide whether to quit.
Extension 1: Adding Agents’ Effort
The model abstracts from the possibility that agents shirk. The intuition of the model holds if
I introduce shirking on any of the two tasks as long as a minimum level of λ is imposed by the
principal. In particular, the predictions for selection remain similar as long as agents’ ex-ante
perception of the minimum level of effort they will be “required” to exert on the private task
increases with expected earnings. Once on the job, the choice of how much effort to exert on
the social and the private tasks differs according to agents’ preferences. All else being equal,
the optimal level of effort on the private task increases with interest in sales σi, while effort
on the social task increases with prosocial motivation γi.
The effort predictions change if we consider the more realistic case in which performance
in the social task has two dimensions: social-output “quantity” (e.g., number of households
visited) and social-output “quality” (e.g., information content of the visits, types of house-
holds visited). If “quality” is harder to monitor by the principal than “quantity,” the model
predicts little shirking on sales and social-output quantities but more shirking on social-output
quality. In particular, the effort exerted in providing high-quality health services increases
with prosocial motivation γi. This would predict that signaling high financial returns may
actually decrease effort and performance on the job. This possibility is explored in Section 7.
Extension 2: Modeling the Principal’s Problem
In order to make the theoretical framework as similar as possible to the empirical setting,
I set up the problem of the principal as one in which, rather than choosing the financial
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incentives, the principal chooses the optimal earnings expectations Yˆ to give to the agents,
by manipulating the Yˆ advertised in the recruitment message of the position.
I assume a three-period model. In period 0, the principal chooses Yˆ . After seeing Yˆ and
forming expectations (λˆ and µˆ), agents decide whether to apply, and the principal recruits
workers from the pool of applicants. In period 1, recruited agents work. By the end of the
period, they have learned λ and their own realization of yi and decide whether to stay on the
job. In period 2, agents who decide to stay continue working while those who drop out stop
working. I assume that the principal recruits workers in period 1 only.
As already mentioned, the principal asks agents to spend a proportion λ of their time on
the social task and 1− λ on the private task. While the principal gets no monetary benefits
from letting the agent work on the social task, she earns y˜ from each unit of time the agent
spends on the private task.53 The larger is λ, the larger is the relative weight the principal
puts on the social output s relative to money y˜. Given the absence of moral hazard (every
worker puts the same effort once hired), the utility of the principal from hiring an agent in a
given period is the same across workers and equals sλ+ y˜(1− λ).
The position is self-sustainable and the costs of the social task are covered by the private
task. The private task pays the workers a salary and covers the fixed per-period cost T of
training and monitoring agents. If the principal cares exclusively about the social task, she
chooses λ¯ = 1− Ty˜ < 1. The more the principal cares about the private task, the larger is λ,
where λ  [λ¯, 1).
Given the absence of moral hazard and the self-sustainability of the position, the goal of
the principal is to recruit and retain as many agents as possible:
maxYˆ
(
N(Yˆ ) + δR(Yˆ )
)
,
where δ is the discount rate, which is lower if the need for hiring workers is urgent, N is the
number of workers recruited in period 1, and R is the number of workers retained in period
2 (R < N).54
When Yˆ provides no signal on λˆ (λˆ′(Yˆ ) = 0), both N ′(Yˆ ) and R′(Yˆ ) are positive, and
it is thus optimal for the principal to increase Yˆ as much as she can, no matter what the
discount rate is. On the other hand, if Yˆ provides a signal about λˆ (λˆ′(Yˆ ) < 0), increasing
Yˆ may backfire. Three cases, which depend on the intensity of the signal |λˆ′(Yˆ )|, need to be
53This is equivalent to saying that an hour of work on the private task yields a total profit Mi = y˜+ yi. The
principal and the worker split the profits: a fixed amount y˜ goes to the principal, while yi = Mi − y˜ goes to
the agent. An alternative way of modeling the split is to assume that the principal takes a proportion α of the
total profit Mi, while 1− α goes to the agent. Predictions remain similar.
54An alternative model is one in which the principal recruits a single worker among all the applicants. If the
probability of filling a position is strictly smaller than one and is affected by the way the position is advertised,
then the predictions on the number of hired workers remain similar. However, the fact that the principal
selects one worker among different applicants may attenuate or exacerbate differences in the applicant pool,
depending on whether workers’ preferences are observable to the principal.
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considered. If the signal is strong enough such that N ′(Yˆ ) < 0, it is optimal for the recruiter
to choose the lowest possible Yˆ , as R′(Yˆ ) is also negative. In the opposite case in which the
signal is weak enough such that both N ′(Yˆ ) > 0 and R′(Yˆ ) > 0, the recruiter chooses Yˆ the
highest possible. Finally, in intermediary cases with N ′(Yˆ ) > 0 but R′(Yˆ ) < 0, a trade-off
arises and the principal sets a high Yˆ only if δ is low enough, i.e., the health situation is
urgent such that the principal gives more weight to the short-term workforce relative to the
long-term workforce.
As a conclusion, it is optimal for the principal to advertise the position with high expected
earnings Yˆ only if (a) Yˆ conveys no signal on the social output, or (b) Yˆ conveys a weak
negative signal on the social output such that the number of applicants increases with Yˆ
(N ′(Yˆ ) > 0) and the discount rate is low enough.
It is important to note that the objective function of the principal would be different if the
maximization problem were subject to a budget constraint, e.g., if the fixed cost of training
workers in the first period are too large to be covered by the profits that the principal makes
in one single period. In this case, the principal can recruit only a specific number of agents
rather than all the applicants. As soon as the number of applicants exceeds the number of
workers to be recruited, the value of N no longer matters for the principal. Retention becomes
crucial: the principal cares about recruiting workers who are retained in the second period,
while recruiting a worker who is not retained leads to a loss.
B The Treatment Effects’ Underlying Mechanisms
Section 3 provides evidence that the higher the point revealed in the earnings distribution, the
higher the expected earnings. This appendix discusses the potential underlying mechanisms.
Firstly, as the recruitment was carried out in areas where the health program was previ-
ously nonexistent, the experiment context is subject to incomplete information. Individuals
may thus update their beliefs about the earnings distribution differently when different points
of the distribution are revealed, therefore changing the expected average income.55 Note,
however, that this updating story is consistent with the findings only under specific priors,
i.e., the maximum is lower than 200 thousand UGX and the minimum is higher than 7 thou-
sand UGX. Given that 7 thousand (200 thousand) UGX translates into earnings per hour
that are well below (above) the average per hour earnings in Uganda, these priors are realis-
tic. To corroborate this, I collected information on agents’ priors for 102 microfinance clients
55The updating of beliefs as a consequence of an information campaign has been examined empirically in
many settings (e.g., Jensen 2010). In the labor market, Osman (2014) shows that providing information about
the whole distribution of incomes in different occupations to high school students in Egypt leads to changes
in beliefs about the average expected income in the different occupations. Beam (2013) finds that informing
Filipinos on the average earnings of overseas Filipino workers affects their expected wage abroad if their baseline
beliefs are wrong.
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across 10 BRAC microfinance groups of Kabale district, where the health program was not
yet present. The respondents were first asked to observe the same CHP recruitment leaflet as
the one in Figure I, but without the sentence “CHPs earn at least 7 (an average of 30) (up
to 200) thousand UGX per month.” They were then asked to answer the following question:
“Imagine a very bad (good) month in which a CHP sells very few (many) health products.
How much would a CHP earn in this very bad (good) month?” The results indicate that,
across respondents, the perceived minimum earnings takes a median value of 20 thousand
UGX, while the median perceived maximum equals 155 thousand UGX. This suggests that
the updating story is indeed a potential mechanism.
A second potential explanation is that salience matters: the amount on the recruitment
message may be a focal point (Bordalo et al. 2013; Chetty et al. 2009), and the task could
be perceived as more lucrative in some vague sense, unrelated to a more complex updating
story. Other theories, such as the overweighting of small probabilities, could also explain the
results.
While I am not able to disentangle these mechanisms, I use the treatments as an exogenous
source of variation of earnings expectations and use this to test the effect of financial incentives
on perceptions of other job attributes (Section 4), selection (Section 5), retention (Section 6),
and performance (Section 7).
C The Household Survey
C.1 Sampling and Data
A random sample of ten households in each CHP’s area (ten percent of the CHP clients)
were interviewed from July-September 2013, roughly a year after the CHPs were recruited.
Without a full census of residents from which to draw a random sample within each village, it
was necessary to select the households to be interviewed through a “random walk” method.
Enumerators started walking from the CHP house, moving in the direction of the sun, and
attempted to visit every fifth house on the road. If no one was home, they interviewed the
house on the right. If there was still no one home, they moved to the house on the left. After
each interview, they repeated the same procedure, skipping another four households before
interviewing the fifth. At the end of a road, they were instructed to alternate directions (right,
left, right, etc.).56
Table A.XIII provides evidence that the sample is balanced across treatment groups on
a number of observed characteristics, e.g., distance to CHP house, number of children below
age 5, number of female household members of reproductive age. Twenty-one percent of
56The survey covers 299 out of the 301 villages. Two villages (one for a CHP who dropped out and the
other for an active CHP), were kept out of the survey in the Adjumani branch due to problems accessing the
villages.
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the households interviewed are “priority households”—i.e., at the time of the interview, the
household included at least one pregnant woman or one woman who had given birth in the 6
months before the interview. Reassuringly, the percentage of priority households is balanced
across treatments. Because the data are not balanced on whether the respondent is a female
or a member of a BRAC microfinance group, I control for these variables in all the household-
level regressions
C.2 Health Knowledge and Health Outcomes
Table A.XVI compares household health knowledge and health outcomes across treatments,
focusing on the three main health problems in Uganda: malaria, diarrhea, and intestinal
worms. Due to limited resources, the data were collected only for the subsample of house-
holds who knew who the CHP was when interviewed. To alleviate the concern that this is a
selected sample of households, I control for the household’s relationship with the CHP (rel-
atives, friends, or acquaintances), distance from the CHP house in walking minutes, gender
of the respondent, household composition (number of children under 5, number of women of
reproductive age), and a dummy for priority households. Moreover, I estimate a weighted
OLS regression that gives each CHP a weight equal to the number of households who know
the CHP. This ensures that areas in which only a few respondents know the CHP are given
less weight in the regression (these respondents are more likely to be a family member or a
friend of the CHP and are less representative of the whole village).
The first thing to note from Table A.XVI is the high incidence of malaria, diarrhea, and
intestinal worms in the study population: in the six months preceding the survey, 70 percent
of the households had a member who suffered from malaria, 23 percent from diarrhea and
15 percent from intestinal worms. Moreover, households lack knowledge on how to treat and
prevent these diseases. Most worrisome is the fact that only 33 percent of the respondents
know that diarrhea should be treated with zinc supplementation plus oral dehydration salts.
The results indicate that households located in the village of a CHP recruited in the high-
pay treatment are 24 percent less likely to know how to treat diarrhea (significant at the 5
percent level) than households located in the low-pay treatment. Moreover, the probability
of a household member suffering from malaria, diarrhea, or intestinal worms is higher in the
high-pay treatment, although the only coefficient that is significant is the one for intestinal
worms: households are 37 percent more likely to have suffered from worms in the high-pay
treatment than in the low-pay treatment. Overall, this table provides suggestive evidence that
CHPs recruited in the low-pay treatment were more efficient in informing their community
about health along a number of dimensions, although not all of them.
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D Drop-out and Performance Elasticities
This appendix estimates the exact drop-out and performance elasticities with respect to ex-
pected earnings by instrumenting CHP earnings expectations with the random treatment
assignment. Because the data on expectations were collected before the CHPs began work-
ing, the estimated elasticities incorporate the selection effect, i.e., agents who apply for a job
that is perceived as being more lucrative have different traits, and have a different propensity
to drop out, than agents who self-select into a less lucrative job.
The instrumental variable strategy is valid only if the exogeneity condition is satisfied, i.e.,
the treatments impact retention and performance only through a change in expected earnings.
This condition is violated if the treatments impact selection through a change in the perceived
income variability, which itself impacts retention. Since no selection is found on risk aversion
(see Section 5.2), I can rule out this possibility. The exogeneity assumption is also violated
if the treatments have a direct impact on the behavior of BRAC after the recruitment stage,
which subsequently impacts retention and performance. This could happen, for instance, if
BRAC decided to set different targets of performance across treatments or monitored more
intensively in some treatments than in others. This hypothesis can be ruled out, as BRAC
policies are the same all over Uganda and are determined by the Bangladesh head office.
Finally, the exogeneity condition is violated if the differences between earnings expectations
of the CHPs and those of the other microfinance clients varies significantly across treatments.
If this difference-in-difference is significant, my treatments could impact retention through the
selection of specific types of agents, e.g., the most optimistic women (with very high expected
earnings) are recruited in the high-pay treatment and the most pessimistic ones (low expected
earnings) in the low-pay treatment. Because the data on expectations in the recruitment
experiment are available for the 301 selected CHPs and not for the whole microfinance group,
I am not able to rule out this possible violation. Nonetheless, there is no specific reason to
believe this would happen.
Table A.XVII estimates the same results as in Tables VII to X using the instrumental
variable strategy rather than a reduced form approach. The results remain consistent with the
OLS ones, e.g., a one-standard-deviation increase in expected earnings increases the dropout
rate by 15 percentage points, while it decreases the overall number of households visited per
month by 9 percent (see Part A of Table A.XVII). The F-statistic from the first stage equals
27 and validates the relevant condition. Part B and C of Table A.XVII provides further
evidence that increasing expected earnings reduces the probability that CHP health services
target priority households, that a household knows how to treat diarrhea (one of the most
deadly diseases in Uganda) and increases the probability that a family member suffers from
intestinal worms.
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E The Powerful Role of the Advertisement Strategy
Organizations are concerned about two key challenges: how to motivate workers and how
to retain the best ones. Empirical evidence highlights the role of financial incentives as a
solution to both of these challenges, through a selection or an incentive effect (see Bandiera
et al. 2011 for a review). However, financial incentives are costly and may not be the most
cost-effective solution. This paper sheds light on the advertisement strategy of a position
as an alternative cheaper way of improving the retention and performance of workers. In
particular, I show that manipulating agent expectations at the recruitment stage has a strong
effect on the selection of workers and, thus, on retention and aggregate performance. I indeed
find that BRAC can increase the retention of workers by 72 percent simply by low-balling the
position, i.e., lowering earnings expectations, and this can be done at zero cost.
Choosing an appropriate advertisement strategy is particularly relevant for jobs with ex-
ante ambiguous earnings, i.e., jobs in which both the applicants and the recruiter do not
know, at the recruitment stage, how much each applicant will earn if recruited. In this type of
job—e.g., jobs that pay a piece-rate, a performance bonus, or in zero-hours contracts—workers
do not receive a fixed wage each month. Earnings vary across workers depending on the
characteristics of the applicant (e.g., ability and motivation) and/or the characteristics of
the applicant’s environment (e.g., in a sales position, earnings depend on the demand; in
position with team bonuses, earnings depend on the performance of others, etc.). During
the recruitment stage, the organization needs to convey information on the compensation
level of the position to potential applicants and has the choice of advertising the position
as being better or worse paying. Although this paper provides evidence that this can be
done by making salient different points of the earnings distributions (revealing the top of the
distribution versus the bottom), the recruiter can certainly vary expectations in other ways.
In the case of a piece-rate position, the organization can for instance vary the information
conveyed on the “difficulty” of a task; in zero-hour contracts, the expected number of days of
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+     Become highly trained on how to treat and prevent them 
 
 
Do you want to become  
COMMUNITY HEALTH PROMOTER? 
Only literate women are eligible 
How much will you earn? 
 Buy medicines and health products from BRAC at a low price (panadol, fortified oil, soap, etc.) 
 Sell them at a price higher than purchase price 
 The more you sell, the more you earn 
 
      CHPs earn up to 200,000 Ushs per month 
 
The exist ng CHPs earn up to 200,000 Ushs. 
 
Only literate women are eligible 
 
Figure I(c): High-Pay Treatment 
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    











    
    
    
    
    




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































    
    



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Randomization at the microfinance group (village) level
# obs. mean s.d. F-stat p Diff p
Part 1: Village data 
Number of households in the village 315 182.95 100.48 0.75 0.47 16.05 0.22
Distance to BRAC branch office (in walking minutes) 315 41.12 40.61 0.09 0.91 -2.42 0.66
Distance to nearest public health clinic/hospital (in walking minutes) 315 50.09 54.78 0.02 0.98 -1.08 0.87
Distance to nearest drugshop (in walking minutes) 315 22.55 24.81 0.91 0.40 -4.57 0.19
Distance to nearest source of drinking water (in walking minutes) 315 19.48 22.48 0.71 0.49 3.78 0.24
Village receives radio broadcast 315 0.88 0.33 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.96
Village receives television broadcast 315 0.70 0.46 1.74 0.18 0.12 0.07
Village receives newspapers 315 0.62 0.49 0.39 0.68 -0.05 0.43
Number of BRAC microfinance clients (potential candidates for CHP 
position) 
315 15.44 3.95 0.36 0.70 0.46 0.40
Age 4799 34.42 8.34 0.43 0.65 0.33 0.36
Married 4796 0.73 0.44 0.09 0.91 0.01 0.67
Highest education level completed 4789 5.90 3.59 1.07 0.34 0.29 0.18
Self-employed in a non-farming activity 4757 0.66 0.47 0.26 0.77 -0.03 0.51
Weekly earnings (in thousands of UGX) 4267 72.02 264.33 0.00 1.00 0.98 0.95
Number of work hours per week 4735 55.05 27.83 0.54 0.58 -2.16 0.32
Number of children under age 5 4298 1.48 1.12 0.63 0.53 0.06 0.28
Number of rooms in the house 4674 3.09 1.66 0.30 0.74 0.09 0.46
Has ever volunteered in the health sector 4863 0.08 0.27 0.19 0.83 0.01 0.57
The most important feature of a job is…
"to have a positive impact on the community" (community driven) 4751 0.42 0.49 0.65 0.52 0.04 0.31
"to earn money" (money driven) 4751 0.37 0.48 0.68 0.51 -0.04 0.25
"to earn respect from the community" (respect driven) 4751 0.21 0.41 0.07 0.93 0.01 0.70
Owns a shop 4639 0.16 0.36 1.22 0.30 -0.03 0.17
Has ever sold health-related products 4863 0.09 0.28 0.61 0.54 0.02 0.27
Part 2: BRAC microfinance-clients data (potential candidates for the CHP position) 
Joint test of significance: p-value =  0.95
Notes: The first three columns report the number of observations, means and standard deviations. “Joint Test” reports the F-statistic and p-value 
from a joint test of the significance of the set of treatment dummies in explaining each variable, using robust standard errors in part 1 and 
standard errors clustered at the microfinance group (village) level in part 2. The last two columns report the largest difference in means and the 
lowest p-value from the associated t-test between pairs of treatment groups, using robust standard errors in part 1 and standard errors clustered 
at the microfinance group (village) level in part 2. The joint test of significance, reported at the bottom of the table, uses a multinomial logit 
model to test whether the covariates, aggregated at the village level, jointly predict treatment assignment, using robust standard errors. The null 
hypothesis is that all covariates together have no predictive power in predicting treatment assignment.  "Distance to BRAC branch office" 
calculates the number of walking minutes from the center of the community to the closest BRAC office (similar definition for the other distance 
measures). "Highest education level completed" takes value 0 for "no education", 1 for "primary school-year 1" (...) 7 for "primary school-year 7", 
8 "secondary school-year 1" (...) 13 "secondary school-year 6". "Self-employed in a non-farming activity" equals one if the main earnings activity 
is a non-farming self-employment activity rather than involvement in agriculture. "Weekly earnings" equal earnings in a typical week from all 
working activities, i.e., the main activity and other side activities, expressed in thousands of UGX and truncated at the top at 1%. "Number of 
work hours per week" is the total number of hours worked on these activities in a typical week. "Has ever volunteered in the health sector" 
equals one if the respondent has ever worked as a health volunteer. A respondent is community driven if she reports that "having a positive 
impact on others in the community" is more important as a job characteristics than earnings money or earnings respect (similar definitions for 
"money driven" or "respect driven"). "Has ever sold health-related products" equals one if the respondent has ever sold products such as 
medicine, soap, fortified oil, iodized salt, etc. The number of observations changes from one variable to another in part 2 because of the presence 
of missing values.
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































(1) (2) (3) (4)
                           TRAIT   →
Has ever 
volunteered 










TRAIT 0.2812*** 0.0865*** 0.0271 0.0503
(0.05) (0.02) (0.03) (0.04)
TRAIT * Medium-Pay Treatment -0.0017 -0.0441 0.0233 0.1156*
(0.06) (0.03) (0.04) (0.06)
TRAIT * High-Pay Treatment -0.1621** -0.0882*** 0.0566 0.1587**
(0.06) (0.03) (0.05) (0.06)
Mean of TRAIT in Low-Pay Treatment 0.079 0.427 0.166 0.081
Observations (Potential Candidate) 4,330 4,252 4,150 4,330
R-squared 0.229 0.210 0.203 0.215
p-value Trait*Med=Trait*High 0.013 0.204 0.488 0.519
p-value Trait*Low=Trait*Med=Trait*High 0.017 0.025 0.483 0.027
Table V: Treatment Effects on Applicants' Traits
Sample: Potential candidates (BRAC microfinance clients)
Dependent variable =1 if the potential candidate applies for the CHP position, 
=0 if the potential candidate does not apply
Interest in salesProsocial preferences
Notes: OLS estimates. Errors clustered at the microfinance-group level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
Whether a potential applicant (microfinance client) applies for the position is regressed on different 
"TRAITS" interacted with the treatments. All regressions include microfinance-group fixed effects 
and control for number of work hours per week, self-employed in a non-farming activity, age, 
marital status, highest education level completed, house size. Results are robust to not adding the 
controls.  "Has ever volunteered in the health sector" equals one if the respondent has ever worked 
as a health volunteer. A respondent is community driven if she reports that "having a positive 
impact on others in the community" is more important as a job characteristics than earnings money 
or earnings respect (similar definitions for "money driven" or "respect driven").  "Has ever sold 
health-related products" equals one if the respondent has ever sold products such as medicine, soap, 
fortified oil, iodized salt, etc. Number of observations varies from one column to the next due to 
missing values in dependent variables.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
         
TRAIT =1 if potential candidate…   →   
Has ever 
volunteered 











1(TRAIT=1) 0.2749*** 0.0703*** 0.0302 0.0834**
(0.04) (0.02) (0.03) (0.04)
1(TRAIT=1) * Medium-Pay Treatment -0.0121 -0.0073 0.0188 0.0710
(0.06) (0.02) (0.04) (0.06)
1(TRAIT=0) * Medium-Pay Treatment 0.0197 0.0326* 0.0167 0.0114
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01)
1(TRAIT=1) * High-Pay Treatment -0.1078* -0.0139 0.0738* 0.1318**
(0.06) (0.02) (0.04) (0.06)
1(TRAIT=0) * High-Pay Treatment 0.0550*** 0.0768*** 0.0320* 0.0303*
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Mean dep var for 1(TRAIT=0)  in Low-Pay T. 0.028 0.195 0.061 0.029
Observations (Potential Candidate) 4,330 4,252 4,150 4,330
R-squared 0.135 0.115 0.109 0.121
p-value Trait1*Med=Trait0*Med 0.586 0.776 0.191 0.305
p-value Trait1*High=Trait0*High 0.007 0.002 0.369 0.090
p-value Trait1*Med=Trait1*High 0.106 0.158 0.955 0.319
p-value Trait0*Med=Trait0*High 0.032 0.033 0.331 0.268
Interest in salesProsocial preferences
Notes: OLS estimates. Errors clustered at the microfinance-group level.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
Regressions control for branch fixed effects and for number of work hours per week, self-employed in a non-
farming activity, age, marital status, highest education level completed, house size.  "Has ever volunteered in 
the health sector" equals one if the respondent has ever worked as a health volunteer. A respondent is 
community driven if she reports that "having a positive impact on others in the community" is more 
important as a job characteristics than earnings money or earnings respect (similar definitions for "money 
driven" or "respect driven"). "Has ever sold health-related products" equals one if the respondent has ever 
sold products such as medicine, soap, fortified oil, iodized salt, etc. 
Table VI: Treatment Effects on Crowding Out and 
Crowding In of Applicants' Traits
Sample: Potential candidates (BRAC microfinance clients)
Dependent variable =1 if the potential candidate applies for the CHP position, 




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Medium-Pay Treatment 0.0818 0.0391 0.0827
(0.06) (0.06) (0.07)
High-Pay Treatment 0.1359** 0.0901 0.0953
(0.06) (0.06) (0.07)
Amount donated (dictator game) -0.1782*** -0.1353**
(0.05) (0.06)




Owns a shop 0.0610
(0.07)
Has ever sold health-related products -0.2300***
(0.07)
Controls No No Yes
Mean of dep var in Low-Pay Treatment 0.189 0.189 0.189
Observations (CHPs) 301 301 271
R-squared 0.131 0.157 0.258
p-value Med=High 0.381 0.405 0.850
p-value Low=Med=High 0.071 0.332 0.288
Notes: OLS estimates. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * 
p<0.1.  All regressions include branch fixed effects. Column 3 additionally includes 
individual controls (number of work hours per week, self-employed in a non-farming 
activity, age, marital status, highest education level completed, house size) and village-
level controls (see list in Table II). "Amount donated" is estimated by playing a 
contextualized dictator game in which the CHPs were asked, privately and 
confidentially,  for voluntary donations to a public health NGO. "Has ever volunteered 
in the health sector" equals one if the respondent has ever worked as a health 
volunteer. A respondent is community driven if she reports that "having a positive 
impact on others in the community" is more important as a job characteristics than 
earnings money or earnings respect. "Has ever sold health-related products" equals one 
if the respondent has ever sold products such as medicine, soap, fortified oil, iodized 
salt, etc.
Table IX:  Treatment Effects on Dropping Out
Dependent Variable =1 if the CHP has dropped out within two years of 
recruitment, =0  if CHP is retained















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































No Inference Scenario:  𝝀! !!𝒀!! = 𝟎 
 



















out by increasing 
expected earnings 
from 𝒀!𝟏 to 𝒀!𝟐 
𝛾!  (joy of giving) 
Agents crowded in 
by increasing their 
expected earnings 












Figure A.I(a): The Effect of Increasing Expected Earnings  
on the Applicant Pool 
	











𝜎! (joy of selling) 
𝑌! 	↑	
𝑢!𝑠𝜆!(𝑌!!)	
	Notes: Any point in the figures corresponds to an agent with identity (𝜎! , 𝛾!). The line in each figure represents the separation locus: 
all agents above or on the line apply for the position while all those below the line do not apply. In the bottom graph, the crossing 
point between the two separation lines is arbitrary and depends on the intensity of the signal |𝜆!!!𝑌!!|. 


























𝛾! (joy of giving) 
Agents on the Locus: retained 









and retained  
 
A2	
Notes: I assume in this graph that  𝑌!! is the level of expected earnings, which, in expectation, equals the average realized 
earnings: 𝑌!! = !(1- 𝜆) and that  𝜆!!𝑌!!! = 𝜆.  See notes in Figure A.I(a) for more details.  
	
Figure A.I(b): The Effect of Increasing Expected Earnings 




𝛾! (joy of giving) 





Agents crowded in by 
increasing 𝒀!𝟏 to  𝒀!𝟐: 
retained with 
probability < 𝟏 𝟐⁄  
Agents crowded out by 
increasing 𝒀!𝟏 to 𝒀!𝟐: would 
be retained if recruited 
	
Retained with probability > 𝟏 𝟐⁄  






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































    
    
    
    
    
    
    































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































=1 if potential candidate 
applies for the CHP 
position
=1 if applicant is 
appointed as CHP by 
BRAC
Sample Potential Candidates Applicants
Has ever volunteered in the health sector 0.2335*** 0.1300***
(0.03) (0.05)
Community driven 0.0158 0.0828**
(0.01) (0.04)
Owns a shop -0.0251 -0.0285
(0.02) (0.05)






Highest education level completed 0.0222*** 0.0240***
(0.00) (0.01)
Self-employed in a non-farming activity -0.0138 0.0251
(0.01) (0.03)
Number of work hours per week -0.0004* -0.0017***
(0.00) (0.00)




Notes: OLS estimates. Errors clustered at the microfinance-group level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
Microfinance Group Fixed Effects included in all the regressions. The first column includes the 
sample of potential candidates (microfinance clients); the second column includes the sample of 
applicants. "Highest education level completed" takes value 0 for "no education", 1 for "primary 
school-year 1" (...) 7 for "primary school-year 7", 8 "secondary school-year 1" (...) 13 "secondary school-
year 6". "Self-employed in a non-farming activity" equals one if the main earnings activity is a non-
farming self-employment activity rather than involvement in agriculture. "Number of work hours 
per week" is the total number of hours worked on these activities in a typical week. "Has ever 
volunteered in the health sector" equals one if the respondent has ever worked as a health volunteer. 
A respondent is community driven if she reports that "having a positive impact on others in the 
community" is more important as a job characteristics than earnings money or earnings respect 
(similar definitions for "money driven" or "respect driven"). "Has ever sold health-related products" 
equals one if the respondent has ever sold products such as medicine, soap, fortified oil, iodized salt, 
etc. 























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Sample:  Microfinance Groups 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)



































OUTCOME VARIABLE   →   
Medium-Pay Treatment 0.0426 0.3690* -0.0179 0.3625** 0.0049 0.3971** 0.1243 0.2873
(0.101) (0.209) (0.150) (0.174) (0.106) (0.192) (0.085) (0.204)
High-Pay Treatment -0.0603 0.7726*** -0.2205 0.8932*** 0.1954 0.4058** 0.2014** 0.5109**
(0.099) (0.225) (0.148) (0.193) (0.127) (0.200) (0.099) (0.223)
Mean of dep var in Low-Pay 0.533 1.686 1.229 0.971 0.495 1.629 0.343 1.876
Observations (Groups) 315 315 315 315 315 315 315 315
R-squared 0.114 0.178 0.168 0.211 0.239 0.216 0.227 0.213
p-value Med=High 0.257 0.076 0.186 0.009 0.089 0.966 0.441 0.322
p-value Low=Med=High 0.520 0.003 0.265 0.000 0.195 0.057 0.103 0.068
OUTCOME VARIABLE   →   
Medium-Pay Treatment 0.0578 0.0470 -0.0412 0.1602** 0.0576 0.0690 0.0955 0.0633
(0.069) (0.053) (0.058) (0.065) (0.061) (0.051) (0.062) (0.046)
High-Pay Treatment -0.0093 0.1423*** -0.1035* 0.3180*** 0.1297** 0.0712 0.0888 0.0702
(0.068) (0.048) (0.061) (0.059) (0.063) (0.050) (0.062) (0.047)
Mean of dep var in Low-Pay 0.400 0.800 0.724 0.514 0.343 0.800 0.295 0.829
Observations (Groups) 315 315 315 315 315 315 315 315
R-squared 0.114 0.113 0.217 0.189 0.239 0.133 0.198 0.115
p-value Med=High 0.320 0.030 0.310 0.007 0.246 0.963 0.916 0.871
p-value Low=Med=High 0.562 0.006 0.242 0.000 0.120 0.297 0.230 0.268
Number of applicants with TRAIT
Notes: OLS estimates. Robust standard errors in parentheses.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  Applicants are 
microfinance members who applied for the CHP position. All regressions include branch fixed effects and control for 
average number of work hours per week in the microfinance group, proportion of microfinance clients who are self-
employed in a non-farming activity, average age in the group, proportion marital status, average highest education 
level completed, average house size. "Has ever volunteered in the health sector" equals one if the respondent has ever 
worked as a health volunteer. A respondent is community driven if she reports that "having a positive impact on others 
in the community" is more important as a job characteristics than earnings money or earnings respect (similar 
definitions for "money driven" or "respect driven"). "Has ever sold health-related products" equals one if the respondent 
has ever sold products such as medicine, soap, fortified oil, iodized salt, etc. 
Table A.VI: Treatment Effects on the Size of the Applicant Pool, 
by Trait






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































(1) (2) (3) (4)
                 TRAIT →
Has ever 
volunteered 











TRAIT 0.1886 0.2950** 0.2995** 0.3153
(0.16) (0.13) (0.15) (0.20)
TRAIT * Medium-Pay Treatment -0.1309 -0.1718 -0.4425** -0.2751
(0.21) (0.18) (0.20) (0.25)
TRAIT * High-Pay Treatment -0.0521 -0.1555 -0.1215 -0.2049
(0.21) (0.17) (0.19) (0.24)
Mean of TRAIT in the  Low-Pay T. 0.240 0.558 0.233 0.155
Observations (Applicants) 749 735 716 749
R-squared 0.381 0.393 0.396 0.383
p-value Trait*Med=Trait*High 0.690 0.922 0.078 0.731
p-value Trait*Low=Trait*Med=Trait*High 0.820 0.587 0.067 0.544
Table A.IX: Treatment Effects on Selection in the 
Candidate Pool
Sample: Applicants 
Prosocial Preferences Interest in sales
Notes:  OLS estimates. Errors clustered at the microfinance-group level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * 
p<0.1.  Whether an applicant is appointed is regressed on different "TRAITS" interacted with the 
treatments. Microfinance Group Fixed Effects included in all the regressions and regressions 
control for number of work hours per week, self-employed in a non-farming activity, age, 
marital status, highest education level completed, house size. Results remain robust to not 
adding the controls. "Has ever volunteered in the health sector" equals one if the respondent has 
ever worked as a health volunteer. A respondent is community driven if she reports that "having 
a positive impact on others in the community" is more important as a job characteristics than 
earnings money or earnings respect (similar definitions for "money driven" or "respect driven"). 
"Has ever sold health-related products" equals one if the respondent has ever sold products such 
as medicine, soap, fortified oil, iodized salt, etc. 
Dependent variable =1 if the applicant is appointed for the CHP position,
 =0 if applicant is not appointed
(1) (2) (3)
Medium-Pay Treatment 0.4590 0.1394 0.4941
(0.31) (0.32) (0.38)
High-Pay Treatment 0.7229** 0.3629 0.6979*
(0.29) (0.32) (0.40)










Controls No No Yes
Observations (CHPs) 6,192 6,192 5,598
p-value Med=High 0.300 0.395 0.530
p-value Low=Med=High 0.0479 0.470 0.207
Table A.X: Treatment Effects on Dropout Rate 
 Proportional Hazard Rate Model
Sample: Community Health Promoters (CHPs)
Dependent Variable = Log of the Hazard Rate of dropping out
Notes: Proportional Hazard Rate (Cox Regressions). Robust standard errors in 
parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Coefficients are not exponentiated. All 
regressions include branch fixed effects. Controls include number of work hours per 
week, self-employed in a non-farming activity, age, marital status, highest education 
level completed, house size, and the list of all village-level controls (see Table I). The 
results remain robust to using other parametric hazard rate regressions (e.g., Weibull, 
exponential). "Amount donated" is estimated by playing a contextualized dictator 
game in which the CHPs were asked, privately and confidentially,  for voluntary 
donations to a public health NGO.  "Has ever volunteered in the health sector" equals 
one if the respondent has ever worked as a health volunteer. A respondent is 
community driven if she reports that "having a positive impact on others in the 
community" is more important as a job characteristics than earnings money or 
earnings respect (similar definitions for "money driven" or "respect driven"). "Has 
ever sold health-related products" equals one if the respondent has ever sold products 
such as medicine, soap, fortified oil, iodized salt, etc.
Has ever volunteered in the health sector















    
    
    
    
    
    
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
VARIABLES
Medium-Pay Treatment 4.412 4.3817 4.6329 4.0549 5.4180* 2.1241 0.2378 0.1882 0.0017 -0.4639 -0.3856 -0.4138
(5.36) (5.29) (5.42) (2.90) (3.01) (2.61) (0.38) (0.39) (0.37) (0.32) (0.32) (0.34)
High-Pay Treatment -5.0483 -5.0810 -6.9057 -0.1329 1.3377 -0.7052 0.2654 0.2118 0.0376 -0.3439 -0.2594 -0.4081
(4.55) (4.54) (5.14) (2.14) (2.10) (2.11) (0.39) (0.41) (0.40) (0.31) (0.32) (0.33)
Amount donated -0.1337 4.5189 6.0152** 3.5683 -0.2189-0.3926 0.3455 0.3815
(5.53) (6.44) (2.80) (2.89) (0.28) (0.36) (0.25) (0.31)
0.5283 -2.8248 0.2213 0.7366**
(4.91) (2.69) (0.40) (0.30)
Community driven -3.3037 -2.2397 0.0440 -0.3956
(5.25) (2.17) (0.32) (0.29)
Owns a shop 4.9930 2.5602 -0.3886 0.0238
(6.03) (2.75) (0.40) (0.36)
1.0135 -0.6026 0.8239 0.5349
(6.23) (2.90) (0.52) (0.40)
Mean in Low-Pay T. 48.861 48.861 48.861 51.761 51.761 51.761 7.489 7.489 7.489 6.859 6.859 6.859
Observations (CHPs) 267 267 256 267 267 256 267 267 256 267 267 256
R-squared 0.255 0.255 0.265 0.744 0.749 0.764 0.711 0.711 0.729 0.252 0.255 0.287
p-value Med=High 0.084 0.085 0.065 0.115 0.118 0.228 0.943 0.951 0.930 0.723 0.709 0.987
p-value Low=Med=High 0.208 0.211 0.170 0.266 0.185 0.481 0.754 0.848 0.995 0.310 0.461 0.354
Medium-Pay Treatment -2.4494 -0.3128 -0.2757 -0.1789
(2.79) (3.92) (0.68) (0.40)
High-Pay Treatment -3.4956 -5.6087 -0.8927 -0.4416
(2.94) (3.96) (0.76) (0.42)
Mean in Low-Pay T. 38.084 53.076 9.857 6.764
Observations (MF Groups) 315 315 315 311
p-value Med=High 0.721 0.208 0.385 0.526
p-value Low=Med=High 0.464 0.309 0.486 0.567
Part 2:  Sample incudes all 315 Microfinance Groups; 
outcome variables = average monthly performance in the period May 2013-April 2014;
 the 14 microfinance groups in which no CHP was recruited are assigned a zero average monthly performance
Sold health-related products
Volunteered in the health sector
Notes: OLS estimates. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. All regressions include branch 
fixed effects. Sales profits are expressed in thousands of UGX. The "score given by BRAC to CHP performance" is a score 
out of 10 that each CHP supervisor gave to the CHP, considering all the performance dimensions, one year after their 
recruitment. "Amount donated" is estimated by playing a contextualized dictator game in which the CHPs were asked, 
privately and confidentially,  for voluntary donations to a public health NGO. "Has ever volunteered in the health sector" 
equals one if the respondent has ever worked as a health volunteer. A respondent is community driven if she reports that 
"having a positive impact on others in the community" is more important as a job characteristics than earnings money or 
earnings respect. "Has ever sold health-related products" equals one if the respondent has ever sold products such as 
medicine, soap, fortified oil, iodized salt, etc. 
Table A.XII: Treatment Effects on Performance using 





per month  
Number of pre- 
and postnatal 
checks
Score given by 
BRAC to CHP 
performance 
Part 1:  Sample restricted to the 267 CHPs active in May 2013; 
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Expected Earnings (in s.d.) -5.0963
(3.33)
Mean of dep.var. 34.65
Observations (CHPs) 286
F stat: 1st stage 26.74
Part B: Household Data
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Expected Earnings (in s.d.) 0.0064 0.0249 0.0196 0.0520 -0.1177 -0.0969
(0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.12) (0.13)




Mean of dep.var. 2,432 2,400 2,404 2,372 2,372 2,341
Observations (HHs) 0.612 0.612 0.538 0.538 0.985 0.985
F stat: 1st stage 22.57 13.52 23.08 13.20 22.19 13.15
Part C: Household Data - Health Knowledge and Health Outcomes
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Malaria Diarrhea Worms Malaria Diarrhea Worms Malaria Diarrhea Worms
Expected Earnings (in s.d.) 0.0161 -0.1170** -0.0177 -0.0015 0.0201 0.0169 0.0377 0.0246 0.0702*
(0.03) (0.05) (0.04) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.05) (0.03) (0.04)
Mean of dep.var. 1,408 1,408 1,408 1,359 1,322 1,225 1,392 1,388 1,383
Observations (HHs) 0.875 0.297 0.744 0.775 0.886 0.809 0.687 0.215 0.153









Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  All regressions include branch fixed effects. Expected 
warnings are expressed in thousands of UGX and are truncated at the top at 1% and at the bottom if the variable takes implausible 
values above 0 and under 500 UGX. They are measured in standard deviations. The results remain consistent if I truncate it at 5% in 
the top or if I do not truncate the variable at all. The F stat at the bottom of the table reports the Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic 
from the first stage.
8.953
(0.84)
% the causes of the health 
problem  mentioned by the 
respondent that are correct
=1 if any household 
member has suffered from 
the  health problem  in the 
last 6 months
=1 if respondent knows the 
drug(s) that treat the 
health problem
(1)
Notes: Errors clustered at village (CHP) level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Columns 2, 4, 6 ,8 use the following instrumental  
variables: treatments dummies and treatment dummies interacted with Priority Household. For full list of controls and other details, 














Notes: IV estimates. Errors clustered at village (CHP) level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  Data include all households who know the 
CHPs. The table shows the point estimates for a weighted IV regression. For the full list of controls and other details, see Table 
A.XVI. The F stat at the bottom of the table reports the Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic from the first stage.
Table A.XVII: IV Regressions 
(3)




per month  
Score given by 





Number of times 
household was 







visited by the CHP
27.19
Household knows 
who the CHP is
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Chapter 2
Social Connections and the Delivery of
Development Programs
1. Introduction
Governments and NGOs often recruit agents from local communities to deliver development
programs. Examples of these community-based positions include microfinance group leaders,
community health workers, agriculture extension workers, seed farmers, to mention a few.
While the ability to recruit from the community is key for the scalability and sustainability
of many interventions, organizations face the challenge that these agents are embedded in
existing social networks and this might determine which beneficiaries are targeted. Indeed, a
rich literature shows that individuals have social preferences and that these depend on social
connections, so that agents might favor individuals they are connected to rather than those
who are more deserving. Understanding the effect of social connections on the targeting
choices of delivery agents has therefore implications for both equity and efficiency.
This paper studies how social connections shape the delivery of an agriculture extension
program implemented by BRAC in Uganda. In a context characterized by low agriculture
productivity, the program trains and employs female agents chosen from the communities to
provide advice, training and sell improved seeds to poor women farmers. As time and seeds
are limited, the agents need to choose which farmers to target. BRAC’s guidelines prioritize
poorer and less productive farmers. Our aim is to test whether social connections shape
targeting at the expense of this goal.
Our evaluation is based on a two-level randomization design. First, we randomize the
allocation of the agriculture extension program at the community level to evaluate whether
the program is beneficial. Second, within each treatment community, we randomly select one
delivery agent out of two eligible candidates in each community. This generates variation
in social connections which is orthogonal to unobservable traits common to farmers who are
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socially connected to potential agents. The estimated effect of social connections thus captures
social preferences without capturing unobservable traits that determine program returns.
Our main finding is that, relatively to unconnected farmers, farmers only connected to
the selected delivery agents are more likely to benefit from the program while farmers only
connected to the agent who ran but was not selected are less likely to benefit. We make
precise the conditions under which the evidence implies that agents put positive weight on
the utility of farmers connected to them (altruism), or negative weight on the utility of farmers
connected to the rival candidate (spite), or both.
The analysis proceeds as follows. To begin with we identify the effect of the agriculture
program on adoption of improved seeds and agriculture productivity with the cluster ran-
domized controlled trial we designed with BRAC. The trial randomises the roll-out of the
program, whereby 109 communities are treated in 2012 and a further 59 are kept as controls
until 2015. Two years after the introduction of the program, we find that farmers in the
treatment communities are more likely to have received advice and training on agriculture
than in control communities. Their adoption rate of BRAC improved seeds increased by 6.2
percentage points without any reduction in the adoption of non-BRAC improved seeds, and
their agriculture rate of returns increase by 1.15, i.e. each dollar of input leads to an addi-
tional 1.15 dollar of output. This corresponds to a 50% increase in rate of returns. These
effects are in line with earlier studies (Beaman et al. 2014; Duflo et al. 2008).
Having established that the program is beneficial and, thus, that distortions from the
optimal allocation of seeds matter, we zoom in on treatment communities to unpack the
effects of social connections. To deliver the program, BRAC relies on agents, called extension
workers or EW for short, chosen among eligible candidates in the community. BRAC identified
two EW candidates in each community based on the number of acres of land they own, their
agricultural knowledge, business skills and popularity. One of the two candidates is then
randomly appointed and the data shows that the two candidates (selected and non-) are
similar to each other. Prior to the randomisation, we measure social connections between
each of the sample farmers and each of the two candidates. Post randomization we show
that farmers connected to the selected EW share similar traits with those connected to the
non-selected EW, and both differ from those connected to neither. The design thus creates
exogenous variation in the connection to the selected and the non-selected EW candidate,
conditional on being connected to one of the two candidates. This allows us to identify the
causal effect of social connections on program delivery.
We find that, compared to farmers connected to none of the candidates, those connected to
the selected EW are significantly more likely to receive advice, training and BRAC improved
seeds from the EW. In contrast, those connected to the non-selected EW are significantly less
likely to receive all three services: they are worse-off than those connected to neither candidate.
The difference between these estimates captures the causal effect of social connections. In
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other words, while farmers connected to a candidate might have unobservable traits that
affect the returns from adoption, these drop out from the difference between knowing the
selected and the non-selected EW. The fact that this is positive and precisely estimated
indicates that social preferences affect targeting choices. These can take the form of altruism
towards one’s friends or spite towards one’s rival’s friends. We use our estimates to bound
the effect of altruism and spite conditional on unobservable traits.
To corroborate this evidence we exploit the intuition that the strength of social preferences
should be increasing in the social distance between the selected candidate and the farmers
who are connected to the non-selected candidate, while the effect of unobservables should not.
Although we do not have data on the full network, we can proxy for social distance by the
connections between the two candidates: if the two know each other, the distance between
the selected EW and the farmers connected to the non-selected EW is at most degree two.
Another proxy of social distance we use is the percentage of farmers in the village that know
both candidates, as this increases the chances that the distance between the selected EW
and the farmers connected to the non-selected EW is at most degree two. We find that
the difference between being connected to the selected EW and being connected to the non-
selected EW is positive and precisely estimated only when social distance is likely to be above
two. This is driven by the fact that the negative effects of the connections to the non-selected
candidate materializes only when social distance is high, while the positive effect of knowing
the selected EW holds irrespective of the social distance between the selected EW and farmers
connected to her rival.
These results are consistent with two, not necessarily mutually exclusive, explanations:
(1) the delivery agent discriminates against farmers who are connected to their rival, (2) the
farmers boycott the delivery agent, although this can only explain why they do not get seeds,
as that hurts the EW, but not why they do not ask for advice/go to training. In either case,
the findings indicate negative social preferences or “spite” as agents are willing to bear a cost
to damage others: the agent gives up on sales commission, the farmers give up on buying
good quality seeds and get some low quality seeds from the market instead.
Finally, we analyze whether farmers connected to the losing EW candidate can compensate
by buying improved seeds from other sources so that ultimately productivity is unchanged.
The results suggest that they tend to adopt significantly more improved seeds from local mar-
kets, which, however, have been shown to be very low quality (Bold et al. 2015). Ultimately,
productivity and returns increase for farmers connected to the winning candidate and drop
for farmers connected to the losing candidate relative to farmers connected to neither.
A straightforward implication of these results is that variations in connections shape adop-
tion rates at the village level. To test this, we exploit natural variation in the relative size
of farmers connected to the winners and losers and we find that aggregate adoption increases
with the percentage of farmers connected to the winner while it decreases with the percentage
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connected to the loser. Although village-level social connections may not be orthogonal to
other village characteristics, these results are suggestive evidence that both the network of
the selected and the non-selected EW, and the overlap between the two networks, impact
aggregate adoption rate.
This paper contributes to two strands of the literature. First, it contributes to the existing
research on the targeting of development programs. In the context of Below Poverty Line card
allocation in India, Niehaus and Atanassova (2013) show that conditioning household card-
eligibility on more poverty indicators may worsen targeting when the program is implemented
by corruptible agents: while less eligible households pay larger bribes and are less likely to
obtain cards, the targeting rule becomes harder to enforce. Other related studies find that
the targeting of antipoverty programs depends on whether the beneficiaries of the program
are identified by the community itself or identified according to a number of pre-determined
criteria (Alatas et al. 2013), whether the program is implemented by the government vs. an
NGO (Banerjee et al. 2009), or on a number of village characteristics (Galasso and Ravallion
2005; Bardhan and Mookherjee 2006). This paper complements these existing studies by
showing that who is chosen as the delivery agent strongly predicts which households are then
targeted and, though this, how successful the program is.
Second, this paper complements studies of social networks and technology diffusion. In
the context of the diffusion of pit-planting in Malawi, BenYishay and Mobarak (2014) find
that selecting ‘average farmers’ as delivery agent works better than selecting government-
employed extension workers or ‘lead farmers’. Farmers indeed appear to be most convinced
by the advice of others who face agricultural conditions that are comparable to the conditions
they face themselves. In the same empirical setting, Beaman et al. (2014) show that select-
ing agriculture extension workers through a complex network-theory targeting rule is more
effective in fostering adoption than using other simpler selection strategies, i.e. minimizing
“geographic distance” between the delivery agent and the population, asking the community
to select these agents or using a simple network-theory targeting rule. Finally, Banerjee et al.
(2013) find that the adoption of a microfinance product in India is higher in villages where
the injection point occupy a central position in the social network. While all three studies
identify the position of the delivery agent in the social network as a determinant of technology
adoption, our paper is the first to show that the adoption rates may be shaped not only by
the position of the selected candidate but also by the position of the non-selected candidate
in the network.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 discusses the context of the experiment
and the empirical design; Section 3 identifies the effect of the BRAC agriculture program on
training, advice and adoption of seeds. Section 4 investigates the individual and aggregate
effects of social connections on program delivery. Section 5 concludes.
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2. Context, Research Design and Data
2.1. The Agriculture Program
Agricultural productivity in sub-Saharan Africa is extremely low. Many argue that growth
in agricultural yields in Asia and the stagnation in Africa can be explained by increased use
of modern technologies in Asia and continued low use in Africa (Morris et al. 2007). As
a large fraction of the population in Africa depends on agriculture, interventions that raise
agricultural productivity are considered to have the potential to reduce poverty and promote
growth.
In such a context, BRAC’s agriculture program provides extension services seeking to im-
prove agriculture productivity by promoting the usage of beneficial farming techniques and
by increasing the availability of high-quality improved seeds. Given the large proportion of
poor marginalized farmers involved in subsistence agriculture in Uganda and BRAC’s objec-
tive to empower women, the program targets poor women farmer. Launched in August 2008,
it operates today in 41 districts of Uganda, engages more than 800 extension workers, and
reaches 40,000 women farmers (Barua 2011).
BRAC selects Extension Workers (EW) among poor marginalized women based on the
following criteria: being a woman farmer, permanent resident in the village, age strictly above
22. During the recruitment process, BRAC additionally favors candidates who own 1 to 3
acres of land, who are respected in the community, with knowledge about agriculture and
with business skills. Once selected, all EWs receive six days of training in crop production
techniques, adoption of improved seeds and pest control, as well as follow-up monthly refresher
courses.
After the initial training, EWs are posted to their villages where they are made responsible
for 3 non-remunerated tasks: (1) train 15-20 farmers at the beginning of each growing season
on good agriculture practices and usage of improved seeds, (2) provide advice on agriculture
to farmers on a daily basis by visiting their homes, (3) set up a demonstration plot using
learned techniques and BRAC improved seeds.57 EWs are remunerated for selling improved
seeds of the two main crops in West-Uganda, i.e. maize and beans. These seeds, which
57The BRAC’s program analyzed in this paper differs from the standard BRAC program implemented in
other existing districts. The standard program enlists two separate extension workers per community known as
the model farmer and the community agriculture promoter (CAP). While model farmers are made responsible
for setting up a demonstration plot and for training general farmers at the beginning of each season, CAPs
are in charge of selling improved seeds to the community. In our experiment, the two agriculture extension
positions are merged into one (we call it the “Extension Worker” position) in which the worker not only trains,
provides advice and has a demonstration plot but also sells improved seeds. BRAC also recruits “Community
Livestock promoters” (CLP) who promote and sell poultry vaccines and medicines. Given that the selection
of these CLPs was not randomized in the experiment (see details below) and that we observe in our endline
data that basically none of the interviewed households buy seeds from these CLPs, our analysis do not focus
on them.
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are produced in BRAC’s production farm,58 are bought by the EWs at the wholesale price
and sold to the community at a markup59. Although BRAC’s agriculture program increases
the availability of improved seeds, the quantity produced in their production farm is limited
and cannot supply all households in the villages. As a consequence, EWs face an allocation
problem.
All the EWs of a given branch are supervised by the same person called the Program
Assistant (PA). PAs visit each of the EWs they supervise once a week in the field. During
these visits, they monitor the EW, sell improved seeds to the EW and also sell BRAC seeds
directly to the community. Our data indicate that among the farmers who have adopted
BRAC seeds at endline, 44% purchased them from the EW, 46% from the PA while the rest
purchased from the branch or from BRAC’s Community Livestock Promoter, i.e. an agent
in charge of promoting poultry vaccines. Although the EW is the most important person for
training and advice to farmers, both the EW and the PA play an important role in selling
seeds.
Two characteristics of the Ugandan context are important to be emphasized here. First,
improved seeds are rare in rural Uganda and are usually sold at a higher price than BRAC’s
one. A survey we conducted at baseline in the 71 local markets of our experiment confirms
this: maize improved seeds are found in 3 markets only and are sold at a median price of 2,500
UGX per kilogram, i.e. 200 UGX higher than BRAC’s price. Second, the improved seeds
that are available in local markets and shops of rural Uganda tend to have poor quality. In a
recent study conducted in 120 local shops/ markets of rural Uganda, Bold et al. (2015) find
that the most popular high-yield variety maize seeds contain less than 50% authentic seeds
and document that such low quality results in negative average returns. As BRAC improved
seeds have better quality and a lower cost, we consider BRAC and non-BRAC improved seeds
as two distinct products in the analysis.
In addition to the agriculture program, BRAC also runs a microfinance program that
provides access to small loans for women engaged in farm or non-farm self-employed activities.
By forming groups of 20 to 25 members who are responsible for each other’s loans, BRAC
microfinance clients get either 3 or 12.5 months loans, with weekly repayment starting from
one week after the disbursement and with a 25% interest rate. As marginalized farmers are
very often credit constrained, the existence of a microfinance program may complement the
agriculture program by enabling them to buy the improved seeds. We test this in Section 3.2.
58In a small sub-sample of the villages, they also sell cabbage, tomato and G-nuts improved seeds.
59Maize seeds are for instance bought from BRAC at 2,000 UGX per kilogram and sold to the community
at 2,300 UGX per kilogram
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2.2 Research design, sample and data
The aim of our research is to understand the role of social connections in shaping the delivery
of an agriculture extension program. To do so, the empirical design is divided in two exper-
iments. The first experiment tests whether BRAC’s agriculture extension program increases
adoption of improved seeds and agriculture productivity. Having established whether the pro-
gram is beneficial and, thus, whether distortions from the optimal allocation of seeds matter,
the second experiment, which is our core experiment, tests the role of social connections in
program delivery.
Experiment 1: Evaluating the Agriculture Program
During BRAC’s expansion in four new branches of West-Uganda,60 we collaborated with
them to randomize the roll-out of their programs across communities between 2012 and 2015.
Each community is formed by one to five villages merged together to avoid contamination
issues. Of our initial sample of 214 villages, 92 villages indeed share a trading center, market,
school, church, mosque, health center or are located in the same valley or hillside. To avoid
contamination, we considered these 92 villages as 46 single units and defined a total of 168
communities to include in our experiment.
Stratifying by branch, size of the community, percentage of farmers and distance to the
closest market, the randomization assigns communities to one of three groups. The first treat-
ment group (51 communities) received both the agriculture extension and the microfinance
programs in 2012. The second treatment group (58 communities) received the agriculture
extension program in 2012 while the microfinance program started only in 2015. The control
group (59 communities) received neither of the programs until 2015.
As extension services were non-existent at baseline and communities that did not receive a
program in 2012 were not informed that the program would start in 2015 (no anticipation ef-
fect),61 comparing treatments and control allows us to identify the effect of BRAC agriculture
extension program on adoption of improved seeds and agriculture productivity. Adding the
microfinance program in a sub-sample of the communities helps us evaluating the importance
of credit constraints in the adoption process.62
The data are constructed as follows: (1) all the 25,384 female household heads located
in the 168 communities of our study are interviewed at census, (2) census data are used to
draw a random sample of 27 households per community included in our 2012 baseline survey
60The four branches are Kabale and Muhanga (in Kabale district), and Rukungiri and Buyanja (Rukungiri
district). Both Kabale and Rukungiri are ‘chief towns’ of their respective districts, and tend to have more
trade and business activities than Muhanga and Buyanja.
61In our baseline data, only 14% of the respondents report having received advice from an agriculture
extension worker in the last cropping season.
62Microfinance is not available in these communities at baseline: only 2% of the sample we interviewed at
baseline report having borrowed money from a microfinance institution in the last year.
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(total of 5,158 respondents),63 (3) 93% of these baseline households were interviewed again at
endline in 2014 (4,366 households). Attrition rates are thus low and, as shown in Table A0,
balanced across treatments. Finally, note that the proportion of respondents who are engaged
in agriculture is large: 75% in the census data and 85% in the baseline data. The analysis in
this paper restricts to the 4,692 respondents who are involved in agriculture at baseline.
The program effects we identify are causal under the assumptions that treatment assign-
ment is orthogonal to characteristics of the community that affect the outcomes of interest.
In support of this assumption, Table 1 presents means and standard deviations for a number
of baseline variables, for each treatment group separately. Reassuringly, most of these base-
line characteristics do not differ significantly between treatments and control communities,
indicating that the randomization yields a sample that is balanced.
Baseline summary statistics indicate that 93% of the respondents know about the exis-
tence of improved seeds and 73% believe they have positive returns (Table 1). Although
knowledge and perceived returns are high, two third of the farmers have never used improved
seeds: 60% because of reported seeds unavailability and 35% because of seeds being too ex-
pensive for them. Among the one third of the respondents who have used improved seeds
at baseline, 80% bought them from local markets or shops, while the remaining 20% bought
them from government extension workers or from the National Agricultural Advisory Services
(not reported).
To measure farmer’s productivity, we use three variables: 1) kilograms of beans/maize
produced per acre cultivated and hour worked, 2) total output value (including all crops) per
acre cultivated and hour worked,64 3) rate of returns, defined as [(value of output - value of
input) / value of input] where the input value includes expenses incurred for buying inputs,
renting land, hiring workers and for the own opportunity cost of time.65
The average farmer of our sample cultivates 1.2 acres of land, works 482 hours on agri-
culture per cropping season and has 50% probability of being engaged in commercial (vs.
subsistence) farming, i.e. selling at least 5% of the agriculture output value. The average
farmer moreover produces 0.9 kg of maize per hour worked and acre cultivated, correspond-
ing to yields of 1,462 kg per hectare per year. This number is in line with the 2012 FAO data
and the Uganda National Household Survey data (1300 and 1900 kg of maize/hectare over a
63The random draw is stratified by household’s microfinance eligibility status, i.e. resident in the village
for at least one year, business owner, interested in receiving microfinance, and with poverty score between 24
and 71%. This is done to make sure to include, in our baseline sample, households who are then eligible to
access BRAC loans once the microfinance program starts and assess potential complementarities between the
microfinance and the agriculture extension program.
64The total output value equals the quantity of each crop produced multiplied by the median market price
of each crop unit in the branch. Extreme outliers, that we define being above or below 2 standard deviations
from the mean, are removed from this calculation. The results are robust to alternative cleaning strategies.
65We assume that the opportunity cost of working on one’s own plot of land equals hours worked on own
land multiplied by the branch median hourly wage paid to work on someone else land. Result are robust to
considering the median hourly salary for working on one’s own non-farm business.
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year respectively).66 The average output value of our sample farmers equals 2,750 UGX per
hour worked and acre cultivated and the average rate of returns over the season are estimated
at 6.5%. Finally, half of the baseline farmers have completed primary school, they own more
land on average than the land they cultivate (2.1 acres owned while 1.2 acres cultivated on
average) and own a total of 18 personal and business assets.
Experiment 2: Evaluating the role of social connections
The second experiment of this paper took place within the treatment communities and was
implemented in 3 consecutive steps. Among the 109 treated communities, BRAC identified
60 clusters, each composed of either 1, 2 or 3 communities and each served by a single EW.
The 60 clusters were created by considering the proximity between the treatment communities
and making sure that the EW could easily reach each of the program recipients. In all of
these clusters, BRAC then selected two EW candidates based on the following criteria: being
a woman farmer, permanent resident in the village, age above 22, preferably with 1 to 3 acres
of land owned, respected in the community, with knowledge about agriculture and business
skills. After confirming that both candidates of the cluster were interested in accepting the
position, we randomly appointed one of the two. The empirical design is illustrated in Figure
1.
Two surveys were conducted after the selection of the two EW candidates but before ran-
dom appointment: 1) the 120 EW candidates were interviewed on their agriculture knowledge
and productivity, 2) the baseline households were asked about their social connections with
the two candidates of their own cluster. More specifically, we asked each household at baseline
whether they knew each of the 2 candidates and if they did: how frequently did they talk
to them, whether they would turn to them for advice on agriculture, and which relationship
they had with them (friend, relative, neighbor, input provider or someone they know).
Throughout the paper, we use the most conservative measure of social connection, i.e.
whether a farmer knows the EW candidate at baseline, irrespective of the exact nature of
the relationship. We narrow this definition to farmers who typically discuss about agriculture
with the EW candidate as a robustness check (see Section 4.2). The percentage and number
of sample farmers connected to the EW candidates is presented in Table 2: 53% know both
candidates, 15% know the winner only, 10% the loser only and 22% neither. Overall, 68%
of farmers are thus connected to the winning candidate and 63% are connected to the losing
candidate.
Balance checks for the EW randomization are reported in Tables 3 and 4: Table 3 compares
the 60 winning candidates to the 60 losing ones, while Table 4 compares respondents connected
to the winner and the loser. Both tables provide evidence that the randomization yielded a
66FAO, “Area Cultivated and Output of Maize in Uganda”, http://faostat.fao.org/site/339/default.aspx.
For UNHS, see http://www.ajfand.net/Volume12/No7/Okoboi10505.pdf
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balance sample. The selected and non-selected EW candidates are indeed similar to each other
in terms of their connections in the cluster, their level of poverty and their involvement in
agriculture (column 4, Table 3). Note that both of them are bigger farmers than the average
non-EW candidate farmer, i.e. they spend more hours on farming, cultivate more land and
are more likely to be engaged in commercial farming. Similarly, respondents connected only
to the winning EW candidate are comparable to those connected only to the loser (column 4,
Table 4) but are both more productive farmers than agents connected to neither (columns 5
and 6).
3. The Effects of the Agriculture Program
3.1. The Effect of the Agriculture Program on Adoption and Productivity
We evaluate the agriculture program with:
yij1 = α+ βyij0 + γTj +Xjδ + εij
where yij1 (yij0) is the outcome of interest for farmer i in community j at endline in 2014
(baseline in 2012), Tj = 1 for treatment communities (treatment one or two) and Xj is a
vector of community-level stratification variables. Errors are clustered at the community
level.
Table 5 provides evidence on program impact. Respondents in the treatment group are
3.6 and 3.8 percentage points more likely than in the control group to have received advice
on agriculture in the last season and to have been trained by the EW in the last year. While
receiving these services does not affect perceived returns of improved seeds (which were high
at baseline already), the program fosters the adoption of BRAC seeds by 6.2 percentage points
after 2 years without reducing the adoption of non-BRAC improved seeds. These effects are
precisely estimated and are in line with other existing studies: Beaman et al. (2014) find an
adoption increase of pit-planting in Malawi of 10% after 3 years.
Three points are of note. First, the fact that the effect on adoption rate is about twice as
large as the effect on receiving training suggests spillovers from training. Second, half of the
adoption of BRAC improved seeds in the treatment communities happens through the EWs
while the other half buys from other BRAC source, i.e. mainly from the EWs supervisors -the
PAs- and also rarely from the Community Livestock Promoter. This indicates that EWs play
an important role in selling seeds. Third, almost no respondent in the control communities
has received training, advice or has bought improved seeds from BRAC (bottom of Table 5).
This provides evidence that the control group has not been contaminated.
Columns 7 and 9 of Table 5 show that the agriculture program increases the likelihood
that a household is engaged in commercial farming by 11% while the number of hours worked
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on agriculture decreases, suggesting an increase in agriculture productivity. Moreover, the
agriculture rate of returns significantly increase by 1.15, i.e. each dollar of input leads to an
additional 1.15 dollar of output. This corresponds to a 50% increase in rate of returns over
a season in comparison to average rate of returns in the control. This effect is in line with
the 36% increase in rate of returns calculated for fertilizers in Kenya by Duflo et al. (2008).
Finally, “output value per acre cultivated and hour worked” increases but the effect is not
precisely estimated.
3.2. The Constraints Relaxed by the Agriculture Program
Having established that the program “works”, we investigate next which constraints to tech-
nology adoption are relaxed by the program. In Table A1, we restrict the analysis to respon-
dents who have never adopted improved seeds at baseline and interact the presence of the
agriculture program with the baseline self-reported constraints to adoption. The results indi-
cate that the lack of availability of high-quality improved seeds is the key constraint relaxed
by the program: respondents who reported not having access to improved seeds at baseline
are significantly more likely to adopt at endline. As already noted, knowledge about the ex-
istence, the benefits and the risks of improved seeds is high at baseline and the program does
not consequently relax an information constraint. Finally, the respondents who reported not
adopting improved seeds at baseline because these are too expensive are more likely to use
both BRAC and non-BRAC improved seeds at endline.
In Table A2, we investigate whether a number of farmer behavioral characteristics and
biases limit investment in improved seeds. First, we interact the treatment status of a commu-
nity with a measure of the respondent’s discount rate to test whether myopic farmers are less
likely to adopt than more forward looking farmers. Next, we interact the treatment dummy
with a measure of farmers’ risk aversion, which may predict adoption of risky or uncertain
agriculture technologies (Liu 2011). Finally, we test whether present-biased farmers under-
adopt beneficial technologies. As discussed in Duflo et al. (2015), this can happen because of
the existence of a lag between the harvest time when cash is most available and the planting
season when improved seeds are purchased. We find that neither the discount factor nor
present-biasedness predict adoption. In contrast, risk aversion matters: agents who report
taking risks in agriculture are more likely to adopt improved seeds.67
67The discount rate is calculated by asking respondents 4 questions: whether they would prefer earning 30k
UGX today or Xk UGX in 1 month where X=30, 40 or 50. The index takes value 0 if the respondent is always
willing to wait for whatever amount of X, value 1 if she is willing to wait only for X=40 or 50, value 3 if she
is willing to wait only for X=50, and value 4 if she is never willing to wait. To measure how much farmers are
willing to take risk in agriculture we asked: “In agriculture and livestock, would you say that you are someone
who likes to take risks, or do you try to avoid risks? Please rate yourself between 0 and 10, where 0 means
you never like to take risks, and 10 means you are always ready to take risks”. To measure present-biasedness,
we asked each respondent 2 hypothetical questions: (1) whether she would prefer earning 30k UGX today or
Xk UGX in 1 month where X=30, 40 or 50; (2) we repeated this question changing the time frame to 6 and 7
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Finally, to understand the relevance of credit constraints in technology adoption and the
necessity to address multiple constraints simultaneously (Jack 2011), we randomly assigned
half of the agriculture extension communities to a complementary BRAC microfinance pro-
gram. Table A3 shows that the introduction of the microfinance program did not affect the
take-up of improved seeds, indicating that credit constraints that can be alleviated by micro-
credit are not important in our context. The absence of an effect can be explained either by
the absence of a credit constraint at baseline or, more realistically, by the fact that microfi-
nance does not properly relax the credit constraint. As discussed in Field and Pande (2008),
the rigid contract offered by microfinance institutions, i.e. clients repay loans in weekly in-
stallments beginning shortly after disbursement,68 may limit investments in new technologies.
4. Social Connections and Program Delivery
4.1. Identification
To estimate the effect of social connections on program delivery, we restrict the sample to
the 60 treatment clusters and the 3,042 farmers who reside there. We estimate the following
specification:
yic1 = α+ ηyic0 + γ
WWi + γ
LLi +Xcδ + εic
where yic1 (yic0) is the outcome of interest for farmer i in cluster c at endline (baseline), Wi= 1
if farmer i knows the winning EW candidate at baseline and Li= 1 if farmer i knows the losing
EW candidate at baseline. Xc is a vector of controls that includes branch fixed effects and
the stratification variables used for treatment allocation in Experiment 1. It also includes
the distance in kilometers between the house of the respondent and the house of the winning
EW to control for differences in targeting due to geographical proximity. We cluster standard
errors at the cluster level (level of the EW selection randomization).
In comparison to the previous section, this section identifies the program effect on each
group of farmers with the same connection status relative to the program effect on unconnected
farmer but it does not identify the effect of the program as a whole.
The parameters of interest, γW and γL, measure the effect of being connected to the
winning and losing candidate relatively to farmers connected to neither candidate. Note that
γ̂W = sW + u while γ̂L = sL + u where sW (or sL) measure the effect of the social preferences
of the selected EW on farmers connected to her (or to the non-selected EW) and u is the
months. A respondent is considered “present biased” if she prefers waiting 1 extra month to get more money
in the future but not willing to wait today.
68BRAC follows this model: microfinance clients repay weekly starting from the week after the disbursement.
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unobservable trait shared by all farmers connected to a candidate EW. Given that winning
status is determined randomly, (γ̂W− γ̂L), which we report at the foot of the table, identifies
the causal effect of social preferences from being connected to the winner relative to being
connected to the loser, clean of unobservable traits shared by farmers connected to an EW
candidate, that is (γ̂W − γ̂L) = sW −sL. The null hypothesis is that connections do not affect
targeting (γ̂W − γ̂L) = 0.
While γ̂W and γ̂L do not identify social preferences when connected and unconnected
farmers have different unobservable traits (u 6= 0), we can identify the social preferences
“frontier” sW = γ̂W − γ̂L + sL, which, assuming sW ≥ 0 and sL ≤ 0 allows us to derive
bounds for sW and sL. The graphical representation of the identification strategy is presented
in Figure 2.
4.2. Results: Individual Outcomes
The Effect of Social Connections on Program Delivery
Table 6 shows that social connections shape the delivery of this program. Indeed, γ̂W − γ̂L
(reported at the foot of the table)69 is positive and precisely estimated throughout so that
relatively to those connected to the losing candidate, farmers who are connected to the winner
benefit more. In particular, agents connected only to the winner are 6 and 7 percentage points
more likely to have received advice and training from the EW respectively, 12 percentage
points more likely to believe improved seeds are beneficial and 5 percentage points more likely
to adopt BRAC seeds from the EW.
Interestingly, γ̂W is always positive while γ̂L is always negative and both are precisely
estimated. This indicates that, relative to farmers connected to neither candidate, farmers
connected to the selected EW are more likely to receive advice, training and adopt seeds,
while farmers who are connected to the non-selected candidate are less likely.
The results are thus consistent with three sets of social preferences. At one extreme, the
EW might put positive weight on the utility of farmers connected to them (altruism) and zero
weight on the utility of farmers connected to the rival candidate. In this case, γ̂L = u⇒ u < 0,
namely the unobservable traits of connected farmers are such that, absent social preferences,
they are less likely to receive the program. This might be the case if connected farmers are less
needy and the EW optimally targets the neediest. In this case sW =γ̂W − γ̂L > 0, implying
that farmers connected to the winner are more likely to receive the program than unconnected
farmers although they should actually be less likely based on their traits alone.
At the other extreme, the EW might put zero weight on the utility of farmers connected
69We report both the coefficient and the standard errors. These are obtained by regressing outcome variables
on “whether the respondent know the selected EW” controlling for the number of connections to potential
candidates (0,1 or 2). This is simply a reparametrization of the specification.
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to them and negative weight on the utility of farmers connected to the rival candidate (spite).
In this case, γ̂W = u⇒ u > 0, namely the unobservable traits of connected farmers are such
that, absent social preferences, they are more likely to receive the program. This might be
the case if connected farmers are more receptive and more willing to adopt. In this case
sL =−(γ̂W − γ̂L) < 0 implying that farmers connected to the loser are less likely to receive
the program than unconnected farmers although they should actually be more likely based
on their traits alone.
For intermediate parameter values, the EW exhibits both altruism for her connected farm-
ers and spite for those connected to her rival, and these preferences must satisfy sW =
γ̂W − γ̂L + sL. For instance, for the adoption of improved seeds from the EW, the first case
implies sW =0.5, sL = 0, the second case sW =0, sL = −0.5, in the third sW ∈ (0, 0.5),
sL ∈ (−0.5, 0).
The fact that social connections predict adoption of BRAC seeds from the EW but not
from other BRAC sources (the PAs) suggests that u = 0 and γ̂W = sW ; γ̂L = sL. While EWs
may have an incentive not to follow BRAC’s guidelines, i.e. target their friends at the expense
of farmers with higher returns to adoption, there is no reason to believe that the PAs have
the same incentive. They are indeed located in the branch office, a more urban area of the
district and outside the villages of our experiment, and have thus no personal connection with
most of the sample farmers at baseline. As PAs are equally likely to target connected and
unconnected farmers (Column 6, Table 6), we can conclude that these farmers have similar
unobserved characteristics (u = 0). This provides suggestive evidence that the coefficients
we estimate, γ̂W and γ̂L, measure the causal effect of a connection to the winning and losing
candidate respectively.
To provide further evidence on the existence of spite, we exploit variation in the strength
of social preferences that is uncorrelated with u. We exploit the intuition that the EW is
more likely to have negative social preferences towards farmers connected to her rival ( i.e.
γ̂L< 0 ⇒ sL < 0) if these are socially distant from her, while u should be the same regardless
of social distance. While we only measure degree 1 connections between farmers and EW
candidates we can proxy degree 2 connections by measuring whether the EWs are connected
to each other (in which case the other EW acts as a link) or whether the two groups of farmers
-those connected to the winner and those connected to the loser- overlap (in which case the
overlapping farmers can serve as link).
We have three measures of connections between the two candidates: whether both EW
candidates belong to the local farmer association, live in the same community and know each
other.70 To measure network overlap, we use a dummy that equals one if the percentage of
70Pairwise correlations between these measures equal: 31% for belonging to the same farm association and
living in the same cluster, 26% for belonging to the same association and knowing the other candidate, and
24% for living in the same community and knowing the other candidate. Information on whether the two EW
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households who know both candidates is above the cluster-level median. We then estimate:
yic1 = α+ ηyic0 + β1(Dummyc = 1) + γ
W0Wi ∗ 1(Dummyc = 0) + γL0Li ∗ 1(Dummyc = 0)
+γW1Wi ∗ 1(Dummyc = 1) + γL1Li ∗ 1(Dummyc = 1) +Xcδ + εic
where Dummyc = 1 if the degree between the selected EW and the farmers connected to the
non-selected EW in cluster c is likely to be 2, while 0 if the degree is likely to be more than
2. Errors are clustered at the level of the EW randomization, i.e. the cluster.
The differences (γL0 - γL1) and (γW0 - γW1) test whether the effect of social connections
varies with social distance.71 (γW1 − γL1) estimates the effect of social connections when the
selected EW and the farmers connected to the non-selected EW are likely to have a degree 2.
(γW0 − γL0) estimates the effect of social connections when the selected EW and the farmers
connected to the non-selected EW are likely to have a degree higher than 2.
Table 7 shows that social connections matter for program delivery only in the latter case
(Dummyc = 0). With training, advice or adoption as an outcome variable, (γ̂W0 − γ̂L0) is
indeed positive and significant (see foot of the Table, p-values 2), while (γ̂W1 − γ̂L1) is not
statistically different than zero (p-values 1).
The findings also show that γ̂L0 < 0 and γ̂L1 ≈ 0, in line with negative social preferences
towards socially distant farmers. Reassuringly, connections to the winning EW candidate
seem to matter irrespective of the social distance between the EW and the farmers connected
to the non-selected EW: γ̂W0 > 0 and γ̂W1 > 0, i.e. agents always put a positive weight on
the utility of their friends. These results are robust to the four alternative measures of social
distance.
Three appendix tables present further results and robustness checks. In Table A4, we
benchmark against total program effect for the variables that take value zero in the control
group, i.e. “receiving advice/ training from BRAC” and “adoption of BRAC seeds”. The
results suggest that agents connected to the winning EW benefit the most, isolated agents
benefit somewhat, while agents connected to the losing EW do not benefit from the program.
In Table A5, we replicate the social network analysis without assuming linearity in the number
of connections, i.e. the effect of knowing both candidates is allowed to differ from the sum of
the effect of knowing the selected and the non-selected candidate. Results remain similar. Fi-
nally, Table A6 shows that our results are robust to a less conservative measure of connection,
i.e. whether a farmer typically discusses about agriculture with the EW candidate.
candidates know each other is available only for 23 clusters out of 60 (available only if at least one of the two
candidates is included in the baseline survey that asks about connections to EW candidates).
71This holds under the assumption that the average unobserved characteristics u is equal in clusters where
Dummyc = 1 from clusters where Dummyc = 0.
104
The Effect of Social Connections on Performance
The previous section indicates that agents only connected to the candidate who ran but was
not selected are less likely to adopt BRAC seeds. We analyze next whether these farmers can
compensate by taking other actions so that total production is unchanged, e.g. buy improved
seeds from non BRAC sources, work more hours, cultivate more land. Results are reported
in Table 8.
Column 1 indicates that agents connected to non-selected EW are more than twice as likely
to buy improved seeds from local markets and shops (3 percentage points increase) than agents
connected to the selected EW. They also spend 97 more hours per cropping season working
on their land (19% higher). Relative to unconnected farmers, farmed connected to the losing
candidate work 36 hours (7%) more while agents connected to the winning candidate work
61 hours (12%) less. In other words, the probability of adopting BRAC improved seeds at
endline seems to be negatively related with the number of hours worked on agriculture. No
differences are found on the number of acres of land cultivated.
Ultimately, it is important to understand whether working more hours and buying more
non-BRAC seeds helps farmers compensate for the lower adoption of BRAC seeds in terms of
agriculture productivity. Results indicate that it does not: the number of kilograms of beans
and maize (the two main crops in the areas of the study) produced per acre of land and hour
worked is 0.47 and 0.54 lower for agents connected only to the loser vs. only to the winner.
Rate of returns are also lower: being connected to the non-appointed person decreases the
returns by 50%.
Who is chosen as the delivery agent and who is not chosen but applied strongly affects
which households benefit from the program: friends of the selected delivery agents benefit
the most while friends of the non-selected agent benefit the least. Relative to unconnected
farmers, yields, output and rate of returns are 50%, 33% and 40% higher for farmers who
know the winner while they are 30%, 10%, 10% lower for those who know the lose”. This
indicates that knowing the right person helps while knowing the wrong one hurts.
4.3. Results: Aggregate Outcomes
Given earlier results that social connections matter only when EW candidates are socially
distant and/or network overlap is small, we now exploit natural variation in group sizes to
quantify the effect of social connections on village wide adoption rates. Intuitively these should
be higher when the size of the in-group is large and when the out-group is small because the
former is actively targeted and the latter is shunned. Although this variation is not orthogonal
to other village-level characteristics and we cannot identify causal effects, this helps us get a
sense of the magnitude. As these are likely to be biased upward, a small magnitude indicates
that social connections do not matter much to explain aggregate outcomes.
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Figure 3 shows cluster-level variation in group sizes, with the percentage of respondents
who know the non-selected EW candidate at baseline on the Y axis and the percentage of
respondents who know the selected EW candidate on the X axis. The figure indicates that
there is a significant amount of variation in social connections across clusters.
Figure 4 shows large differences in program delivery across clusters, e.g nobody adopts
BRAC improved seeds in 10 clusters out of 60, while adoption is above 10% in other 8 clusters.
Similarly, the number of farmers who received advice or training vary significantly from one
cluster to another: in 25 clusters no-one receives those services, while in 10 clusters more than
10% of the farmers receives them.
We estimate the effect of social connections by regressing aggregate outcome variables
on the percentage of households in the cluster who know the winning EW candidate and
the percentage who know the losing candidate (see Table 9). Keeping size of the out-group
constant, one inter-quartile range increase in the in-group is associated with a 6% increase
in aggregate training rate, a 5% increase in the aggregate adoption of BRAC seeds and a
7% decrease in the adoption of lower-quality non-BRAC seeds. All these effects are precisely
estimated. In contrast, by keeping the size of the in-group constant, an additional inter-
quartile range in the out-group decreases training rate and adoption of BRAC seeds by 4%
and 3% respectively, while the adoption of non-BRAC seeds increases by 8%. Table A7
replicates Table 7 at the aggregate level. Results are consistent with before: social connections
matter only when EW candidates are socially distant and/or network overlap is small. This is
suggestive evidence that the size of both the in-group and out-group shape aggregate adoption.
More work is needed to assess causality.
5. Conclusions
We study how social connections shape the delivery of an agriculture extension program. In
each community, we identified two candidates for the position and randomly appointed one
of the two. We find that both the connections to the selected extension agent and to the
non-selected agent matter: relatively to unconnected farmers, farmers connected only to the
selected delivery agents are more likely to benefit from the program while farmers connected
only to the non-selected agent are shunned.
We show that these results are consistent with in-group favoritism and out-group discrim-
ination: the negative effects of the connections to the non-appointed candidate matter only
when the social distance between the selected delivery agent and the farmers connected to the
non-selected candidate is above degree two. This indicates that agents not only put a positive
weight on the utility of their friend, they also put a negative weight on the utility of their
rival’s friends when these are socially distant from them. As a consequence, both positive and
negative social preferences shape program delivery.
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Although the agriculture extension program we analyze is representative of many other
community-based development programs, two considerations about the specific features of
our context are important to inform the external validity of the results. First, the setting we
study is one with excess supply of delivery agents. With limited labor supply, negative social
preferences might be less relevant: connections to the non-selected candidate do not matter
as this person may simply not exist. Second, the total profits that BRAC extension workers
make from the sale of improved seeds are relatively low. In the presence of stronger incentives,
agents may not be willing to bear a cost to favor their friends or damage their friend’s rival,
i.e. they may not give up on a high sales commission. As illustrated in Bandiera et al. (2009),
performance-based incentives may change the agent’s stake in the delivery of public goods.
The findings of this paper have key policy implications for the selection of delivery agents.
In their recruitment decisions, organizations should take into account social connections of the
beneficiaries with all candidates for the position. Appointing the most-connected agent in the
village may not always be the optimal solution: if this person has a “rival” who is herself well-
connected and with little network overlap, then the organization could benefit from recruiting
someone less popular. Because who is chosen as delivery agent affects which beneficiaries are
then targeted, improving the selection process of these agents has the potential to substantially






























































































































































































































































































































FIGURE 2: GRAPHICAL REPRESENTATION OF IDENTIFICATION STRATEGY
Note: This figure illustrates the true effect of "being connected to the losing candidate" on the Y axis and the  true effect 
of "being connected to the winning candidate on the X axis".  The possible combinations of these two effects are 
illustrated by the dashed red line. The intersection between the dashed red line and the X axis represents the extreme 
case in which the true effect of being connected to the winning candidate is 0. The intersection between the Y axis and 
the dashed red line represents the other extreme: no effect of social connection to the losing candidate. In the specific 
case in which u=0 (no omitted variables and measurement error), then the estimated coefficients equal the true effects.
Assumptions:       γ𝐿 = 𝑠𝐿 + 𝑢 ;    γ𝑊 = 𝑠𝑊 + 𝑢 ;     𝑠𝐿 ≤ 0 ;   𝑠𝑊 ≥ 0  
 
γ𝐿 and γ𝑊→ estimated effect of connection to losing / winning   
                      candidate 
𝑠𝐿 and 𝑠𝑊→ true social preferences 
𝑢 → measurement error or omitted variable 
 
𝒔𝑳 
𝜸𝑊 − 𝜸𝐿 𝜸𝑊 
𝜸𝐿 
𝑢 = 0 
𝒔𝑾 
𝑢 = −𝜸𝐿 
𝑢 = −𝜸𝑊 𝜸
𝐿 − 𝜸𝑊 
Sample: treatment communities only
FIGURE 3: CLUSTER-LEVEL VARIATION IN SOCIAL 
CONNECTIONS TO EXTENSION WORKERS' CANDIDATES
Note: The figure plots, for each cluster, the % of respondents who know the non-selected EW candidate at baseline on the Y axis 
and the % of respondents who know the selected EW candidate at baseline on the X axis. Each dot represents one of the 60 
treatment clusters. Any dot on the 45 degree line has the same % of respondents who know the selected and non selected EW 
candidate ."Knows (non) selected EW candidate" equals 1 if the respondents knows this person independently of whether she 
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Sample: treatment communities only
FIGURE 4: CLUSTER-LEVEL VARIATION IN PROGRAM DELIVERY
Note: The figures show the endline cluster-level variation in the percentage of respondent who received BRAC services, who believe improved 
seeds have positive returns and who adopted improved seeds at endline. "Received advice on agriculture from EW " equals 1 if the respondent 
received an advice from the BRAC extension worker at any time during the past season (during trainings, household visits, etc.). "Was trained by 
EW "  equals 1  if the respondent attended at least one training organized by the extension worker in the past year. Beliefs about the returns of 
improved seeds equal zero for agents who do not know about the existence of improved seeds. Respondents who adopted improved seeds at 
endline were asked the sources of these seeds. Sources include BRAC extension worker,  BRAC branch office, markets, shop or government 
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Number of observations 1490 1552 1650
Knows about existence of improved seeds 0.931 0.926 0.945 0.401 0.312 0.829
(0.254) (0.261) (0.228)
Believes improved seeds have positive returns 0.680 0.724 0.760 0.078 0.378 0.312
(0.467) (0.447) (0.427)
Has ever adopted improved seeds 0.308 0.291 0.368 0.274 0.131 0.735
(0.462) (0.455) (0.482)
Agriculture activity in the last cropping season:
Hours worked 488.653 452.767 504.220 0.623 0.098 0.161
(341.302) (309.705) (349.616)
Acres of land cultivated 1.205 1.278 1.109 0.164 0.026 0.362
(1.360) (1.440) (1.164)
0.517 0.583 0.515 0.951 0.019 0.038
(0.500) (0.493) (0.500)
0.862 0.915 0.786 0.482 0.159 0.652
(1.944) (1.872) (1.720)
0.914 0.886 0.899 0.927 0.922 0.852
(1.776) (1.701) (1.942)
2.488 3.209 2.529 0.931 0.196 0.197
(8.059) (9.926) (7.595)
5.498 7.436 5.696 0.886 0.305 0.254
(24.937) (33.425) (22.418)
Other characteristics:
Acres of land owned 2.156 2.214 2.044 0.511 0.328 0.719
(3.571) (3.216) (3.746)
Total number of assets owned 18.268 18.265 18.819 0.380 0.369 0.995
(8.309) (8.671) (8.309)
Completed primary school 0.452 0.479 0.437 0.537 0.072 0.288
(0.498) (0.500) (0.496)
Notes: Columns 1, 2 and 3 show means and standard deviations in parentheses. Column 4, 5 and 6 reports the p-value of the test of equality of means based on standard errors 
clustered at the community level.  The p-values are robust to controlling for stratification variables.  Beliefs about the returns of improved seeds equal zero for agents who do not 
know about the existence of improved seeds. "Engaged in commercial agriculture" equals 1 if the ratio between revenues and output value is above the median of 5%. "Kg of maize 
(beans) produced per hour worked and acre cultivated" calculates the production of maize (beans) in kg per acre and hour worked dedicated to maize (beans) cultivation. This 
variable is missing for agents who did not grow maize (beans) in the last cropping season. The total output value equals the quantity of each crop produced multiplied by the 
median market price of each crop unit in the branch. Quantity and value of production are truncated above and below two standard deviations from the mean. Results are robust 
to alternative cleaning strategies. "Rate of returns" divide the difference between the total production and input value by the input value. The input value includes expenses 
incurred for buying inputs, land and labor costs (hiring workers and own opportunity cost of time). The opportunity cost of working on one's own plot of land equals hours worked 
on own land multiplied by the branch median hourly wage paid to work on someone else land. Result are robust to considering the median hourly salary for working on one's own 
non-farm business. Number of assets owned calculates the total number of personal and business assets owned by the household.
TABLE 1: BALANCE CHECKS ON HOUSEHOLD CHARACTERISTICS AT BASELINE
Advice, knowledge and adoption of improved seeds:
Engaged in commercial agriculture
Rate of returns: (output value - input value) / input value
Kg of beans produced per acre cultivated and hour worked     
      (conditional on cultivating beans)
Output value per acre cultivated and hour worked 
      (in thousand UGX)
Kg of maize produced per acre cultivated and hour worked
      (conditional on cultivating maize)
p-values
Sample: treatment communities only
Knows who the EW 
candidate is
Does not know who 






Total 68% 32% 100%
N=1,785 N=824 N=2,609
TABLE 2: CONNECTIONS TO SELECTED AND NON-SELECTED 
EXTENSION WORKER CANDIDATES AT BASELINE
Note: Table shows percentage and number of respondents in treatment clusters who know  the selected and/ or non-selected EW candidates are at 
baseline. The randomization of the EW selection takes place within the treatment communities only and is done at the cluster level. Each cluster is 
composed of 1, 2 or 3 treatment communities. 
Non-selected EW candidate
Knows who the EW candidate is
Does not know who the 
 EW candidate is
Selected 
EW candidate














Number of observations 60 60 3042
Measures of connections, as reported by households
0.703 0.738 - 0.476
(0.271) (0.270) -
0.524 0.548 - 0.651
(0.286) (0.292) -
Belongs to the community farm association 0.769 0.691 - 0.366
(0.425) (0.466) -
Belongs to BRAC microfinance group 0.350 0.383 - 0.708
(0.481) (0.490) -
Agriculture activity in the last cropping season:
Hours worked 564.870 529.107 497.073 0.301
(160.376) (198.752) (136.694)
Acres of land cultivated 1.583 1.763 1.155 0.430
(1.086) (1.359) (0.307)
0.875 1.000 0.532 0.334
(0.354) (0.000) (0.161)
Other characteristics:
Acres of land owned 2.949 2.873 2.004 0.864
(2.508) (2.313) (0.697)
Total number of assets owned 42.817 39.550 18.630 0.565
(32.333) (29.670) (2.944)
Completed primary school 0.617 0.533 0.483 0.360
(0.490) (0.503) (0.137)
%  respondents who typically discuss agriculture 
with the EW candidate
Notes: Columns 1 and 2 show means and standard deviations in parentheses for the selected and the non-selected EW candidate respectively. Column 3 shows 
the means and standard deviations in parentheses for the average farmer in treatment communities (treatment 1 or 2). Column 4 reports the p-value of the test 
of equality of means in column 1 and 2 based on robust standard errors. The randomization of the EW selection takes place within the treatment communities 
only and is done at the cluster level. Each cluster is composed of 1, 2 or 3 treatment communities. "Engaged in commercial agriculture" equals 1 if the ratio 
between revenues and output value is above the median of 5%.  Number of assets owned calculates the total number of personal and business assets owned by 
the household.
TABLE 3:  BALANCE CHECKS ON CHARACTERISTICS OF 
EXTENSION WORKER CANDIDATES AT BASELINE 
%  respondents who know the EW candidate
Engaged in commercial agriculture








of the EW 
candidates
selected 










Number of observations 1651 1785 557
Knows about existence of improved seeds 0.935 0.926 0.942 0.291 0.443 0.048
(0.247) (0.261) (0.233)
Believes improved seeds have positive returns 0.716 0.714 0.705 0.705 0.174 0.280
(0.451) (0.452) (0.457)
Has ever adopted improved seeds 0.357 0.351 0.228 0.663 0.857 0.752
(0.479) (0.477) (0.420)
Agriculture activity in the last cropping season:
Hours worked 481.576 473.722 471.840 0.766 0.127 0.006
(354.844) (343.467) (251.654)
Acres of land cultivated 1.213 1.229 1.197 0.859 0.340 0.148
(1.319) (1.445) (0.934)
0.549 0.559 0.541 0.278 0.371 0.727
(0.498) (0.497) (0.499)
0.957 0.969 0.687 0.879 0.102 0.108
(1.982) (2.035) (1.554)
1.014 1.039 0.429 0.756 0.012 0.021
(1.870) (1.940) (0.714)
3.366 3.243 1.443 0.653 0.067 0.073
(9.890) (10.020) (3.107)
7.788 7.408 3.345 0.544 0.133 0.301
(33.384) (32.180) (20.435)
Other characteristics:
Acres of land owned 2.079 2.123 2.205 0.909 0.274 0.235
(2.789) (3.185) (2.206)
Total number of assets owned 18.143 18.127 19.172 0.964 0.231 0.219
(8.387) (8.448) (8.782)
Completed primary school 0.446 0.456 0.482 0.278 0.287 0.955
(0.497) (0.498) (0.500)
TABLE 4: BALANCE CHECKS ON HOUSEHOLD CHARACTERISTICS BY CONNECTIONS TO 
EXTENSION WORKER CANDIDATES
p-value
Advice, knowledge and adoption of improved seeds:
Engaged in commercial agriculture
Rate of returns: (output value - input value) / input value
Output value per acre cultivated and hour worked 
      (in thousand UGX)
Kg of maize produced per acre cultivated and hour worked
      (conditional on cultivating maize)
Kg of beans produced per acre cultivated and hour worked     
      (conditional on cultivating beans)
Notes:  "Knows (non) selected EW candidate" equals 1 if the respondents knows this person independently of whether she knows the other candidate or not. Columns 1 and 2 
show means and standard deviations in parentheses. Column 3 reports the p-value of the test of equality of means based on standard errors clustered at the community level.  s 
and standard deviations in parentheses. Column 4, 5 and 6 report the p-values of tests of equality of means based on standard errors clustered at the community level.  The p-
values are robust to controlling for stratification variables or to clustering at the cluster level.  Beliefs about the returns of improved seeds equal zero for agents who do not know 
about the existence of improved seeds. "Engaged in commercial agriculture" equals 1 if the ratio between revenues and output value is above the median of 5%. "Kg of maize 
(beans) produced per hour worked and acre cultivated" calculates the production of maize (beans) in kg per acre and hour worked dedicated to maize (beans) cultivation. This 
variable is missing for agents who did not grow maize (beans) in the last cropping season. The total output value equals the quantity of each crop produced multiplied by the 
median market price of each crop unit in the branch. Quantity and value of production are truncated above and below two standard deviations from the mean. Results are robust 
to alternative cleaning strategies. "Rate of returns" divide the difference between the total production and input value by the input value. The input value includes expenses 
incurred for buying inputs, land and labor costs (hiring workers and own opportunity cost of time). The opportunity cost of working on one's own plot of land equals hours worked 
on own land multiplied by the branch median hourly wage paid to work on someone else land. Result are robust to considering the median hourly salary for working on one's own 














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































   
   
   
   



















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Movement Restrictions and Education,
Evidence from Palestine
1. Introduction
Education plays a key role not only as an indicator of human capital but also as a central
component of economic development. Understanding its determinants has therefore always
been recognized as a first order economic question. In this paper, I study the extent to
which movement restrictions limit education. Examples of movement obstacles abound, e.g.
countries in conflict or in post-conflict often block access to specific locations due to security
concerns. Assessing the effect of movement restrictions on education in these countries is
important not only to understand the evolution of human capital itself but also to evaluate
the role that mobility constraints plays in intensifying conflicts through the weakening of the
educational system.72
In this paper, I base the evidence on the West Bank Separation Barrier that was built in
2003 by the Government of Israel to enhance their security. While the Barrier (or the “Wall”)
was constructed to limit movements between Israel and the West Bank, it also constitutes a
major movement obstacle within the West Bank: the Barrier was built within the West Bank
cutting off individuals located in-between the Green Line and the Barrier. Restricted opening
hours at the Gates of the Barrier, overcrowding, along with the multiple layers of checks and
security procedures at these Gates have made the crossing long and difficult. One third of the
West Bank population is estimated to be affected by the Wall, i.e. they have limited access
to schools, jobs, services on the other side of the Wall (UNOCHA 2010b).
To study the impact of movement restrictions on education, I use a difference-in-differences
approach that compares education outcomes in areas affected by the Wall (“treatment group”)
to those not affected (“control group”), for individuals who were young enough to be in school
72In areas where unemployment is high and where young people participate in military activities for lack of
alternative opportunities, education may provide a viable option for keeping them away from combat. They
also prepare students in taking an active part in important civil processes.
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when the Wall was constructed (“exposed cohorts”) to individuals who were already out of
school (“non exposed cohorts”). In the identification strategy, the exposure of an individual
to the Wall is thus determined both by her age and her location of residence.
The main source of data is the 2009 Socioeconomic and Food Security cross-sectional
survey (SEFSec) that contains information on the age, education and income of 25,744 indi-
viduals in the West Bank and indicates whether their residential location is affected by the
Wall or not. An area is considered “affected” if it is located between the Green Line and the
Wall, or outside but encircled by three or four sides by the Wall. While all individuals living
in locations affected by the Wall are included in the “treatment group”, I include only their
closest match among those living in non-affected areas to the “control group”. The matching
approach selects control individuals for whom the distribution of income, age and number of
schools is as similar as possible to the distribution in the treated group.
Throughout the paper, I consider three outcome variables: (1) whether an individual has
dropped out from elementary school (vs. if she has completed elementary school), (2) whether
she has dropped out from preparatory school, and (3) whether she has ever been enrolled in
school. For each of these variables, I use information on the age of the respondent when the
Wall was constructed in 2003 and the education system in Palestine to identify “exposed”
cohorts. For drops out from elementary (preparatory) school, children are exposed if they are
too young to have completed elementary (preparatory) school in 2003, i.e. less than 13 (17)
years old. Similarly, only students who are too young to have ever attended school in 2003
are “affected”, i.e. younger than 7 years old. For each outcome variable, I divide the exposed
and unexposed cohorts in a “younger” and an “older” sub-cohort, e.g for the drop out from
elementary school, the young exposed (unexposed) cohort is aged 4-8 (14-18) while the old
one is 9-13 years old (19-23).
The analysis proceeds in three steps. First, I estimate difference-in-differences for two
separate “experiments of interest”: the young unexposed cohort is compared to the young
exposed cohort in the first and to the old exposed cohort in the second. The distinction
between these two experiments allows me to separately identify the shorter vs. longer-run
effect of limited mobility on education, i.e. for the drop out variables the effect is identified for
students who had nearly completed their studies when the Wall was constructed (old exposed
cohort) to those who were further away from completion (young exposed cohort). Second,
I present the results for a control experiment that compares the two unexposed cohorts to
each other. The control experiment aims to support the parallel trend assumption, i.e. in
the absence of movement restrictions, the treatment group would have followed the same
time trend in education levels as the control group. Third, I conduct a number of robustness
checks dealing with anticipation effects, migration issues, reversion to the mean and omitted
variables.
The results show that movement restrictions negatively impact education. Using a logit
131
regression model with location and year-of-birth fixed effects, I find that the construction of
the Barrier raised the elementary and preparatory school drop out rate by 3.7 and 6 percentage
points respectively when unexposed cohorts are compared to the young exposed cohorts. As
an average of 7 and 11.5 out of 100 students abandon elementary and preparatory school
respectively in the control areas, limiting the freedom of movement has a large negative effect
on education as it raises the drop out rate by 50%. In contrast, the difference-in-differences
coefficients are not significant when the unexposed cohorts are compared to the old exposed
ones: students who were close to school completion did not give up school and decided to
bear the travel/psychological cost of crossing the Wall. This result is consistent with the
fact that the marginal benefit from attending school decreases with the number of years
before completion. Finally, the Barrier is found to increase the share of individuals who
have never attended school by 3.6 percentage points, i.e. 45% higher than in control areas.
Reassuringly, the estimated coefficients are not significantly different than zero in the control
experiment, indicating that the treatment and control groups were on parallel trends before
the construction of the Wall.
To provide further evidence that the identified effects are causal, I show that the Barrier
affected education only in areas where the Wall construction is completed while had no effect
in districts where the Wall was initially planned but ended up not being built. Moreover, I
find that refugees, who are allowed to enroll in UN schools located in refugee camps and have
access to these schools even after the construction of the Wall, are less negatively affected
than non-refugees.
Importantly, the impact of limited mobility is stronger for households defined as “food
insecure”, i.e. low income and low consumption. Food secure households, who are wealthier
and can afford movings kids from a public to a private school if needed, are instead less
affected. This indicates that movement restrictions lead not only to a decrease in average
education but also to a potential increase in income inequality. Finally, movement restrictions
are found to affect boys more than girls. This is consistent with existing anecdotal evidence
that indicates that girls are granted permits to cross checkpoints more easily than boys who
are more likely to be turned down on the grounds of security.
Besides its direct effect on the reduced access to schools, the Barrier could also affect
education indirectly by reducing access to health facilities, land and work places.73 Rather
than only dropping out because they cannot access schools, children may quit school because
their parents lost their job and they cannot afford school fees anymore or because their
health deteriorated. Although I am not able to separate direct from indirect effects of limited
mobility on education in this paper, existing literature indicates that indirect effects matter,
73Palestinians without a Jerusalem ID cannot access East Jerusalem where most of the specialized hospitals
are located. To enter Jerusalem, they need a special short term permit that is often turned down for males
between 15 and 30 on the grounds of security. Palestinians living in the West Bank also need a visitor permit
to access their farming land in the Seam Zone.
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i.e. Di Maio and Nandi (2008) analyze the relationship between child labor and schooling
attendance in Palestine and show that the loss of the father’s job raises significantly the
probability that the children participate in the labor market and abandon school.74
While this study shows that movement restrictions are detrimental for education, the drop
in education may have had a broader economic and social impact. How did the labor market
adjust to a decrease in the supply of educated workers? Was the Wall construction able to
deter violence or did its negative impact on education increase subsequent violence? Data I
am collecting on the frequency of violent events in the West Bank will allow me to answer
this question in a future study and will, hopefully, provide us with a deeper understanding of
the effect of policies promoting freedom of movement on economic development.
This paper is related to the extensive literature that studies the determinants of education.
Among the many papers that exist, those that are more closely related to this study, both
in terms of topic and of identification strategy, are Lavy and Zablotsky (2011) and Duflo
(2001). Lavy and Zablotsky (2011) analyze the effect of mother’s education on fertility and
education of children. Using the revocation of the Military Government of Arabs in Israel
that imposed severe travel restrictions, they find that the change in access to schools led to a
sharp decline in fertility. Duflo (2001) uses a similar difference-in-differences approach as the
one in this paper to estimate the impact of school construction on education and earnings.
This study contributes to the existing literature by providing, to the best of my knowledge,
the first rigorous evaluation of the role of limited mobility in shaping education outcomes.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, I discuss movement restriction
in the West Bank and its theoretical impact on education. In Section 3, I describe the data, the
education system in Palestine and present an overview of the identification strategy. Section
4 presents estimates of the impact of the Wall on education and its heterogeneous effect.
Section 5 discusses threats to the identification strategy and robustness checks, and Section
6 concludes.
2. Movement Restrictions in the West Bank
Following the beginning of the second Intifada, the Israeli authorities implemented a compre-
hensive system of physical movement obstacles within the West Bank to enhance their security.
As a result of this, a Barrier and other movement obstacles, i.e. checkpoints, roadblocks and
earth mounds, were built to separate Israel from the West Bank.75
The construction of the Separation Barrier started in June 2002 in the North of the West
Bank. By the end of 2003, 198 km of Wall were built in the Centre and the North and
74A survey of the PCBS on the impact of the Annexation Wall shows that 26 percent of the students
interviewed abandoned school because of economic hardship (PCBS 2005).
75Among the 66 checkpoints, 65 percent are located along the Barrier and used by the Israeli authorities to
control access to East Jerusalem and Israel.
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60 km around East Jerusalem. The construction of the South part of the Wall started in
October 2003 but was halted in 2004 due to financial constraints and concerns raised by the
international community. Nowadays, the Wall is almost completed in the North and Center
of the West Bank, while it is half incomplete in the South. Figure 1 shows a map of the parts
of the Wall that are constructed, in construction or planned in July 2008. The map of the
Wall has not changed much since the end of 2003: most of what is built today was built back
then, i.e. the intensity of “movement restrictions” has remained more or less constant since
the end of 2003.
According to the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA
2010b), over 674,000 Palestinians - approximately 30 per cent of the West Bank population -
were directly affected by the Wall in 2003: 274,000 of them were living in areas between the
Wall and the Green Line76 and 400,000 were located East of the Wall with the necessity to
cross it every day to access their farms, jobs, schools and services.
The only way to cross the Wall is through Wall Gates that have varying opening hours:
some are always open while others open only a few days a week at specific hours. Every
individual who crosses the Wall needs a permission issued from the Israeli Defense Forces and
a Jerusalem ID if she wants to access East Jerusalem. Overcrowding, along with the multiple
layers of checks and security procedures at these checkpoints have made the crossing long
and difficult. Crossing one side to another of the Wall in other ways than through the Gates
is basically impossible due to the presence of the Wall, layers of razor wire, military patrol
roads, sand paths to trace footprints, trenches, a three-meter high electric fence, and buffer
zones of 30 to 100 meters beside the Wall with prohibited access to Palestinians.
Anecdotal evidence suggests that the Wall has caused a disruption in the education system.
A number of students and teachers who could easily access their school before the Wall was
built, now have to cross checkpoints to reach the school and need an approved permission to
do so. Students living in Ramallah and studying in Jerusalem must for instance take transport
to Qalandia checkpoint, then transport to Ram checkpoint and finally get a third transport
to school. In areas without checkpoints and where the Wall cuts straight through, children
have been cut off from school, e.g. in Abu Dis students travel over 20 kilometers around the
Wall to reach their classrooms. In places where the checkpoints open only at specific hours,
teaching hours shorten to allow students to get back home. Even when checkpoints are open
all the day, students and teachers are often late in school as passing through checkpoints can
take a long time and parents may not have the time to bring their children themselves to
school.
76Of these, 161,000 live in enclaves, 96,000 are inside the depth Barriers and 17,000 are closed in areas
between the Wall and the Green line.
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3. Data and Identification Strategy
3.1. Data
The main source of data of this paper is the 2009 Socioeconomic and Food Security survey
(SEFSec) conducted by the Food and Agriculture Organization in collaboration with the
Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS). The survey contains information on gender,
age, education, income, labor force participation, food security of 25,744 individuals located
in the West Bank. Education is reported in three ways, i.e. with their enrollment status, the
number of years of education and the highest level of education completed.
Importantly, the data indicate whether the place of residence of the respondent is affected
or not by the construction of the Wall. An area is considered “affected” if it is located between
the Green Line and the Wall as constructed in 2003,77 or outside but encircled by three or
four sides by the Wall. Among the twelve districts of the West Bank, Jericho and Nablus are
the least affected by the Wall while Qalqylia, Salfit and Jerusalem are the most exposed with
over 80% of the households defined as “affected”. The construction of the Wall began in 2002
and a large part of what is built today (see Figure 1) was concluded by the end of 2003.
While the SEFSec dataset includes information on the residence of all interviewed re-
spondents in 2009, it does not include information on their precise migration history. As a
consequence, I am not able to assess whether a respondent changed location between 2002,
when the construction of the Wall started, until 2009, when the survey was done. Although
I assume that the location remained the same in the analysis, I discuss migration issues in
details in Section 5.2.
Finally, I merge the SEFSec data with a school database provided by the Palestinian
Ministry of Education and Higher Education (MoEHE). This enables me to know: (a) the
total number of schools located in each district, (b) who is admitted in the schools: age and
gender, (c) the type of management of the schools: public school, private school or UNRWA
school for refugees (United Nations Relief and Works Agency) .
3.2. Identification Strategy
The identification strategy relies on a difference-in-differences approach that compares educa-
tion outcomes in areas affected by the Wall (“treatment group”) to those not affected (“control
group”), for individuals who were in school when the Wall was constructed (“exposed cohort”)
to individuals who were not (“non exposed cohort”).78 The identifying assumption is that,
77Only the sections of the Wall that were constructed in 2003 are considered in the definition of an “affected
area” while those planned, but not constructed in 2003 are not.
78Note that although some sections of the Wall were planned in 2003 but were then not yet constructed
in 2009, the context and the data do not allow me to use these areas as the control group. First, movement
restrictions existed in these areas due to the presence of soldiers and fences along the line where the Wall was
supposed to be constructed but then was not. Second, although the SEFSec database contains information on
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in the absence of movement restrictions, treatment areas would have followed the same time
trend in education levels as the control. I discuss and provide evidence that this assumption
holds in Section 4.
Because areas affected by the Wall differ from the unaffected ones in terms of number
of schools, age and income per capita of the population, I resort to a one-to-one matching
approach in defining the control group. While all individuals living in locations affected by
the Wall are included in the “treatment group”, only their closest match among those living
in non-affected areas is added to the “control group”. The matching approach selects 9,433
individuals among the pool of 16,284 control individuals for whom the distribution of income,
age and number of schools is as similar as possible to the distribution in the treated group.
The matching is done without replacement and with common support. Results are robust to
using different matching strategies, e.g. 5 nearest neighbors, matching with replacement.
The exposure of an individual to the construction of the Wall is determined jointly by
her location and by whether she was enrolled in school or about to start school at the end
of 2003. Although I do not have information on the education history of each respondent, I
use information on the age of the respondent in 2003 and the education system in Palestine
to identify cohorts likely to have been in school in 2003. The educational system in Palestine
consists in elementary school from grade 1 to 6, preparatory school from grade 7 to 10 and
secondary school from grade 11 to 12. The three education outcome variables I use in the paper
are: 1) whether an individual has dropped out of elementary school (vs. if she has completed
elementary school), 2) whether she has dropped out from preparatory school, 3) whether she
has ever been enrolled in school. Given that dropout from secondary school is extremely low
(see below), the analysis focuses on elementary and preparatory school exclusively.
As only a small percentage of the students repeat classes,79 I use fixed-age cut-offs for a
non-repeating student in Palestine to estimate whether a respondent is likely to be in school
or not in 2003. For drops out from elementary school, children are exposed if they have not
yet completed elementary school in 2003. Given that children usually start elementary school
at age 7, they are at risk of dropping out only if they are 13 years old or younger in 2003.
Similarly for drops out from preparatory school, only children who are 17 or younger in 2003
are potentially at risk. Finally, only students who are too young to have ever attended school
in 2003, i.e. 7 or younger, are affected by the Wall in their decision to enroll in school or not.
Figure 2 illustrates the age cut-offs for the three variables of interest.
Two point are here of note. First, because the SEFsec survey was conducted six years
after the Wall was built, using the number of years of education as an outcome variable
the locality code of the respondent, it does not provide me with the name of these locality for privacy reason
(in other words, I do not know which code refers to which locality).
79In Palestine, students do not repeat classes until grade 4 of elementary school. After grade 4, students may
be asked to repeat a class. The SEFSec sample indicates that among the respondents with 7 years of education,
only 6 percent has not completed elementary school. A similar percentage is observed for preparatory school.
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would overestimate my results. Students who were old enough in 2003 to have completed
their education would indeed be compared to younger exposed children who may still be
enrolled in school in 2009. Outcomes such as “Dropping out of school” and “Having never
been enrolled in school” have the advantage of referring to decisions taken before the 2009
survey for both the exposed and unexposed cohorts.
Second, the reason I use the end of 2003 as the key date for defining “exposure” rather
than June 2002, when the Wall construction started, is that I would otherwise allow for
time variation in the exposure to the Wall, i.e. students who started school just before the
end of 2003 are more intensively exposed to the Wall than those who were enrolled in 2002
but finished school before the end of 2003. Using 2003 as the cutoff thus ensures that each
individual in the “exposed cohort” is equally exposed to the Wall. A caveat here is that
my results are underestimated if the partial construction of the Wall in 2002 has affected
negatively the education of “unexposed” students who were in school in 2002 but not in 2003.
On the other hand, the results are overestimated if students who were about to finish school
in 2002 had an extra incentive to study and complete schooling before the Wall was fully
built. These potential anticipation effects are discussed in section 5.1.
3.3. Summary Statistics
Table 1 presents summary statistics for the treatment and the control group separately. Al-
though respondents in both groups are similar in terms of their education, age and labor
force participation, they strongly differ in whether they face mobility restrictions. While 26
percent of the treatment households report that mobility constraints are the major problem
they face, only 17 percent report it as an obstacle in the control group. This difference, which
is significant at the one percent level, indicates that I am capturing movement restrictions
difficulties by separating the sample in areas affected and not by the Barrier.
Eight percent of the individuals in the sample have never attended school while the rate of
elementary, preparatory and secondary school completion is 78, 51 and 23 percent respectively.
The drop out rates from elementary, preparatory and secondary school equal 7, 11 and 1.5
percent respectively. Note that, throughout this paper, I define “drop-out rate” as the share
of students who were enrolled but stopped going to school, and did not re-enroll afterwards.
Finally, 63% of the sample is “food secure”, i.e. both income or consumption are above
$4.7/adult equivalent/day while the rest is “food insecure”.
The MoEHE school database indicates that there are an average of 7.3 schools per district
in the West Bank. One third of these schools are female schools, one third are male schools
and one third are mixed. Finally, 72% of the schools are public, 15% are private and 12% are
UNRWA schools for refugees.
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4. The Effect of Movement Restrictions on Education
4.1. Simple Difference-in-Differences
A first evidence of the effect of the Barrier on education is presented in Figure 3. The Figure
presents the percentage of agents who dropped out from elementary and preparatory school
and the percentage who have never enrolled in school by age in 2003, for the treatment and
the control group separately. While the exposed cohorts tend to have higher probabilities of
dropping out from elementary school in the treatment than in the control areas, the opposite
is true for the unexposed cohorts. The same pattern is observed for the drops out from
preparatory school and ever enrollment in school.
Tables 2 presents simple two-by-two DID estimates while Figure 4 presents the graphical
representation of these results. The exposed and unexposed cohorts are divided into a younger
and an older cohort, e.g. for the drop out from elementary school, the exposed cohort is divided
into a “young” and “old” cohort aged 4-8 and 9-13 respectively while unexposed cohort are
divided into age ranges 14-19 and 19-23. While a similar 5 years age interval is used for the
drop out from secondary school, I use a 3 years age interval for the “never enrolled in school”
variable.80
The effect of movement restrictions on education is estimated in Panel A and B by com-
paring education of the young and old exposed cohort respectively to the young unexposed
one. Panel C presents a control experiment that compares education of the young unex-
posed cohort to the old unexposed cohort. The identifying assumption is satisfied if the DID
estimate in Panel C is not significantly different than zero.
Columns (a) and (b) of Table 2 suggest that exposed cohorts abandon elementary and
preparatory school more often in affected areas while the opposite is true for unexposed
cohorts, leading to positive DID estimates. Importantly, the DID is positive and significant
only for the young exposed cohorts in Panel A and B while non-significant for older exposed
cohorts. These results are consistent with the expected cost of staying in school -i.e. crossing
the checkpoints every day until school completion- increasing with the number of years before
school completion. In other words, the findings indicate that the older cohorts are not affected
by limited mobility because their expected cost of dropping out is larger than the benefits of
finishing school while this is not the case for younger exposed cohorts.
Two points are here of note. First, most parts of the Wall that exist today were already
built by the end of 2003, young and old exposed cohorts face a similar “intensity of travel re-
strictions”. The difference in the reaction of these cohorts is hence not explained by increasing
“exposure” to the Wall. Second, Panel D of Table A1 indicates the different in their reaction
80The reason is that the youngest children in Panel A (aged 2 in 2003) need to be at least 8 in 2009 to have
been faced with the decision of enrolling in school in 2009. The DID would be underestimated if I include, in
the exposed cohorts, children aged 0 and 1 in 2003 (too young to be enrolled in 2009).
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is statistically different than zero: the young exposed cohort is significantly more negatively
affected by movement restrictions than the old exposed cohort.
In Column (c) of Table 2, the results show that the Barrier increases the share of individuals
who have never attended school. In contrast with the drop out results, the DID estimates are
stronger for older exposed cohorts. This indicates that the effect of the Wall on enrollment was
attenuated over time, i.e. kids who were about to start school when the Wall was constructed
did not enroll while those in the same situation a few years later did. This could be explained
by learning effects, e.g. parents “learn” about another school located on their side of the Wall
and decide to enroll their kids in this school.
Importantly, the DID estimates are not significantly different than zero in Panel C for all
the outcome variables. In other words, in the absence of movement restrictions before the
construction of the Wall, treatment and control group were following parallel trends. This is
clearly illustrated in Figure 4.
4.2. Difference-in-Differences with Fixed Effects and Controls
The difference-in-differences presented in the previous section can be generalized to a regres-
sion framework. As the education outcome variables of this paper are binary, I use a logit
estimation that fits the data better than a linear estimation:
logit(Yijl) = α+ βj + γl + TjEiδ +Xiζ + εijl
where Yijl is an education dummy variable for individual i living in district j and aged l in
2003, Tj = 1 if the district of residence is affected by the construction of the Wall (treatment
group), Ei = 1 if the individual i is young enough in 2003 to belong to the exposed cohort,
βj are district fixed effects and γl are year of birth fixed effects. Finally, Xi is a vector
of individual and household controls that are correlated with Yijl: gender, ownership of an
Israeli/Jerusalem ID or not, refugee status (refugee or non-refugee), location of the house
(urban, rural or refugee camp), distance to the closest school in kilometers, number of children
in the household, number of parents who work in the household.
The parameter of interest is here the odds ratio which measures the extent to which
the effect of living in an area affected by the Wall changes for exposed cohorts compared
to non-exposed ones. The logit coefficient δ and the odds ratio are reported in Table 3
with different specifications: without fixed effects and without controls, with fixed effects
and without controls, with fixed effects and with controls. Reassuringly, the magnitude and
precision of the estimated effects are robust to adding fixed effects or control variables in the
regression. This provides supporting evidence that the estimated effects are not biased by
omitted variables. More discussion on potential omitted variables is discussed in Section 5.
When the old unexposed cohort is compared to the young exposed cohort (Panel A), the
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results suggest that the construction of the Wall increased the dropout rate from elementary
and preparatory school by 1.68 and 1.60 times respectively (Columns a and b). However, the
Wall did not affect the drop out rate of the old exposed cohort: these students, who were about
to finish elementary/preparatory school when the Wall was constructed, were thus willing to
bear the cost involved by limited mobility in order to complete their studies (Panel B). In
Column (c), the impact of the Wall on the probability of having never attended school is
significant only for the oldest exposed cohort. Finally, in all three Tables, DID estimates are
not significantly different than zero in the control experiment (Panel C). This is reassuring as
the contrary would have suggested that, irrespective of the Wall, education was deteriorating
faster in affected localities, and the positive coefficients we identify may then have reflected
this differential trend rather than the effect of the Wall.
In non-linear models, DID estimates may differ from δ as the cross partial derivative of
E(Yijl) with respect to Ei and Tj is different from the derivative of E(Yijl) with respect to the
multiplicative term EiTj . To address this potential issue, I calculate marginal effects manually
using the correct cross partial derivative formula (Ai and Norton 2003).81 Reported in Table
4, these marginal effects suggest that the construction of the Wall increased the drop-out rate
from elementary and preparatory school by 3.7 and 5.9 percentage points respectively when
comparing the youngest affected cohort to the unaffected one. As the average drop out rate
in the West Bank is 7% for elementary school and 11% for preparatory school, these effects
are large in magnitude: they correspond to a 50% increase in drop out rate. Moreover, the
probability of having never attended school increased by 45% (3.6 percentage points) when
older unaffected cohorts are compared to unaffected ones. Reassuringly, no significant effects
are detected in the control experiment.
The second part of Table 4 calculates marginal effects for exposed and unexposed cohorts
within the treatment areas separately. While the Wall increased drop out of young exposed
cohorts, it had no effect on unexposed cohorts. Similarly, it increased the chances of having
never attended school for old exposed cohorts while had no effect on unexposed cohorts.
Placebo tests and heterogeneous effects
To provide further evidence that the identified DID estimates are causal, I present the results of
two placebo tests in Table 5: the first placebo test exploits variation in movement restrictions
intensity across districts while the second exploits variation across households in access to
schools after the Wall was constructed.
While the exact location of the Wall is certainly endogenous to a number of factors that




= 1/1+e−(α+β+γ+δ+Xiζ) − 1/1+e−(α+β+Xiζ)−+1/1+e−(α+γ+Xiζ) + +1/1+e−(α+Xiζ) where F (Yijl) =
1/1+e−(α+βj+γl+AjTiδ+Xiζ+εijl) is the logit cumulative distribution function
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endogenous. As the Wall was gradually constructed from North to South, the Barrier was
almost complete in the North in 2003 while it was largely incomplete in the South. As a
consequence, the effect of movement restrictions is expected to be stronger in the North
where families face more mobility obstacles. This prediction is confirmed by Part 1 of Table
5: the affected population living in the North is more than 3 times as likely to have dropped
out and to have never enrolled in school than the unaffected population. This effect is smaller
and not significant in the Center and in the South of the West Bank.82
Part 2 of Table 5 replicates the analysis using a more precise index of movement restriction
intensity in the district rather than using its location. The Mayssun El-Attar Index (2009)
equals Wallj/Borderj + InsideWallj+Enclavesj/TotalAreaj where Wallj is the length of the Wall (in
km) in district j, Borderj refers to the length of the Green Line border, InsideWallj is
the size (in km2) of the area between the Green Line and the Wall, Enclavesj is the size
of the areas that have become enclaves. Again, Table 5 indicates that impact on education
was weaker in areas less exposed to mobility obstacles (index equal to 0) while stronger in
localities with an index bigger than one.
In the West bank, all the households with a registered refugee status are eligible for free
basic education through UNRWA (United Nations Relief and Works Agency) schools. As
refugees tend to live in refugee camps, close to where the UNRWA schools are located, most
of them continue having access to UNRWA schools after the construction of the Wall and
are thus less affected by the Wall.83 Table 5 confirms this prediction: the negative impact of
movement constraints is stronger for non-refugees than for refugees. In particular, it appears
that non-refugees living in areas affected by the Wall drop out three times as much from
elementary school as those living in unaffected areas (significance at 1 percent). In contrast,
the education level of agents with the refugee status has been less impacted.
In the rest of this section, I explore whether there are heterogeneous effects of limited
mobility by wealth and by gender. The results are reported in Table 6. Using “food security”
a measure of wealth, I find that the effect of limited mobility is stronger “food insecure” than
“food secure” households. Exposed food insecure children drop out from elementary and
preparatory school 4 and 2.5 times more than unexposed food insecure children, while the
effect on food secure households is positive but insignificant. This indicates that movement
restrictions lead to an increase in income inequality as poor families seem to be more negatively
affected than rich families. Richer parents may indeed have the option of sending their kids
to a private school in case the public one is too difficult to reach or can afford to pay a driver
to bring children to school without having to queue at the checkpoint on their own and losing
their jobs.
82Note that the estimates for the Centre are higher and more significant when the locality of Ramallah is
excluded from the sample.
83The UNRWA defines a refugee as someone: “whose normal place of residence was Palestine between June
1946 and May 1948, who lost her home and means of livelihood as a result of the 1948 Arab-Israeli War”.
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Finally, Table 6 shows that the effect of the Wall is stronger for boys than for girls.
Exposed boys living in affected areas are more than twice as likely of having dropped out as
in unaffected areas. For girls, the interaction term is positive but not significant. This result
is consistent with existing anecdotal evidence that indicates that girls are granted permits to
cross checkpoints more easily than boys who are turned down on the grounds of security.
4.3. Extended Difference-in-Differences
I extend results in the previous section by estimating the effect of limited mobility age-by-age
with:
logit(Yijl) = α+ βj + γl +
m∑
l=n
(TjAil) δl +Xiζ + εijl
where Tj = 1 if district j is affected by the Wall, Ail = 1 if individual i is aged l in 2003 and
[n − m] is the “exposed” age range. In the regression, individuals in the oldest unexposed
cohort in 2003 form the control group. The parameters of interests, δl, estimate the differential
effect of the Barrier for agents aged l in 2003 in comparison to unexposed agents. δl are
expected to be non-positive for l > p where p is the youngest age for an individual to be
considered unexposed.
Figure 5 plots smoothed interaction terms, i.e. for each l :
(δl−1+δl+δl+1)
3 is plotted. The
advantage of considering this smoothed version of the coefficients is that it shows more clearly
the discontinuity in the trend for affected and unaffected cohorts. With drop out or with
never enrollment as an outcome variable, the smoothed coefficients tend to be negative for
the unexposed cohorts while positive for the exposed ones. Note that for drop out from
preparatory schools, the interaction term sharply increases for exposed cohorts younger than
13. This again confirms the fact that only the youngest exposed students seem to have given
up preparatory school as a consequence of mobility constraints. With “never enrollment in
school”, the estimated coefficients are negative for unexposed cohort older than 8, strongly
increase for exposed cohort just below 8 while slowly decrease for younger exposed cohorts.
5. Threats to Identification and Robustness Checks
The interpretation of the coefficients relies on the identifying assumption that there are no
omitted time varying and district-specific effects correlated with the construction of the Wall.
Potential threats to the identification are discussed below.
5.1. Anticipation
This paper defines “exposed cohorts” as individuals who were in school at the end of 2003,
rather than using June 2002 (start date for the construction) as the cutoff. While this ensures
142
that each individual that belongs to the “exposed cohort” is equally exposed to the Wall, my
results may be over- or underestimated by anticipation effects. More precisely, the results
are underestimated if the partial construction of the Wall in 2002 has affected negatively the
education of “unexposed” students who were in school in 2002 but not in 2003. On the other
hand, the results are overestimated if students who were about to finish school in 2002 had
an extra incentive to study and complete schooling before the Wall was fully built.
To alleviate these concerns, I replicate the analysis using two alternative experiments of
interest in which old and young exposed cohorts are compared to the old unexposed cohort,
rather than the young unexposed one. Because old unexposed individuals were already out
of school in June 2002, their education was not directly affected by the Wall. They are
moreover less likely to have quickly completed their schooling because of an anticipated nearby
construction of the Wall. Panel E and F of Table A1 shows that the results remain robust to
these two alternative experiment of interests. Results are also robust to replicating Table 2
using June 2002 as the cutoff for the definition of “exposure” (not reported).
5.2. Sample Selection: Migration
The SEFSec dataset includes information on the current residence of all interviewed house-
holds while does not include information on the precise migration history of each household.
As a consequence, I assume in the analysis that the location of each respondent has not
changed between 2002, when the construction of the Wall started, until 2009, when the sur-
vey was done. This assumption may not be satisfied if households living in affected areas
anticipated that once the Wall was constructed, they would have limited access to education
and decided to move to unaffected areas in the West Bank or outside the West Bank. Simi-
larly, the assumption does not hold if households managed to move from affected to unaffected
areas after 2003, once the Wall was built.
These movements are threat to the analysis if the educational composition of individuals
living in areas affected or not by the Barrier changed as a result of the construction of the
Wall. If the sample of households who migrated is non-random and would have been less
affected by the Wall than the average sample household, then the estimated DID estimates
are overestimated.84 If, instead, agents who migrated are those who would have been more
severely affected by the Wall then the effect I identify is underestimated.
The difficulty in getting formal permission to move both within the West Bank and outside
of the West Bank85 combined with the difficulty in finding a job in the West Bank (20%
unemployment rate) and selling land/ houses in affected areas, strongly limits internal and
84This could be the case if wealthier households were more likely to migrate. The effect of the Wall con-
struction on education is indeed found to be milder for richer households than poorer ones.
85Migrating to another area of the West Bank or to Jerusalem requires a permission that is usually hard to
get. Moving out from the West Bank to neighboring countries, e.g. Jordan, Egypt, is hard as these countries
have very strict criteria for granting residence and work permits.
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external migration. This is confirmed by a number of existing surveys. The 2003 PCBS
Household Survey (PCBS 2003) on the Impact of the Separation Wall asked a random sample
of 5,148 persons located in affected and unaffected areas whether they recently moved and
if, not, whether they were planning to. Only 5% of the sample reports having changed
location in the past or wanting to move, with an equal proportion in the West and the East
of the Barrier. Among this 5%, 72% reported having moved or wanting to move as a result
of the Wall. Another survey of the PCBS (PCBS 2006) on the impact of the Separation
Wall on forced migration indicates that only 0.8% of the population living in localities where
the Barrier passes through have been displaced in 2003. Finally, the SEFSec survey asked
each respondent included in the analysis whether she migrated in the six months before the
interview and for what reasons. It turns out than among the 23,500 individuals interviewed,
only 2% changed place of residence and this proportion is equal in Wall-affected and unaffected
areas. Moreover, the income level, the educational outcomes and the age of the 2% who
migrated is not statistically different from the rest of the population (not reported).
To provide further evidence that the DID estimates are not biased by sample selection
issues, Table 7 (Part 3) replicates the analysis excluding from the sample all respondents who
got married, had children and became “parent” in a new household since they went to school.
Their probability of moving, before or after the Wall was built, is indeed higher than the
respondents who still live with their parents (coded as being son or daughter in the household).
With this restricted sample, I find the effect of limited mobility to be slightly stronger than
before in the experiment of interest while not significant in the control experiment. This
suggests that, if anything, migration leads to underestimate my results. Reassuringly, the
respondents “included” in the sample have similar education level, wealth, gender as those
“excluded” (not reported), indicating that these two groups do not seem to statistically differ
on the extent to which they are affected by limited mobility. Results in Table A2 indicate that
neither the number of years of schooling, nor the higher education level significantly predicts
the chances of still living with parents.
5.3. Omitted Variables
Because the Barrier was built to protect Israel from attacks emanating from the West Bank,
one eventuality is that the location of the Wall coincides with the areas of Palestine that are
experiencing an increase in violence. If school attendance in affected areas diminishes as a
result of violence increase and not only as a consequence of movement restrictions, the results
of Section 4 are overestimated, i.e. parents keep their children at home because of their fear
of violence rather than because schools are not accessible. Reassuringly, changes in violence
level seem to be unrelated to the proximity to the Barrier. Nablus and Hebron, which are
among the governorates less exposed to movement restrictions, are for instance the areas with
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the larger increase in deaths and buildings damaged in these last years (UNOCHA 2010b).
Moreover, the fact that education is affected only in localities that are subject to movement
restrictions (see Table 7) suggests that the estimates cannot be completely explained by the
violence argument.
The DID estimates identified above could also be biased by the economic depression that
took place in Palestine while the Wall was constructed. The results would be biased if this
depression, which certainly negatively affected education, was more severe for exposed cohorts
and in localities affected by the Wall. The PCBS Labor Force Surveys (2002 to 2010) however
suggest that the young population has not suffered more from the economic crisis than the
oldest cohort. Moreover, the 2009 SEFSec survey ask households whether “expenditures in
education have been reduced as a result of economic depression” and the data show that fewer
households did so in “Wall-affected” areas than in non-affected ones (11 percent against 14
percent).
The estimated effect of the Wall would be biased if the construction of the Barrier was
accompanied by measures that had diverging impacts on education in different districts, i.e.
new education law, new schools constructed, government investments in education, foreign aid
in the instruction sector. Reassuringly, no education policy was implemented before SEFSec
survey was conducted.86 The MoEHE school database indicates that the number of schools
did not change from 2003 and 2009 in areas affected by the Wall. Three schools were destroyed
because they were on the Wall path, others were transformed into military barracks but this
reduction in the number of schools is compensated by the construction of new schools.
5.4. Reversion to the Mean
Reversion to the mean is another possible threat to the identification, particularly for drops
out from preparatory school: in the pre-Wall period, the drop out rate was lower in treatment
areas than in control and was decreasing over time while it started increasing in treatment
areas in the post-Wall period, surpassing the control (Figure 3, Panel 2). This change in the
time trend can potentially be explained by reversion to the mean. To alleviate this concern,
Table 7 presents the results for an alternative sample that excludes the localities of Ramallah
and East Jerusalem (Al-Quds) which are the richest areas of the West Bank and are both
part of the treatment group. While the exclusion of these two regions raises the average drop
out level in treatment areas above the control ones in the pre-Wall period and eliminates the
pre-Wall negative trend, the results remain similar. This provides suggestive evidence that
reversion to the mean does not confound my results.
86The only new education regulation was adopted in 2010, after the SEFSec survey was conducted. It
prescribes that all schools in Israel, including the Arabic schools in Jerusalem, pay teachers at least 4,500
shekels per month, they should all satisfy security measures and should provide 20 hours per week of special
assistance to pupils with movement restrictions.
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5.5. Quality of Education
The analysis has focused on the “quantity” of education, but “quality” of education is another
important dimension to consider. The finding that limited mobility negatively affects the
“quantity” of education would be less worrying if this is compensated by an improvement in
the quality of education.
Although I do not have data to formally test this assumption, anecdotal evidence suggests
that the reduction in quantity of education was coupled with a reduction in quality of edu-
cation. To illustrate this, let us take the example of Shireens school, a high-quality private
school that I visited when I was in Anata. The school is located close to the Shufat refugee
camp just outside the Wall that separates Jerusalem from the West Bank, but inside the
administrative boundaries of Jerusalem. Because of the Barrier, students who were coming
from Jerusalem and who are now inside the Wall cannot attend this school anymore. The
reduction in enrolled pupils forced the school to decrease the tuition fees and consequently
lower the quality of education by reducing the number of teachers and accepting more children
per class. Other anecdotal evidences suggest that: (1) school schedules have been interrupted
due to strict opening hours at the Gates and, (2) overcrowding at the Gates has increased the
absence of teachers from school.
6. Conclusions
In this paper, I study the role of movement restrictions in shaping schooling decisions. This
is a relevant topic with implications for economic development and social changes. The
evidence is based on the construction of the West Bank Separation Barrier in 2003 as a
natural experiment. The exposure of an individual to the Barrier is determined both by
her locality of residence and by whether she was in school or about to start school when
the Barrier was built. Using a difference-in-differences approach, the results suggest that
movement restrictions seriously deteriorate schooling levels: the probability of dropping out
from elementary and preparatory school increased by 3.7 and 6 percentage points respectively,
i.e. a 50% increase relative to localities with no movement restrictions, while the proportion
of students who have never attended school increased by 3.6 percentage points.
Heterogeneous effects of movement restrictions on education are detected. Students who
were enrolled and about to finish school when the Wall was constructed did not give up
school while students who were far from school completion were more likely to drop out.
This indicates that the expected cost of staying in school -crossing the checkpoints every day-
increases with the number of years before school completion. The results also show that the
poorest children are the most likely to drop out, suggesting that movement restrictions not
only deteriorate the average education level but may potentially increase income inequality.
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Finally, boys are found to be more affected than girls. Reassuringly, the results are robust to
a number of checks dealing with anticipation effects, migration issues, reversion to the mean
and omitted variables.
Considerations about the specific features of the Palestinian context are important to
inform the external validity of the results. First, Palestine is a part of the world with strong
political tensions and the impact of limited mobility may hence be intensified by political fear,
i.e. the Barrier may have an effect on education not only because of the inability to cross the
Wall but also as a result of the fear of going through checkpoints. Second, the construction of
a Separation Barrier is a specific type of movement restrictions. Examples of other movement
obstacles abound, e.g. countries in conflict or in post-conflict often block access to specific
locations due to security concerns. In the Democratic Republic of Congo and Liberia, for
instance, families were forced to flee their homes and live in refugee camps where there is no
access to colleges. In countries not in conflict, social and religious norms may also limit the
freedom of movement, e.g. imposing women to be accompanied by a male family member
when moving in public spaces.
While this study shows that movement restrictions negatively impact education, more
research is needed in order to better understand the effect of worse education on broader
economic and social impact. This will inform us on the importance of adopting policies
promoting freedom of movement to improve economic and social development.
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Notes:  This map shows the parts of the Barrier that were constructed, under construction, or planned (not yet 
started) in July 2008. It also shows in grey all the areas of the West Bank that are considered affected by the Wall. An 
area is considered “affected” if it is located between the Green Line and the Wall as constructed in 2003 or outside 
but encircled by three or four sides by the Wall. Source: UNOCHA Occupied Palestinian Territory. Map can be found 
at: http://www.ochaopt.org/documents/barrierrouteprojections_july_2008.pdf
Figure 1: Map of the West Bank - July 2008 
Figure 2:  Education System and Cohorts Exposed
or Unexposed to the Wall
Notes: This figure indicates the age cut-offs (age of the respondent in 2003) above which a respondent is considered 
"exposed" to the Wall for three variables: whether a respondent dropped out from Elementary school (enrolled but never 
finished it), dropped out from Preparatory school (enrolled but never finished it), never been enrolled in school (never 
attended school and never enrolled in Elementary school). The educational system in Palestine consists in Elementary 
school from grade 1 to 6 and Preparatory school from grade 7 to 10. Children usually start school at 7 years old. For "drops 
out from Elementary school", children are exposed if they have not yet completed Elementary school in 2003, i.e. 13 years 
old or younger in 2003. For "drops out from Preparatory school", they are exposed if they have not finished Preparatory 
school in 2003, i.e. 17 or younger. For "never enrolled in school", they are exposed if they are too young to have ever 
attended school in 2003, i.e. 7 or younger. 
Figure 3: Education by age, in Treatment and 
Control group
Notes: Figure shows average education outcome variable on Y axis and age of the respondent 
in 2003 on X axis, for treatment and control group separately and for the difference between 
the two groups. An area is in treatment group if it is considered “affected” by the Wall, i.e.  
located between the Green Line and the Wall or outside but encircled by three or four sides 
by the Wall. Areas in the control group are not "affected". The vertical line on the graphs 
indicates the age cut-offs. Agents at the right of this line are "exposed", those at the left 
belong to un-exposed cohort. 3 education variables are considered: whether a respondent 
dropped out from Elementary school (enrolled but never finished it), dropped out from 
Preparatory school (enrolled but never finished it), never been enrolled in school (never 
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Figure 4: Education for Exposed and Unexposed 
cohorts, in Treatment and Control group
Notes: Figure shows average education outcome variable on Y axis and different age-ranges on X axis, for 
treatment and control group separately. An area is in treatment group if it is considered “affected” by the 
Wall, i.e.  located between the Green Line and the Wall or outside but encircled by three or four sides by 
the Wall. Areas in the control group are not "affected". Exposed cohorts are circled with a red circle. Both 
exposed and non-exposed cohorts are divided into a younger and an older cohort.  3 education variables 
are considered: whether a respondent dropped out from Elementary school (enrolled but never finished it), 
dropped out from Preparatory school (enrolled but never finished it), never been enrolled in school (never 
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Figure 5: Smooth difference-in-differences estimates, by Age
Notes: Figure plots "interaction term coefficients" obtained from regressing education outcome variable on age dummies 
interacted with a dummy for treatment group. In the regression, individuals in the oldest unexposed cohort form the 
control group. The coefficients estimate the differential effect of the Barrier for agents aged "a" in 2003 in comparison to 
unexposed agents. Here the coefficient is "smooth": calculates average between coefficients for age "a-1", "a" and "a+1".  
An area is in treatment group if it is considered “affected” by the Wall, i.e.  located between the Green Line and the Wall or 
outside but encircled by three or four sides by the Wall. Areas in the control group are not "affected". 3 education variables 
are considered: whether a respondent dropped out from Elementary school (enrolled but never finished it), dropped out 
from Preparatory school (enrolled but never finished it), never been enrolled in school (never attended school and never 






































Movement restrictions are an obstacle 0.259 0.166 0.000
(0.438) (0.372)
Never enrolled in school 0.080 0.072 0.084
(0.271) (0.258)
Highest level of education completed…
       Elementary school 0.777 0.784 0.398
(0.417) (0.412)
       Preparatory school 0.501 0.528 0.009
(0.500) (0.499)
       Secondary school 0.225 0.239 0.101
(0.418) (0.426)
Drop out from…
       Elementary school 0.071 0.068 0.379
(0.258) (0.251)
       Preparatory school 0.109 0.116 0.253
(0.312) (0.320)
       Secondary school 0.016 0.012 0.111
(0.126) (0.110)
Has a work 0.284 0.275 0.256
(0.451) (0.446)
Monthly household income per capita 493.705 472.954 0.024
(407.088) (732.976)
Food security (scale 1 to 4) 2.829 2.697 0.000
(1.207) (1.201)
Food insecure 0.699 0.613 0.000
(0.459) (0.487)
Number of observations 9433 9433
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics- SEFSec Survey after Matching
Notes: Columns 1 and 2  show respondent-level means and standard deviations in parentheses for treatment and control group. 
Column 3 reports the p-value of the test of equality of means based on robust standard errors. Households in the treatment group 
live in areas “affected” by the Wall, i.e.  located between the Green Line and the Wall or outside but encircled by three or four sides 
by the Wall. Households in the "control group" live in areas defined as  "not affected" by the Wall. While all sample individuals living 
in locations affected by the Wall are included in the “treatment group”,  only a subsample of individuals initially sampled in non-
affected areas are in the control group, i.e. those for whom the distribution of income, age and number of schools is as similar as 
possible to the distribution in the treated group. The matching is done without replacement and with common support. Results are 
robust to using different matching strategies, e.g. 5 nearest neighbors, matching with replacement. "Movement restrictions are an 
obstacle"=1 if respondent indicates that "in general movement restrictions represented an obstacle to me /my family during the past 
6 months".  "Dropped out from Elementary/Preparatory/Secondary school"=1 if student enrolled in the school but did not completing 
it. "Works"=1 if respondent works at least 1 hour per week and earns money for this. "Works"=0 if the respondent is not working, i.e. 
student, retired, looking for a job, disable, does not want to work. "Household income per capita" calculates the household average 
monthly family income during the past 6 months (in NIS) divided by the number of household members. "Food security" takes value 1 
if the respondent is defined "food insecure" , 2 if "vulnerable", 3 if  "marginally secure", 4 if "food secure". A respondent is food 








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Adjusted coefficient -0.004 -0.029 0.001
(0.0178) (0.0357) (0.0194)







    Marginal effect for Exposed Cohort 0.036** 0.061** 0.033**
(0.0144) (0.0249) (0.0160)
    Marginal effect for Unexposed Cohort -0.011 -0.021 -0.007
(0.0196) (0.0279) (0.0186)
Year of birth fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
District fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Individual controls Yes Yes Yes
Notes:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust standard errors. The table reports coefficients for the interaction term between 
"dummy =1 for Exposed cohort" and "dummy=1 for Treatment Group" adjusted following  Ai et al. 2003. Three outcomes 
variables are considered: (a) whether a respondent dropped out from Elementary school, (b) dropped out from Preparatory 
school, (c) never been enrolled in school. For the first two outcome variables, I report the Adjusted coefficient for experiment of 
interest 1 and for control experiment. Within the experiment of interest 1, I report the marginal effect for exposed and 
unexposed cohort separately. For "never enrollment in school", I report Adjusted coefficient for experiment of interest 2 and 
control experiment.  Within the experiment of interest 2, I report the marginal effect for exposed and unexposed cohort 
separately. All specifications control for district and year of birth fixed effects and a list of individual control variables: i.e. 
gender, ownership of an Israeli/Jerusalem ID or not, refugee status, location of the house, distance to the closest school in 
kilometers, number of children in the household, number of parents who work in the household. For "drops out from 
Elementary school", children are exposed if they have not yet completed Elementary school in 2003, i.e. 13 years old or younger 
in 2003. For "drops out from Preparatory school", they are exposed if they have not finished Preparatory school in 2003, i.e. 17 
or younger. For "never enrolled in school", they are exposed if they are too young to have ever attended school in 2003, i.e. 7 or 
younger. An area is in treatment group if it is considered “affected” by the Wall, i.e.  located between the Green Line and the 
Wall or outside but encircled by three or four sides by the Wall. Areas in the control group are not "affected". 
Table 4: Adjusted Difference-in-Differences Estimates
(a) Drop Out from 
Elementary School
(b) Drop Out from 
Preparatory School
(c) Never enrolled 
in school







PART 1: Split sample by areas of the West Bank (North, Center and South)
Subsample = North of the West Bank 1,806
Coefficient 1.264** 1.320*** 1.182**
(0.5620) (0.4423) (0.4787)
Odds Ratio 3.539** 3.108*** 3.259**
(1.9888) (1.1295) (1.5601)
Subsample = Center of the West Bank 1,588
Coefficient -0.272 -1.042 0.268
(0.4045) (0.6961) (0.4697)
Odds Ratio 0.762 0.375* 1.308
(0.3081) (0.1917) (0.6144)
Subsample =  South of the West Bank 834
Coefficient 0.597 0.582 -0.206
(0.4372) (0.5693) (0.6521)
Odds Ratio 1.817 2.135 0.814
(0.7945) (1.0877) (0.5308)
PART 2:  Split sample by movement restriction intensity 
Subsample =  strong intensity (index=1) 1,028
Coefficient 1.058** 1.251*** 1.301**
(0.4146) (0.4746) (0.6260)
(0.9144) (0.6169) (7.3517)
Odds Ratio 2.881** 3.495*** 3.672**
Subsample = medium intensity (index >0 and <1) 1,091
Coefficient 0.591 0.072 2.059**
(0.5063) (0.5741) (0.9383)
Odds Ratio 1.806 1.074 7.835**
Subsample = weak intensity (index=0) 1,009
Coefficient -0.292 0.683 -0.265
(0.5819) (0.4347) (0.4550)
Odds Ratio 0.747 1.979 0.767
(0.4347) (0.8604) (0.3490)
PART 3: Split sample by refugee status
Subsample = respondents with refugee status 1,121
Coefficient 0.061 0.719 0.105
(0.4139) (0.4612) (0.6460)
Odds Ratio 1.063 1.381 1.111
(0.4399) (0.5128) (0.7175)
Subsample = respondents not with refugee status 3,107
Coefficient 1.116*** 0.160 0.527*
(0.3586) (0.4172) (0.3171)
Odds Ratio 3.052*** 1.801* 1.695*
(1.0944) (0.6133) (0.5373)
Control variables
Year of birth fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
District fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Individual controls Yes Yes Yes
Notes:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust standard errors. Logit regressions. The table reports coefficients and odds ratio for the interaction term 
between "dummy =1 of Exposed cohort" and "dummy=1 for Treatment Group". Each regression restricts to a subsample: North, Center or South area of the 
West Bank / areas with weak, medium or strong movement restrictions intensity / refugees and non refugees. An area has weak movement restriction 
intensity if the Mayssun El-Attar Index=0, medium if Mayssun El-Attar Index>0 and <1 and strong if Mayssun El-Attar Index=1. See explanation of the Mayssun 
El-Attar Index in the paper section 4.2. Three outcomes variables are considered: (a) whether a respondent dropped out from Elementary school, (b) dropped 
out from Preparatory school, (c) never been enrolled in school. For the first two outcome variables, I report the  coefficient/ odds ratio for experiment of 
interest 1. For "never enrollment in school", I report coefficient/ odds ratio for experiment of interest 2 . For each of these variables, the specification include 
year of birth and district fixed effects plus a number of individual controls, i.e. gender, ownership of an Israeli/Jerusalem ID or not, refugee status (refugee or 
non-refugee), location of the house (urban, rural or refugee camp), distance to the closest school in kilometers, number of children in the household, number 
of parents who work in the household. An area is in treatment group if it is considered “affected” by the Wall, i.e.  located between the Green Line and the 
Wall or outside but encircled by three or four sides by the Wall. Areas in the control group are not "affected". 
Table 5:  Extended Difference-in-Differences by Subsamples   
(a) Drop Out from 
Elementary School
(b) Drop Out from 
Preparatory School
(c) Never enrolled 
in school







PART 1: Split sample by Food Security
Subsample = Food Insecure 1,609
Coefficient 1.349*** 1.062* 0.238
(0.4961) (0.4312) (0.4427)
Odds Ratio 3.852*** 2.492** 1.269
(1.8721) (1.0880) (0.5619)
Subsample =  Food Secure 2,618
Coefficient 0.233 0.164 0.587
(0.2934) (0.3045) (0.3603)
Odds Ratio 1.262 1.688 1.798
(0.3645) (0.5968) (0.6479)
PART 2:  Split sample by Gender
Subsample = Boys 2,186
Coefficient 0.779** 0.783** 0.750**
(0.3385) (0.3927) (0.3806)
Odds Ratio 2.180** 2.309** 2.116**
(0.7256) (0.8482) (0.8053)
Subsample = Girls 2,186
Coefficient 0.179 0.480 0.226
(0.3571) (0.3447) (0.4047)
Odds Ratio 1.196 1.702 1.254
(0.4273) (0.6734) (0.5074)
Control variables
Year of birth fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
District fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Individual controls Yes Yes Yes
Notes:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust standard errors. Logit regressions. The table reports coefficients and odds ratio for 
the interaction term between "dummy =1 of Exposed cohort" and "dummy=1 for Treatment Group". Each regression restricts to a 
subsample: respondents defined as food secure/ food insecure and buys/girls. A respondent is food secure if  both income and 
consumption are above $4.7/adult equivalent/day.  Three outcomes variables are considered: (a) whether a respondent dropped 
out from Elementary school, (b) dropped out from Preparatory school, (c) never been enrolled in school. For the first two outcome 
variables, I report the  coefficient/ odds ratio for experiment of interest 1. For "never enrollment in school", I report coefficient/ 
odds ratio for experiment of interest 2 . For each of these variables, the specification include year of birth and district fixed effects 
plus a number of individual controls, i.e. gender, ownership of an Israeli/Jerusalem ID or not, refugee status (refugee or non-
refugee), location of the house (urban, rural or refugee camp), distance to the closest school in kilometers, number of children in 
the household, number of parents who work in the household. An area is in treatment group if it is considered “affected” by the 
Wall, i.e.  located between the Green Line and the Wall or outside but encircled by three or four sides by the Wall. Areas in the 
control group are not "affected". 
Table 6:  Extended Difference-in-Differences Estimates by 
Subsamples   











1) Original Sample (as in table 2)
Experiment of interest 1 1.636** 1.796** 1.596*
(0.4106) (0.4250) (0.4414)
Control Experiment 1.044 0.757 1.020
(0.2935) (0.2088) (0.3285)
2) Sample excluding East Jerusalem and Ramallah localities
Experiment of interest 1 1.705** 1.383** 1.691*
(0.4259) (0.2013) (0.4812)
Control Experiment 1.024 0.952 0.933
(0.2828) (0.1682) (0.3090)
3) Sample excluding household heads and wives/husbands.
Experiment of interest 2 1.798** 1.989** 1.609*
(0.4761) (0.6016) (0.4425)
Control Experiment 0.679 0.946 1.120
(0.2816) (0.4703) (0.3683)
Control variables
Year of birth fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
District fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Individual controls Yes Yes Yes
Table 7: Odd Ratios for Alternative Samples  
Notes:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust standard errors. Logit regressions. The table reports odds ratio for the 
interaction term between "dummy =1 of Exposed cohort" and "dummy=1 for Treatment Group". The results are 
presented for 3 samples: full sample (as in table 2), sample excluding East Jerusalem and Ramallah localities, sample 
excluding households heads and their wives/husbands. Three outcomes variables are considered: (a) whether a 
respondent dropped out from Elementary school, (b) dropped out from Preparatory school, (c) never been enrolled 
in school. For each of these variables,  specification includes district/ year of birth fixed effects and a number of 
individual controls, i.e. gender, ownership of an Israeli/Jerusalem ID or not, refugee status, location of the house, 
distance to the closest school in kilometers, number of children in the household, number of parents who work in the 
household. Experiment of interest 1 compares young exposed and unexposed cohorts to each other,  Experiment of 
interest 2 compares old exposed cohort to young unexposed cohort, Control Experiment compares young and old 
unexposed cohorts. For "drops out from Elementary school", children are exposed if they have not yet completed 
Elementary school in 2003, i.e. 13 years old or younger in 2003. For "drops out from Preparatory school", they are 
exposed if they have not finished Preparatory school in 2003, i.e. 17 or younger. For "never enrolled in school", they 
are exposed if they are too young to have ever attended school in 2003, i.e. 7 or younger. An area is in treatment 
group if it is considered “affected” by the Wall, i.e.  located between the Green Line and the Wall or outside but 
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